[nandhu-kumar]

Summary

Extends the Go API test harness (#2357) to two protocol areas it never reached: the per-client
protocol switches eSignet enforces through additionalConfig, and the RFC 7662 token
introspection endpoint newly added through thunderidengine. Both are covered on every plugin —
mock, sunbird, mosipid — and land in the same consolidated HTML report.

Also brings the mosipid plugin's api+e2e coverage against a live, IDA-backed deployment (#2190)
from 75/109 to 116/128 passed — five harness defects a real deployment exposed and fixed (PMS
cookie auth, tab selection, input accumulation across flow steps, OTP replay staleness, PMS→IDA
websub outage vs. propagation-delay misdiagnosis, detailed below) — and adds coverage for whether a
deactivated client is actually locked out, at authorize, token and userinfo, across all
three plugins. That coverage found a live product gap: it isn't.

Area	What it covers	Where
Protocol switches	require_pkce, require_pushed_authorization_requests, dpop_bound_access_tokens — enforced at authorize, /oauth2/par, token and userinfo. A client is registered per combination and the flow that combination demands is driven end to end; negatives point the relying party against what the client requires.	internal/e2e/protocol.go, internal/e2e/dpop.go, data/scenarios/*
Protocol additionalConfig validation	Registration-side allowlisting and type checking of the same keys, plus the update path — no login needed.	data/features/client-mgmt/additional-config.feature
Token introspection (e2e)	/oauth2/introspect against tokens a completed flow has just proven usable: active-token metadata, hint handling, the DPoP cnf.jkt binding, an unissued token, and four client-authentication rejections.	internal/e2e/introspect.go, data/scenarios/*
Token introspection (api)	Endpoint-shape and client-authentication validation reachable without a token or a registered client.	data/features/flow-execute/introspect.feature
Client status / deactivation enforcement	Whether INACTIVE is enforced at authorize/par (before a code is issued), token (redeeming a code from before deactivation) and userinfo (spending a token from before deactivation) — each a separate scenario with a reactivate positive control.	internal/e2e/lifecycle.go, data/features/client-mgmt/client-status.feature, data/features/flow-execute/inactive-client.feature
mosipid live-deployment fixes (#2190)	PMS cookie vs. Bearer auth, login-id tab selection, flow input accumulation, OTP-replay staleness, PMS→IDA websub-outage diagnosis	internal/e2e/e2e.go, internal/esignet/driver.go, internal/wsotp/listener.go, api/steps.go

Everything stays configuration-driven: the new coverage is declared in the per-plugin scenario
JSON and Gherkin, with no code change needed to re-point at another plugin or environment.

---

Issue coverage

Issue	Scope	Status in this PR
#2359 — Add automation testing for introspection endpoint	oauth2/introspect functional validation: active/inactive tokens, hints, client authentication, error contract	Closes — 4 e2e scenarios per plugin spec + 5 api scenarios, live-validated. One product gap found and reported (below).
#2455 — Per-client protocol switch coverage: PKCE, PAR and DPoP	require_pkce, require_pushed_authorization_requests, dpop_bound_access_tokens on the e2e and api surfaces	Closes — 13 e2e scenarios per plugin spec + registration-side validation, live-validated. Its own "mosipid caveat" (whether PMS forwards additionalConfig to eSignet) is now confirmed: it does not — see Product gap #2 below.
#2190 — [api-test] Plugin coverage: mosip (OTP) — conformance + client-mgmt + flow/execute + e2e	Live api+e2e coverage for the mosip plugin against an IDA-backed deployment	Advances, not closes — client-mgmt and flow/execute are green (71/71, 20/22 on the latest esdev run); e2e is unblocked and passing the majority of its scenarios (25/35) for the first time, after fixing the harness defects below. Conformance for this plugin remains out of scope here. Left open; not this PR's call to close.
#2120 (parent)	Four-surface harness; PAR/DPoP scenarios were listed under Phase 5+ as not delivered by #2357	Part of — the PAR/DPoP (FAPI2) scenario item is now delivered. CronJob manifest, report persistence, alerting and JUnit XML remain open.

Closes #2359
Closes #2455
Part of #2120
Part of #2190

Both issues need a maintainer to attach them under #2120 and set label/milestone/assignee — my
account has no write access on this repo, so the sub-issue link and those fields could not be set
from here. #2455's body opens with Parent: #2120, matching the convention #2276/#2278 use.

---

What's covered, in detail

Protocol switches — e2e (13 scenarios per plugin spec)

Scenarios declare client_config (what the client requires) and optionally flow (what the
relying party actually does). Driving the two against each other is how a negative is expressed:
a client requiring PAR, approached directly, must be refused.

• 7 positive combinations through to userinfo: require_pkce, PAR, DPoP, and every pairing
  and the triple.
• 6 negatives: no code_challenge, the plain challenge method, a direct authorize against a
  PAR-required client, a token call with no DPoP proof, a proof from a different key than the one
  bound at PAR, and a DPoP-bound token presented with the Bearer scheme at userinfo.

