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fix(tool_google_workspace): make check_connection actually probe the API - #1700

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dylan-savage merged 4 commits into
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madhumitha-chandrasekaran-1:fix/RR-1694-check-connection-live-probe
Sep 3, 2026
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dylan-savage merged 4 commits into
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madhumitha-chandrasekaran-1:fix/RR-1694-check-connection-live-probe

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@madhumitha-chandrasekaran-1 madhumitha-chandrasekaran-1 commented Jul 28, 2026 •

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Summary

check_connection for gmail/drive/docs/sheets derived connection_ok entirely
from local checks (client object constructed, token's claimed scopes look
right) — it never called Google. calendar was the only service with a live
probe wired. That's why a disabled Google API on the caller's project was
invisible: connection_ok: true while every real call 403'd with
accessNotConfigured.

  • Wire a live probe for gmail (users().getProfile), drive (about().get),
    and docs/sheets (get() against a made-up resource id, swallowing the
    expected 404 — neither API has a list/about endpoint to probe cheaply).
  • _check_connection_impl no longer defaults connection_ok to True when
    no probe runs; it now reports 'unknown'. Also fixes a latent bug where the
    scope-coverage check (connection_ok and covered) could silently coerce
    that sentinel back to a bool.
  • execute() now attaches the structured Google reason code (e.g.
    accessNotConfigured vs forbidden vs rateLimitExceeded) to raised
    errors, surfaced as errorReason in the diagnostic output.
  • Updated README diagnostics bullets for the co-located docs contract.

Closes #1694

Update: review round

Per @joshuadarron's review:

  • _structured_errors/_error_reason_code only parsed the legacy
    error.errors[] shape (Gmail, Drive). Sheets and Docs are One Platform
    APIs and carry the reason in error.details[] as a google.rpc.ErrorInfo
    instead, with no errors[] array at all — so a disabled Sheets/Docs API
    (the actual tool_google_workspace: connection_ok reports true when the Google API is disabled #1694 scenario) never got an errorReason. Now parses both
    shapes, with a further fallback to the coarser error.status (e.g.
    PERMISSION_DENIED) when even ErrorInfo is absent. _is_rate_limit_403
    now also normalizes SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE ErrorInfo reasons.
  • calendar's tool description and README now use the same "live probe +
    scope coverage" wording this PR already applied to the other four
    services.
  • Raised the probe-error truncation cap (200 → 500 chars) so the actionable
    guidance clause isn't cut mid-sentence.
  • A scope-check failure no longer overwrites a probe failure's error
    message — it now reports separately as scopeError.

Test plan

  • pytest nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/ — 365 passed, 27 skipped
    (skipped tests require live Gmail OAuth creds or optional deps not
    installed in this test env, unrelated to this change)
  • ruff check / ruff format --check clean
  • Live-verified against real Google servers: built and ran the engine
    locally, then called check_connection with a syntactically-valid but
    fake OAuth token (httplib2 debug logging on). Confirmed a real HTTPS
    round-trip to gmail.googleapis.com and a genuine 401 from Google,
    with connection_ok correctly flipping to false. Re-ran the identical
    script against the pre-fix code (via a temporary git stash of just
    these two files) to confirm it silently returned connection_ok: true
    with zero network traffic — the exact bug in the issue.
    Note: this live-network run covered Gmail only; the drive/docs/sheets
    probes are exercised against mocks (including a fabricated
    error.details[] body reproducing the disabled-Sheets scenario above),
    not a real API call.

Summary by CodeRabbit

  • New Features

    • Added live connectivity checks for Google Calendar, Docs, Drive, Gmail, and Sheets.
    • Diagnostics now verify OAuth scope coverage and report connection status, performed checks, and detailed error reasons.
    • Improved error messages for invalid tokens, disabled APIs, configuration issues, rate limits, and quotas.
  • Documentation

    • Updated tool descriptions and guides to explain connectivity checks and scope verification.
  • Tests

    • Added coverage for successful probes, expected not-found responses, scope issues, and configuration failures.

connection_ok was derived only from local checks (client constructed,
token scopes claimed) for gmail/drive/docs/sheets, since check_connection
called _check_connection_impl() without a probe. calendar was the only
service with a live probe wired, so a disabled Google API on the caller's
project was invisible everywhere else — connection_ok: true while every
real call 403'd.