Clients are pooled by config, so scenarios naming no client_config still share the single
unhardened client the order-dependent consent cases rely on.

This needed the relying-party side of DPoP: proof generation (RFC 9449) over a key kept separate
from the client's registration key, RFC 7638 thumbprints, the PAR pre-step, the DPoP scheme at
userinfo with an ath binding, and the use_dpop_nonce retry at par, token and userinfo.
The proof algorithm is negotiated from dpop_signing_alg_values_supported rather than fixed — esdev
advertises no RS256, so a hardcoded choice is rejected outright.

Protocol additionalConfig validation — api (@client-mgmt)

Allowlist rejection, non-object payload, non-boolean switches, id_token_response_type,
allowed_authorization_scopes, and the update path — asserted against the real MOSIP error envelope
(HTTP 200 + errors[].errorCode, not a 4xx).

Token introspection — e2e (4 scenarios per plugin spec)

Reaching the endpoint meaningfully needs a token the deployment actually issued, so scenarios add an
introspect list to a flow that has already completed through userinfo. Each entry is one POST and
prefixes its own assertions with its name, so a row says which case failed.

A case has two independent axes — which token is submitted (access_token / id_token /
unissued / none) and how the call authenticates (private_key_jwt / no_assertion /
wrong_key / wrong_audience) — and the negatives are written by pointing one axis away from the
positive.

• An issued access token is reported active with client_id, sub, scope, iss, exp and
  iat, and resolves with no hint and under a mismatched hint — RFC 7662 §2.1 makes
  token_type_hint an optimization the server may ignore.
• A DPoP-bound access token reports its cnf.jkt, matching the thumbprint the token carries.
  Without this a resource server consulting introspection instead of reading the token would have no
  way to know a proof of possession is required.
• An unissued token is reported inactive, not as an error (§2.2), and carries no metadata
  (§4) — otherwise introspection becomes an oracle for guessed tokens.
• Four client-authentication and request rejections: no token parameter (400
  invalid_request), a client_id with no assertion, an assertion signed with an unregistered key,
  and an assertion issued for another audience (401 invalid_client).

{{client_id}}, {{issuer}}, {{sub}} and {{dpop_jkt}} are substituted from what the run
obtained, expect_values takes dotted paths (cnf.jkt), and an array member matches on any element
since RFC 7662 lets aud be either. One check is added rather than declared: an active token
whose exp has already passed fails.

Token introspection — api (@flow-execute, 5 scenarios)

Client authentication is validated before the submitted token is looked at, so everything
reachable without a registered client is endpoint-shape validation: a request naming no client and
an empty request (400 invalid_request), a client_id with no assertion and an unverifiable
assertion (401 invalid_client), and the endpoint not being exposed over GET — where a token would
land in access logs.

Unit tests

27 added (protocol_test.go 18, introspect_test.go 9), including an RFC 7638 known-answer
thumbprint test, PS256/PSS verification, the use_dpop_nonce retry handshake, dotted-path member
lookup, and a check that each client-authentication mode produces a materially different request.

Documentation

docs/e2e-scenarios.md gains a Protocol combinations and an Introspection coverage section
(field tables, placeholders, what each needs from the deployment); README.md surface and tag tables
updated.

Client status / deactivation enforcement — e2e + api

The api surface already covered throwing the switch (client-mgmt/client-status.feature, 12
scenarios: casing normalizes but padding does not, empty string and explicit null are invalid
rather than "leave it alone", a patch naming other fields leaves a deactivated client deactivated,
deactivating twice is idempotent). Nothing covered whether eSignet then acts on it.

client_lifecycle in a scenario flips a client's status mid-flow at one of three stages, each a
separate scenario because they fail differently and a deployment could plausibly enforce one without
the others:

Stage	Question	Enforced at
before_authorize	May a deactivated client start an authorization at all?	authorize, or par for a PAR-required client
after_authorize	May a code issued while active still be redeemed?	token
after_token	May a token issued while active still be spent?	userinfo

Each negative is paired with a reactivate positive control — same client, same plumbing, status
restored, flow must complete — so a negative that fails cannot be blamed on the deactivation
machinery itself. A scenario carrying client_lifecycle registers a dedicated client rather than
drawing from the shared pool, since deactivating a pooled client would silently break every later
scenario using that config. flow-execute/inactive-client.feature asks the before_authorize
question again from the api surface directly.

They fail, and that's the finding — see Product gap #2 below.

mosipid — fixes a live, IDA-backed deployment exposed (#2190)

Everything here is config-driven and applies to the mosip plugin only; nothing here touches the
mock/sunbird code paths, which is why the regression check below is a
byte-identical A/B run rather than an assertion.