- Wire a live probe for gmail (users().getProfile), drive (about().get),
  and docs/sheets (a made-up-id get(), swallowing the expected 404 since
  neither API has a list/about endpoint to probe cheaply).
- _check_connection_impl no longer defaults to True when no probe runs;
  it reports 'unknown' instead, and fixes a bug where the scope-coverage
  check could silently coerce that sentinel back to a bool.
- execute() now attaches the structured Google reason code (e.g.
  accessNotConfigured vs forbidden vs rateLimitExceeded) to raised
  errors, surfaced as errorReason.

Closes rocketride-org#1694
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉

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📒 Files selected for processing (7)
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/calendar/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/calendar/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/google_client.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/docs/test_docs.py
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  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/test_google_client.py

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

Google Workspace connection diagnostics now perform service-specific API probes, report unknown status when no probe runs, validate OAuth scope coverage, and surface structured API error reasons across Docs, Drive, Gmail, Sheets, and Calendar.

Changes

Google Workspace diagnostics

Layer / File(s) Summary
Structured Google API errors
nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/google_client.py, nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/test_google_client.py
Structured error reasons now support legacy and One Platform responses, rate-limit detection, 403 messages, exception metadata, and fallback status parsing.
Connection-check status and scope reporting
nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/IInstance.py, nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/{docs,sheets}/...
Diagnostics track executed checks, distinguish verified and unknown states, validate user-token scopes, preserve probe errors, and report malformed token data under scopeError.
Service probes and validation
nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/{docs,drive,gmail,sheets,calendar}/..., nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/{docs,drive,gmail,sheets}/...
Service diagnostics invoke live API probes, document user OAuth and service-account behavior, and test successful, 404, unauthorized, and API-configuration responses.

Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~30 minutes

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to e3842

Connection checks now perform live Google API probes and expose provider reason codes for failures; the supplied checks pass, so no actionable merge-blocking risk remains after normal checks and review.

Sequence Diagram(s)

sequenceDiagram
  participant check_connection
  participant _check_connection_impl
  participant GoogleWorkspaceAPI
  participant token_scope_report
  participant diagnostics

  check_connection->>_check_connection_impl: provide service-specific probe
  _check_connection_impl->>GoogleWorkspaceAPI: execute live API probe
  GoogleWorkspaceAPI-->>_check_connection_impl: success, 404, or structured error
  _check_connection_impl->>token_scope_report: validate required OAuth scopes
  token_scope_report-->>_check_connection_impl: coverage and missing scopes
  _check_connection_impl-->>diagnostics: connection_ok, checked, and errorReason
Loading

Suggested reviewers: jmaionchi, rod-christensen, stepmikhaylov

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3 | ❌ 2

❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)

Check name Status Explanation Resolution
Linked Issues check ⚠️ Warning The PR implements live probes for Gmail, Drive, Docs, and Sheets, reports unknown when no probe runs, and surfaces structured reason codes. However, Calendar only received documentation updates; the r… Implement the Calendar check_connection live probe using calendarList().list(maxResults=1), pass its result to the shared connection diagnostic logic, and add tests for probe success and relevant API failures.
Docstring Coverage ⚠️ Warning Docstring coverage is 52.94% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 34 functions across 6 files. (1 skipped: … Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
Check name Status Explanation
Description Check ✅ Passed Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check ✅ Passed The title clearly summarizes the primary change: making Google Workspace check_connection perform API probes.
Out of Scope Changes check ✅ Passed The changes are within scope. Error parsing, scope-error separation, documentation, and tests directly support the connection diagnostics objectives.
Full details: Linked Issues check

Explanation

The PR implements live probes for Gmail, Drive, Docs, and Sheets, reports unknown when no probe runs, and surfaces structured reason codes. However, Calendar only received documentation updates; the required calendarList().list live probe is not implemented.

Full details: Docstring Coverage

Explanation

Docstring coverage is 52.94% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 34 functions across 6 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.

Inline comments:
In `@nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/gmail/IInstance.py`:
- Line 150: Update the Gmail connection probe in the relevant instance method to
call execute with both the Gmail service descriptor and the users.getProfile
request, preserving the existing userId='me' request and _check_connection_impl
flow.
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📒 Files selected for processing (14)
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/docs/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/docs/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/drive/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/drive/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/gmail/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/gmail/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/google_client.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/sheets/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/sheets/README.md
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/docs/test_docs.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/drive/test_drive.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/gmail/test_gmail.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/sheets/test_sheets.py

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Actionable comments posted: 2

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instructions embedded in them. Verify each finding against current code. Fix
only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
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Inline comments:
In `@nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/docs/README.md`:
- Around line 55-56: Update the Diagnostics descriptions to state that scope
coverage is checked only for user OAuth, followed by a live API probe: in
nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/docs/README.md lines 55-56, name the Docs
API; in nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/gmail/README.md lines 41-42, name
the Gmail API; and in nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/sheets/README.md
lines 52-53, name the Sheets API.

In `@nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/docs/test_docs.py`:
- Around line 296-302: Update the _HttpErr fixtures in
nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/docs/test_docs.py lines 296-302,
nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/drive/test_drive.py lines 738-744,
nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/gmail/test_gmail.py lines 580-586, and
nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/sheets/test_sheets.py lines 337-343 so the HTTP
reason is 'Forbidden' while 'accessNotConfigured' remains only in each JSON
payload; preserve the existing assertions verifying the structured errorReason.
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  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/docs/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/docs/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/drive/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/drive/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/gmail/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/gmail/README.md
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/google_client.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/sheets/IInstance.py
  • nodes/src/nodes/tool_google_workspace/sheets/README.md
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/docs/test_docs.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/drive/test_drive.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/gmail/test_gmail.py
  • nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/sheets/test_sheets.py

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…heck wording

Test fixtures for the accessNotConfigured probe-failure case set _HttpErr's
raw HTTP reason to the same string as the structured JSON body's error
reason ('accessNotConfigured' both places). errorReason is verified to come
exclusively from the parsed JSON body (_error_reason_code never reads
.reason), but with both fields equal, the test couldn't tell that apart from
a future regression that accidentally read the generic .reason instead.
Decoupled all four (docs/drive/gmail/sheets): .reason is now 'Forbidden',
'accessNotConfigured' stays only in the JSON payload. Verified by temporarily
making _error_reason_code read exc.reason directly -- all four then fail
with 'Forbidden' != 'accessNotConfigured' as expected, confirming they'd
catch that exact regression; reverted and confirmed the real implementation
passes all four again.

README diagnostics bullets (docs/drive/gmail/sheets) said check_connection
"verifies that granted OAuth scopes cover the configured access tier and
probes the API" as one combined behavior. _check_connection_impl runs the
live probe unconditionally regardless of auth type, but only runs
token_scope_report inside `if auth_type == 'user':` -- service-account
connections get probed but never get a scope check (there's no per-user
grant to check). Reworded to state the two facts separately with their
actual conditions.

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Checked this out and ran it: pytest nodes/test/tool_google_workspace/ → 353 passed, 20 skipped, matching the test plan. The core fix is real and correctly built — execute is functools.partial(google_client.execute, SERVICE) in each service's client.py, so the single-arg probe calls are right; err.status is set on every non-retried path, so the docs/sheets 404 swallow works; the probe id is a well-formed 44-character Docs/Sheets id, so a genuine notFound (not a malformed-id 400) is what it will hit; and dropping connection_ok and covered in favor of an explicit False correctly stops the 'unknown' sentinel from being coerced.

Two things to fix before merge.

1. _error_reason_code only parses the legacy error shape, so it misses the case this PR is about — on Sheets and Docs

_structured_errors reads error.errors[] only. That is the legacy Discovery-style body Gmail and Drive return, and the tests fabricate exactly that shape. Sheets and Docs are One Platform APIs: their SERVICE_DISABLED / permission responses carry the reason in error.details[] as an ErrorInfo, with error.status alongside — no errors[] array at all.

Ran a realistic disabled-Sheets body through this branch's own parser:

body = {'error': {'code': 403,
                  'message': 'Google Sheets API has not been used in project 123456789 before or it is disabled.',
                  'status': 'PERMISSION_DENIED',
                  'details': [{'@type': 'type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo',
                               'reason': 'SERVICE_DISABLED', 'domain': 'googleapis.com', ...}]}}
structured errors parsed: []
reason code parsed: None

So for a disabled Sheets or Docs API — the headline scenario in #1694 — errorReason is never set, and the 403 message renders as Sheets API 403 (forbidden): ..., which actively names the wrong cause. connection_ok still correctly flips to False, so this is a partial miss rather than a regression, but "attaches the structured Google reason code (e.g. accessNotConfigured)" from the PR summary does not hold for two of the four services you just wired probes into.