• PMS wants the admin token as a Cookie, not a Bearer header (KER-ATH-401 otherwise) —
  eSignet's own client-mgmt wants Bearer, so the transport is chosen per target
  (api/steps.go, internal/e2e/e2e.go's createClientViaPMS).
• The login-id tab was never switched. Every identifier tab's submit action is named
  submit_uin; only nextNode says which identifier it actually sends. selectAction took the
  sole non-navigation action and ignored id_type, so a phone number could go out on the UIN tab.
  Fixed with a stage-0 tab correction in internal/esignet/driver.go, keyed on nextNode.
• Flow inputs must accumulate and be re-sent every step, not just the current view's own field.
  Diffed against a working browser session: the UI resends username+captcha_token at every step
  after first collecting them, but the driver was sending only the current view's new field, so
  CredentialsAuthExecutor saw {otp} alone and answered FET-1005 "Invalid credentials" as if the
  OTP were wrong. carriedInputs in driver.go now accumulates across the whole flow.
• The mock-SMTP OTP listener treated replayed history as live. The socket replays recent
  messages to every client that connects; timing by arrival made a stale replayed code look newer
  than the flow waiting for one. internal/wsotp/listener.go now parses the message's own send time
  and falls back to arrival only when it's absent.
• A PMS→IDA websub outage was being misdiagnosed as a client-age propagation delay. The two look
  identical from a single run — a freshly registered client fails IDA-MLC-007 "Send OTP failed", an
  aged one passes — but the mechanism differs, and it changes the fix: propagation is a queue that
  drains on its own; an outage drops the event permanently, and only re-registering the client
  recovers it. Distinguished on esdev by registering a brand-new client and driving submit_uin
  every two minutes for 81 minutes straight through an outage window with no recovery, then again
  once it cleared — new clients synced instantly, stale ones (including one 10 hours old) never did.
  No code changed for this one; it's a diagnosis, recorded in data/config/config.local.json's
  comment block and docs/ so the next person hitting IDA-MLC-007 across the board checks websub
  delivery before waiting it out.

---

Verification

Full run against esignet-thunder1.esdev via
docker compose up --build --abort-on-container-exit --exit-code-from harness, all surfaces,
profile=full:

Surface	Result
conformance/oidcc-test-plan	4 / 37
conformance/fapi2-security-profile-final-test-plan	46 / 56
client-mgmt	32 / 32
flow-execute	11 / 11
e2e	32 / 34 (2 pre-existing gaps: bio, and the id_token introspection mismatch below — no longer parked as known_issue, see below)
ALL	170 total, 125 passed, 33 failed, 4 skipped, 7 errored, 0 known

The previous comparable run on the same target was 161 / 117; the delta is exactly this PR's added
coverage. The conformance numbers are unchanged, so nothing here regressed them. The 33 failures
break down as: 25 oidcc modules blocked by the client-assertion aud check (oidcc-test-plan signs
private_key_jwt with aud = token endpoint per OIDC Core §9, while esignet-service accepts only
the issuer), the bio positive (the harness has no biometric input answer), and the id_token
introspection mismatch below — reclassified from Known to Failed since this run, not re-executed
against esdev, so the other 32 numbers are unchanged from the original run.

The protocol negatives are refused with the specific errors they exist to prove:

Case	Rejection
require_pkce, no challenge	invalid_request — code_challenge is required for this application
require_pkce, plain method	invalid_request — Invalid code_challenge or code_challenge_method
PAR-required, direct authorize	refused, no redirect issued
DPoP-bound, no proof at token	invalid_dpop_proof
DPoP proof from a different key	invalid_grant — DPoP proof key does not match authorization code binding
Bearer at userinfo on a bound token	401 invalid_token — DPoP-bound token must use DPoP scheme

mosipid — api + e2e, esdev + qajava21 PMS/Keycloak (2026-09-02)

Separate target from the table above: mosip plugin, api+e2e only (conformance out of scope),
eSignet on esignet-thunder.esdev.mosip.net, PMS/Keycloak/identity on qajava21 — the deliberate
cross-environment split #2190 anticipates. ./run-all.sh -c data/config/config.mosip.json.

Surface	Result
client-mgmt	71 / 71
flow-execute	20 / 22
e2e	25 / 35
ALL	128 total, 116 passed

Was 83/109 (e2e 5/30) before the fixes above; the PMS→IDA websub outage clearing mid-session
accounts for most of the e2e jump — a controlled same-minute A/B under two partner configs isolated
it from the partner question below (0 IDA-MLC-007 in the whole 128-scenario run, vs. 90 the same
morning before the outage cleared). Of the 12 remaining failures: 5 are the client-status product
gap above (independently caught by both the e2e and the flow-execute surface); 3 are PMS
silently dropping additionalConfig on client registration — see Product gap #2; 2 have no
configured password/biometric answer, not a defect; 1 is the id_token introspection gap this PR
already reports; 1 is the pre-existing uploadCertificate 500.

One partner, nandhu, still fails IDA's kyc-auth with FET-1005 — confirmed by a second full
run under nandhu/policy 72518: e2e 6/35, 29× FET-1005, 0× IDA-MLC-007 (registration and
send-OTP fine, only the OTP submit refused). /partners/nandhu/apikey/status returns
PMS_PMP_009 — no approved API-key/policy mapping. config.local.json uses
mpartner-default-mock-rp-oidcdd/68895 instead, which completed the same suite end to end.

---

Product gap found

1. /oauth2/introspect never reports an id_token active

A freshly issued, unexpired id_token reports active: false — under the id_token hint, the
access_token hint, and no hint at all — while the access token from the same flow reports active.
docs/esignet-openapi.yaml documents the endpoint as taking "an access token or ID token" and lists
id_token in the token_type_hint enum, so this deviates from the published contract.

The test case is kept and reported FAILED, not parked in the report's Known bucket. It was
initially marked known_issue so this one claim-assertion failure would not fail the run; that
marking is removed here on purpose — a tracked gap sitting in Known reads as accepted rather than
urgent, and no issue is yet filed against thunderidengine to make it visible outside this report.
It goes back to known_issue (with the reason string pointed at that issue) once one exists, or to
passing the day the engine honours the documented contract.

2. A deactivated client is not locked out — reproduced on two independent deployments

/oauth2/authorize does not check client status: a client whose own GET /client-mgmt/client/{id}
reports INACTIVE still gets redirected into /signin with a live executionId, and the login,
token exchange and userinfo call all complete normally. INACTIVE is the operator's kill switch
for a relying party that has been retired, compromised or offboarded — this is that switch doing
nothing.

• Local mock deployment: the whole journey (authorize → PAR → token → userinfo) completes
  on a deactivated client.
• esdev (thunder-go), independently: reproduced with raw curl outside the harness, and caught
  by two unrelated code paths at once — the e2e surface's four inactive client negative
  scenarios, and the flow-execute scenario "A deactivated client can no longer start an authorization", which asserts the redirect lands on eSignet's own /error route and instead gets
  /signin.

Not marked known_issue, for the same reason as gap #1 — no thunderidengine/thunder-go issue exists
yet to point the reason string at, and this one is a straightforward lockout bypass rather than an
edge case.

A second, narrower gap surfaced alongside it: PMS's /oidc-clients silently drops
additionalConfig on registration — round-tripping a client with require_pkce/PAR/DPoP set and
reading it back shows the field simply absent, no error. So on the mosipid plugin, clients
registered through PMS for #2455's protocol-switch coverage come back unhardened; the positive
scenarios still pass (an unhardened client accepts a hardened flow without complaint) but the three
negative ones fail, because there is nothing to refuse against. This is the "mosipid caveat" #2455
raised as unconfirmed and is now confirmed — environment-side, not an eSignet bug, and not fixable
from the client-registration path PMS exposes.

---

Also included

• Consent decision payload fix. ConsentExecutor reads a missing top-level approved as false
  and rejects the whole decision with FET-1066, however many per-element approvals it carries — so
  every fresh consent prompt failed and only the stored-consent path worked.
• PS256 signature verification. verifyJWS accepted only RS256, so a deployment publishing
  PS256 keys failed every signed-userinfo and ID-token assertion. Both RSA families are now
  accepted, held to the salt length RFC 7518 fixes PS256 at — the policy signJWS already signed
  under.
• Conformance module driving. Two FAPI2 modules cannot be driven as the happy path:
  user-rejects-authentication waits for error=access_denied at the relying party, which needs
  consent denied and the resulting errorAssertion carried through to the callback, and
  par-ensure-reused-request-uri… aborts if the first visit authenticates, so that visit stops at
  the login page and the same authorize URL is drivable a second time. Both are declared in a
  per-module table rather than branched on inline, and the driver switches they set are restored
  before returning — one Driver is shared across every module, so a leaked DenyAll would
  silently deny consent for the whole run that follows.
• Two rejections the driver could not name. An authorize eSignet refuses sends the browser to
  its own /error route rather than back to the client, so following the hop only fetched HTML and
  failed on it; the errorCode is now surfaced. A step eSignet rejects while leaving the flow
  INCOMPLETE returns the same view again, which the driver re-submitted until maxFlowSteps ran
  out — on the OTP path spending a real attempt per retry, enough to trip a max-attempts lockout.
• Review fixes (CodeRabbit on this PR, two rounds): expect_error_contains added to the three
  PKCE/PAR negatives that could previously pass on an unrelated failure; DPoP nonce retry extended
  to the userinfo call, which alone still used the non-retrying path; an unchecked type assertion
  and two QF1008 selectors in protocol_test.go; the @client-mgmt tag table row; the PS256 salt
  length above, and an MD038 code span in the troubleshooting table. Second round: requireHTTPS
  guards AdminToken against a non-https PMS/eSignet base before createClientViaPMS or the
  client-status calls send it; readClientStatus now rejects a non-2xx read-back instead of trusting
  whatever response.status happens to parse to, matching its sibling setClientStatus; the
  before_authorize inactive-client negative asserted only the generic "login flow failed" prefix
  every driver.Run failure produces, which is exactly how it passed for the wrong reason under the
  nandhu partner above — tightened to the driver's authorize-error-page text, which only that hop
  produces.
• ADMIN_TOKEN opt-in. api's @client-mgmt steps and e2e's client pre-registration both
  required a full Keycloak client-credentials round-trip for a value that a locally started
  esignet-service never inspects (scope middleware only installs when both ISSUER_URL and
  JWKS_URL are set). ADMIN_TOKEN supplies the bearer directly for such a target — an explicit
  opt-in, not a fallback, so a real deployment still requires KEYCLOAK_* and cannot go green on a
  broken IAM. Documented in README.md, docs/configuration.md and .env.example.
• CRLF fix for the harness image. A Windows checkout leaves run-all.sh with CRLF line
  endings, which makes its shebang unresolvable — the container then exits with a bare "no such
  file or directory" naming a script that plainly exists. Normalised in the Dockerfile's own
  RUN, so the image builds regardless of checkout.