Worth also parsing error.details[] entries with an ErrorInfo @type (and falling back to error.status) in _structured_errors / _error_reason_code, and adding a test that fabricates a details[]-shaped body. Right now nothing in the suite exercises that shape, which is why the gap is invisible in CI. This is also why _is_rate_limit_403 should keep its substring fallback — worth a comment noting it carries the new-shape cases until the parser handles them.

2. calendar is now the odd one out

calendar/IInstance.py:161 has had a probe all along, but its tool description (:155) still reads "Returns connection_ok: true when the required scopes are present", and calendar/README.md:52 still says check_connection "verifies that granted OAuth scopes cover the configured access tier". Those are the exact sentences this PR rewrote for the other four services, and calendar is now the only one whose docs undersell what it does. Same one-line treatment as gmail/drive/docs/sheets.

Nits

  • The 200-char truncation now eats the new guidance. The 403 message is 403 characters; out['error'] = str(exc)[:200] (IInstance.py:119) cuts it mid-sentence at "…with the required", so the whole accessNotConfigured clause never reaches the caller — and per finding 1, on Sheets/Docs there is no errorReason key to compensate. Either lead with the most actionable clause or raise the cap for this path.
  • Scope-check failure clobbers the probe's error. If the probe fails and token_scope_report then raises, out['error'] is overwritten with invalid user token data: … (IInstance.py:137), losing the probe's message. Appending, or using a separate key, keeps both.
  • Live verification covered gmail only. The test plan's real-network run was Gmail with a fake token; drive/docs/sheets probes are exercised only against mocks. Not blocking — the code reads correctly — but worth saying explicitly in the PR body so nobody reads it as all four being live-checked.

The connection_ok: 'unknown' design is right, and the reasoning in the docstring is the correct instinct. Happy to re-approve once the reason-code parser covers both error shapes and calendar's docs catch up.

…alendar docs drift

_error_reason_code only read the legacy error.errors[] body (Gmail,
Drive). Sheets and Docs are One Platform APIs and carry the reason
in error.details[] as a google.rpc.ErrorInfo instead, with no
errors[] array at all -- so a disabled Sheets/Docs API, the actual
rocketride-org#1694 scenario, never got an errorReason. Now parses both shapes,
falling back further to the coarser error.status when even
ErrorInfo is absent. _is_rate_limit_403 normalizes the
SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE ErrorInfo reasons to match its existing set.

Also:
- calendar's tool description and README now use the same "live
  probe + scope coverage" wording already applied to the other four
  services.
- raise the probe-error truncation cap (200 -> 500 chars) so the
  actionable guidance clause isn't cut mid-sentence.
- a scope-check failure no longer overwrites a probe failure's
  error message; it now reports separately as scopeError (with the
  two tests that asserted the old key updated to match).
@nihalnihalani

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I re-checked the bug on develop: gmail/IInstance.py#L149, drive#L165, docs#L96 and sheets#L97 all still call _check_connection_impl() with no probe, and IInstance.py#L91 still derives connection_ok from self._svc() is not None. tool_google_workspace has not changed since #1570, so this is unfixed.

Both of @joshuadarron's blockers from 2026-08-25 look closed at e384299: _structured_errors now reads error.details[] ErrorInfo alongside error.errors[] with an error.status fallback, and calendar's tool description and README were brought in line. His two nits are closed too — the error truncation went from 200 to 500 characters, and the scope-check failure writes a separate scopeError key instead of overwriting the probe's message. CI OK is green. The standing review state is still CHANGES_REQUESTED from before that push, so a re-review request would help.

The other thing to settle is that #1704 and #1707 change the same check_connection code, all three declaring fixes #1694. From the diffs: this PR wires probes for all five services and parses both Google error-body shapes; #1707 wires gmail+drive and has unprobed services report connection_ok: 'unknown'; #1704 wires gmail+drive with a plain bool. Which shape the repo wants is a maintainer call, but two pieces from the others look worth having whichever way it goes:

#2037 rewrites the same execute() error-wrapping block in google_client.py as well, so whichever of the four lands first forces a rebase on the rest.