---

Not in this PR (tracked under #2120 Phase 5+)

In-cluster Rancher/CronJob manifest, report persistence (S3/PVC) and publishing, failure alerting,
JUnit XML output. Enforcement of an additionalConfig update (as opposed to registration) is
also not covered — verifying it needs a login flow driven against a mutated client, which neither
the api surface nor the current e2e client pool can express.

Summary by CodeRabbit

• New Features

  • Added coverage for PKCE, PAR, DPoP, token introspection, client lifecycle changes, and biometric credentials.
  • Added ADMIN_TOKEN as an alternative authentication method.
  • Added client profile, status, validation, patch, health, and certificate API coverage.

• Bug Fixes

  • Improved OTP freshness handling and secure redirect validation.
  • Reports now count all non-passing modules, including errored results.

• Documentation

  • Expanded configuration, scenario, troubleshooting, and conformance guidance.

• Configuration

  • Conformance runs now default to the full profile.

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Walkthrough

The API test suite adds PKCE, PAR, DPoP, RFC 7662 introspection, client lifecycle checks, admin-token authentication, expanded client-management validation, conformance-driving behavior, report accounting, and runtime support.

Changes

API test suite expansion

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Protocol-aware E2E execution api-test/internal/e2e/*, api-test/internal/esignet/*	E2E scenarios now support per-configuration clients, PKCE, PAR, DPoP proofs and nonces, introspection, lifecycle status changes, rejection assertions, and flow overrides.
Client-management and endpoint coverage api-test/data/features/client-mgmt/*, api-test/data/features/flow-execute/*, api-test/data/features/system-info/*	Feature coverage adds protocol configuration validation, client profiles, field validation, PATCH semantics, status lifecycle, introspection validation, inactive clients, and system-information endpoints.
Scenario definitions and documentation api-test/data/scenarios/*, api-test/docs/*, api-test/README.md	Scenario files and documentation describe protocol combinations, introspection, client deactivation, biometric credentials, throwaway clients, full conformance profiles, and ADMIN_TOKEN.
Authentication and configuration wiring api-test/api/*, api-test/cmd/*, api-test/internal/config/*	Admin authentication accepts explicit tokens, biometric answers are supported, known issues receive a dedicated outcome, discovery passes new endpoints, and the default conformance profile is full.
Conformance, reporting, and runtime support api-test/internal/conformance/*, api-test/internal/report/*, api-test/internal/result/*, api-test/internal/wsotp/*, api-test/internal/httpx/*, api-test/Dockerfile	Conformance driving adds module behavior and visit budgets, reports include all non-passing modules, OTP freshness uses message dates, redirects require HTTPS, and the runtime image handles stage selection and line endings.

Estimated code review effort: 5 (Critical) | ~120 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to 538da

The expanded OAuth test harness adds valuable coverage, but its workflow credential handling and dependency integrity should be hardened, and several assertions can still report misleading results or miss protocol violations. These issues should be resolved or explicitly accepted before merge.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant Scenario
  participant E2ERunner
  participant ClientManagement
  participant Authorization
  participant TokenEndpoint
  participant Introspection
  Scenario->>E2ERunner: resolve client and flow configuration
  E2ERunner->>ClientManagement: register or update client
  E2ERunner->>Authorization: submit PAR or authorization request
  Authorization->>TokenEndpoint: redeem authorization code
  E2ERunner->>TokenEndpoint: send DPoP-bound token request
  E2ERunner->>Introspection: inspect access or ID token

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Suggested reviewers: mohanachandran-s, anushasunkada, jayesh12234, prafulrakhade, zesu22

Poem

Protocol switches wake and gleam
DPoP keys guard the flowing stream
Clients change state, then rise anew
Reports count each tested view
Tokens reveal their fields of light
The harness checks each path just right

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2

❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)

Check name	Status	Explanation	Resolution
Out of Scope Changes check	⚠️ Warning	The pull request includes unrelated changes, including conformance profile and driver behavior, report-counting changes, system-info features, OTP timestamp handling, Docker and workflow updates, and …	Remove the unrelated changes or move them to separate pull requests with their own linked issues. Keep only changes required for introspection coverage, per-client PKCE/PAR/DPoP coverage, and directly necessary harness support.
Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 64.29% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 154 functions across 34 files. (1 skipped…	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

✅ Passed checks (3 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly identifies the primary changes: per-client PKCE, PAR, and DPoP coverage plus the /oauth2/introspect endpoint.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	The changes satisfy #2359 with flow-execute and end-to-end introspection coverage. They satisfy #2455 with additionalConfig validation, protocol-combination scenarios, DPoP proof and nonce handling, A…

Full details: Out of Scope Changes check

Explanation

The pull request includes unrelated changes, including conformance profile and driver behavior, report-counting changes, system-info features, OTP timestamp handling, Docker and workflow updates, and partial-report plumbing. These changes are not required by #2359 or #2455.

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

Docstring coverage is 64.29% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 154 functions across 34 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)

✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1

🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡

• Create stacked PR
• Commit on current branch

🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)

• Create PR with unit tests

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Actionable comments posted: 5

🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents

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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
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minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@api-test/data/features/client-mgmt/additional-config.feature`:
- Around line 295-321: Extend the scenario after the successful PUT assertions
to execute protocol checks for client {{cid}}. Verify authorization without a
code_challenge fails, a direct authorization request without PAR fails, and a
token flow without DPoP proof fails, confirming the updated additionalConfig is
enforced.

In `@api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json`:
- Around line 187-211: Require the three negative scenarios in
api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json lines 187-211 to include
expect_error_contains set to "login flow failed"; apply the same change to the
three corresponding kbi scenarios in
api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json lines 129-153 and otp
scenarios in api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json lines 154-178,
covering pkce none, pkce plain, and use_par false so each test validates
authorize-time rejection.

In `@api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go`:
- Around line 843-855: Update the userinfo request flow around tokenSigner.proof
and r.do to use a GET equivalent of postWithDPoP when DPoP is active, including
handling a use_dpop_nonce response by reading DPoP-Nonce, regenerating the proof
with the nonce, and retrying once. Keep Bearer behavior unchanged, and simplify
the initial DPoP setup so proof generation is handled by the retry-capable
helper.

In `@api-test/internal/e2e/protocol_test.go`:
- Around line 395-407: Update TestDPoPJWKExponentRoundTrips to safely validate
and extract d.jwk["e"] as a string before calling b64urlDecode, failing the test
with a clear message when the member is missing or has the wrong type; simplify
both accesses to the public exponent flagged by QF1008 using the appropriate
promoted field while preserving the existing round-trip assertion.

In `@api-test/README.md`:
- Around line 32-33: Update the `@client-mgmt` tag description in the README tag
table to mention validation coverage for PKCE, PAR, and DPoP protocol
additionalConfig alongside the existing consent configuration coverage.

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• api-test/README.md
• api-test/cmd/e2e/main.go
• api-test/data/features/client-mgmt/additional-config.feature
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json
• api-test/docs/e2e-scenarios.md
• api-test/internal/e2e/crypto.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/dpop.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/protocol.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/protocol_test.go
• api-test/internal/esignet/driver.go

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Inline comments:
In `@api-test/internal/e2e/introspect_test.go`:
- Around line 260-270: Add a negative-control introspection case alongside the
existing inactive case that returns an inactive response containing the field
listed in ExpectAbsent, then assert that the expect_absent validation fails.
Keep the existing unissued-token assertions intact and anchor the change to the
IntrospectCase and run flow.

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📒 Files selected for processing (12)

• api-test/README.md
• api-test/cmd/e2e/main.go
• api-test/data/features/flow-execute/introspect.feature
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json
• api-test/docs/e2e-scenarios.md
• api-test/internal/e2e/crypto.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/introspect.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/introspect_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/protocol_test.go

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Inline comments:
In `@api-test/docs/troubleshooting.md`:
- Line 83: Remove the trailing whitespace inside the inline code span in the
troubleshooting table row beginning with “authorize returned eSignet's error
page,” keeping the surrounding text and Markdown structure unchanged.

In `@api-test/internal/e2e/crypto.go`:
- Around line 190-199: Update the PS256 branch in verifyJWS to use
rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash instead of rsa.PSSSaltLengthAuto, enforcing the RFC
7518 32-byte salt requirement; add a rejection test covering a PS256 JWS signed
with a non-standard salt.

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📒 Files selected for processing (6)

• api-test/docs/troubleshooting.md
• api-test/internal/conformance/run.go
• api-test/internal/conformance/run_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/crypto.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/introspect_test.go
• api-test/internal/esignet/driver.go

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minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@api-test/api/engine_test.go`:
- Around line 19-20: Update adminAuthAvailable in api-test/api/engine_test.go at
lines 19-20 to require KEYCLOAK_TOKEN_URL, KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID, and
KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET together when ADMIN_TOKEN is absent. Apply the equivalent
all-fields-required check in api-test/cmd/cfg/main.go at lines 193-197 using
c.Keycloak.TokenURL, c.Keycloak.ClientID, and c.Keycloak.ClientSecret; both
sites must report authentication as available only for a complete Keycloak
configuration or a present ADMIN_TOKEN.

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• api-test/Dockerfile
• api-test/api/engine_test.go
• api-test/api/steps.go
• api-test/cmd/cfg/main.go
• api-test/cmd/e2e/main.go
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json
• api-test/internal/config/config.go

💤 Files with no reviewable changes (3)

• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json

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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
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minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go`:
- Around line 691-692: Update createClientViaPMS to validate PMSBaseURL before
invoking r.do: require an absolute URL whose scheme is exactly HTTPS, reject
invalid or non-HTTPS values with an error, and return before constructing or
sending the request containing r.AdminToken. Preserve the existing request flow
for valid HTTPS URLs.

In `@api-test/postman/esignet-mosipid.postman_collection.json`:
- Line 302: Update the consent approval request construction to escape the JSON
text stored in consent_decisions before inserting it inside quoted JSON,
matching the handling used for consentPrompt. Ensure the resulting raw request
body remains valid JSON and consent approval succeeds; apply the change at the
consent_decisions storage/insertion flow rather than altering unrelated prompt
handling.

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• api-test/.gitignore
• api-test/api/steps.go
• api-test/data/config/config.mock.json
• api-test/data/features/client-mgmt/client-pms.feature
• api-test/internal/conformance/run.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go
• api-test/internal/esignet/driver.go
• api-test/internal/esignet/driver_test.go
• api-test/internal/wsotp/listener.go
• api-test/internal/wsotp/wsotp_test.go
• api-test/postman/README.md
• api-test/postman/esdev-mosipid.postman_environment.example.json
• api-test/postman/esignet-mosipid.postman_collection.json

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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)

api-test/api/engine_test.go (1)

123-123: 🎯 Functional Correctness | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win

Make the PMS readiness detail match the new admin-auth predicate.

When ADMIN_TOKEN is set and PMS_BASE_URL is missing, the condition at Line 117 still emits this row. The detail at Line 123 says KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET is missing, although that credential is not required on this path. Partial Keycloak configuration can also produce the wrong diagnostic. Update the message to describe PMS_BASE_URL or admin-auth availability.

Proposed fix

-				OutcomeDetail:  "PMS_BASE_URL/KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET not set — PMS-backed client-mgmt needs admin auth plus an onboarded partner+policy",
+				OutcomeDetail:  "PMS_BASE_URL not set or admin auth unavailable — PMS-backed client-mgmt needs PMS_BASE_URL plus complete Keycloak credentials or ADMIN_TOKEN and an onboarded partner+policy",

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In `@api-test/api/engine_test.go` at line 123, Update the PMS readiness detail in
the relevant condition near OutcomeDetail so it reflects the admin-auth
predicate: report missing PMS_BASE_URL or unavailable admin authentication,
without claiming KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET is required. Ensure partial Keycloak
configuration produces an accurate diagnostic.

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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
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Inline comments:
In `@api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json`:
- Line 354: Update the inactive-client negative scenarios in
api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json:354-354,
api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json:295-295, and
api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json:320-320 to assert rejection at
the authorize stage instead of matching the generic “login flow failed” driver
error; update api-test/docs/e2e-scenarios.md:284-286 to document this
stage-specific invariant.

In `@api-test/internal/e2e/lifecycle.go`:
- Around line 169-170: The readClientStatus flow must reject non-2xx GET
responses before decoding response.status, preventing failed read-backs from
passing lifecycle assertions. Add the same status validation used by
setClientStatus before firstErrorCode and status parsing, while preserving the
existing error handling for rejected response bodies.
- Around line 136-137: Update the Runner request flow around Runner.Base and
httpx.NewClient to require an HTTPS base URL and reject redirects that downgrade
from HTTPS to HTTP before transmitting the AdminToken bearer header. Preserve
valid HTTPS requests while preventing cleartext or downgrade requests from
carrying the token.

In `@api-test/README.md`:
- Around line 32-33: Update the Needs column for both the api and e2e entries to
state that Keycloak admin credentials or ADMIN_TOKEN can satisfy the
prerequisite, while preserving the other existing requirements.

---

Outside diff comments:
In `@api-test/api/engine_test.go`:
- Line 123: Update the PMS readiness detail in the relevant condition near
OutcomeDetail so it reflects the admin-auth predicate: report missing
PMS_BASE_URL or unavailable admin authentication, without claiming
KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET is required. Ensure partial Keycloak configuration
produces an accurate diagnostic.

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• api-test/README.md
• api-test/api/engine_test.go
• api-test/api/steps.go
• api-test/data/features/client-mgmt/client-status.feature
• api-test/data/features/flow-execute/inactive-client.feature
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json
• api-test/docs/e2e-scenarios.md
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/lifecycle.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/lifecycle_test.go

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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go`:
- Around line 356-365: Update the AdminToken validation in the registration flow
to reject configurations where TLS verification is disabled, before issuing
AdminToken requests. Use the existing TLSVerify setting alongside the
requireHTTPS checks, and return registrationFailureRows with the established
validation error path; preserve the current URL checks and behavior for verified
configurations.
- Around line 277-280: Configure the shared HTTP client’s CheckRedirect handler
to reject any redirect target whose URL scheme is not https, while preserving
normal HTTPS redirects. Add a regression test verifying that an HTTP redirect
hop does not receive credential-bearing requests, using the existing client and
redirect-test helpers.

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• api-test/README.md
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-mosip.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios-sunbird.json
• api-test/data/scenarios/e2e-scenarios.json
• api-test/docs/e2e-scenarios.md
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/lifecycle.go

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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)

api-test/api/engine_test.go (1)

107-107: 🎯 Functional Correctness | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win

Report the actual missing PMS/admin prerequisite.

Line 107 now emits this row when either PMS_BASE_URL or admin authentication is missing, but Line 113 still reports PMS_BASE_URL/KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET not set. That message is incorrect when only one prerequisite is missing, especially when ADMIN_TOKEN satisfies admin authentication. Build the detail from the same two predicates.

Proposed fix

+		missing := make([]string, 0, 2)
+		if os.Getenv("PMS_BASE_URL") == "" {
+			missing = append(missing, "PMS_BASE_URL")
+		}
+		if !adminAuthAvailable() {
+			missing = append(missing, "admin authentication")
+		}
 		if strings.EqualFold(plugin, "mosip") &&
-			(os.Getenv("PMS_BASE_URL") == "" || !adminAuthAvailable()) {
+			len(missing) > 0 {
 			rows = append(rows, Envelope{
 				Surface:        "client-mgmt",
 				Plugin:         plugin,
 				Module:         "create-update-client-pms (not run)",
 				HarnessOutcome: "ENV_NOT_READY",
-				OutcomeDetail:  "PMS_BASE_URL/KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET not set — PMS-backed client-mgmt needs admin auth plus an onboarded partner+policy",
+				OutcomeDetail:  strings.Join(missing, ", ") + " missing — PMS-backed client-mgmt needs admin auth plus an onboarded partner+policy",
 			})
 		}

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minimal, and validate.

In `@api-test/api/engine_test.go` at line 107, Update the prerequisite reporting
around the PMS_BASE_URL/adminAuthAvailable condition so the emitted detail
identifies exactly which prerequisite is missing; build the message from those
same two predicates, including ADMIN_TOKEN-backed authentication, rather than
always reporting PMS_BASE_URL/KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET as unset.

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only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@api-test/internal/e2e/dpop.go`:
- Line 24: Update chooseDPoPAlg to return a harness capability error when
discovery’s dpop_signing_alg_values_supported contains neither PS256 nor RS256;
remove the fallback to defaultDPoPAlg in that case, while preserving selection
of the first mutually supported algorithm.

In `@api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go`:
- Around line 759-762: Update readAdditionalConfig to validate status is
successful (2xx) before json.Unmarshal and returning
resp.Response.AdditionalConfig; reject non-2xx responses so
patchAdditionalConfig cannot accept error payloads as valid read-backs, while
preserving the existing parse-error handling for successful responses.

---

Outside diff comments:
In `@api-test/api/engine_test.go`:
- Line 107: Update the prerequisite reporting around the
PMS_BASE_URL/adminAuthAvailable condition so the emitted detail identifies
exactly which prerequisite is missing; build the message from those same two
predicates, including ADMIN_TOKEN-backed authentication, rather than always
reporting PMS_BASE_URL/KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET as unset.

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📒 Files selected for processing (24)

• api-test/api/engine_test.go
• api-test/api/steps.go
• api-test/cmd/cfg/main.go
• api-test/cmd/e2e/main.go
• api-test/internal/config/config.go
• api-test/internal/conformance/run.go
• api-test/internal/conformance/run_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/dpop.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/e2e_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/introspect.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/introspect_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/lifecycle.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/lifecycle_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/pms_additionalconfig_test.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/protocol.go
• api-test/internal/e2e/protocol_test.go
• api-test/internal/esignet/driver.go
• api-test/internal/esignet/driver_test.go
• api-test/internal/report/html.go
• api-test/internal/report/html_test.go
• api-test/internal/result/result.go
• api-test/internal/wsotp/listener.go
• api-test/internal/wsotp/wsotp_test.go

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🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents

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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/push-trigger.yml:
- Line 217: Update the workflow dependency references for actions/checkout,
actions/setup-java, actions/cache, actions/upload-artifact, actions/setup-go,
and mosip/kattu to verified immutable 40-character commit SHAs, preserving or
adding comments that identify the corresponding versions.
- Line 217: Update the actions/checkout@v4 step to disable credential
persistence by configuring persist-credentials as false; do not alter other
workflow behavior.

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