@dylan-savage
dylan-savage dismissed joshuadarron’s stale review September 3, 2026 20:38

Dismissing Josh's requested review as both of his blockers + all three of his nits were addressed in the latest commit.

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Approving.

Verified on e384299: 355 passed, 26 skipped, ruff check and ruff format --check clean, all CI green.

Why this is the right fix. connection_ok was derived from "did the client object construct" plus an inspection of the token's claimed scopes, neither touches the network, so a project with the API switched off reported connection_ok: true while every real call 403'd. This wires a real probe for gmail, drive, docs and sheets, and brings calendar's docs in line.

Two follow-ups, neither blocking:

  1. The 500-char cap still clips the guidance it was raised to protect — with Google's real SERVICE_DISABLED detail the assembled 403 message is 667 chars, so it ends mid-sentence before the accessNotConfigured/SERVICE_DISABLED clause. Cap detail, not the assembled string. Degrades rather than misleads, since errorReason still carries the diagnosis.
  2. The docs/sheets probe swallows any 404 as proof of reachability. Tighten to exc.status == 404 and getattr(exc, 'reason_code', None) in (None, 'notFound', 'NOT_FOUND') so a gateway or stale-discovery 404 can't read as healthy.

Superseded PRs: Closing #1704 and #1707. This is a strict superset of #1704 and #1707, it lands the same drive and gmail probes plus docs and sheets, keeps #1707's connection_ok: 'unknown' honesty framing, and is the only one whose error parser handles the One Platform shape that Sheets and Docs actually return.

@dylan-savage
dylan-savage merged commit 65a2e13 into rocketride-org:develop Sep 3, 2026
25 checks passed
erichanwang pushed a commit to erichanwang/rocketride-server that referenced this pull request Sep 7, 2026
…API (rocketride-org#1700)

* fix(tool_google_workspace): make check_connection actually probe the API

connection_ok was derived only from local checks (client constructed,
token scopes claimed) for gmail/drive/docs/sheets, since check_connection
called _check_connection_impl() without a probe. calendar was the only
service with a live probe wired, so a disabled Google API on the caller's
project was invisible everywhere else — connection_ok: true while every
real call 403'd.

- Wire a live probe for gmail (users().getProfile), drive (about().get),
  and docs/sheets (a made-up-id get(), swallowing the expected 404 since
  neither API has a list/about endpoint to probe cheaply).
- _check_connection_impl no longer defaults to True when no probe runs;
  it reports 'unknown' instead, and fixes a bug where the scope-coverage
  check could silently coerce that sentinel back to a bool.
- execute() now attaches the structured Google reason code (e.g.
  accessNotConfigured vs forbidden vs rateLimitExceeded) to raised
  errors, surfaced as errorReason.

Closes rocketride-org#1694

* test,docs(tool_google_workspace): decouple test fixtures, fix scope-check wording

Test fixtures for the accessNotConfigured probe-failure case set _HttpErr's
raw HTTP reason to the same string as the structured JSON body's error
reason ('accessNotConfigured' both places). errorReason is verified to come
exclusively from the parsed JSON body (_error_reason_code never reads
.reason), but with both fields equal, the test couldn't tell that apart from
a future regression that accidentally read the generic .reason instead.
Decoupled all four (docs/drive/gmail/sheets): .reason is now 'Forbidden',
'accessNotConfigured' stays only in the JSON payload. Verified by temporarily
making _error_reason_code read exc.reason directly -- all four then fail
with 'Forbidden' != 'accessNotConfigured' as expected, confirming they'd
catch that exact regression; reverted and confirmed the real implementation
passes all four again.

README diagnostics bullets (docs/drive/gmail/sheets) said check_connection
"verifies that granted OAuth scopes cover the configured access tier and
probes the API" as one combined behavior. _check_connection_impl runs the
live probe unconditionally regardless of auth type, but only runs
token_scope_report inside `if auth_type == 'user':` -- service-account
connections get probed but never get a scope check (there's no per-user
grant to check). Reworded to state the two facts separately with their
actual conditions.

* fix(tool_google_workspace): parse the One Platform error shape, fix calendar docs drift

_error_reason_code only read the legacy error.errors[] body (Gmail,
Drive). Sheets and Docs are One Platform APIs and carry the reason
in error.details[] as a google.rpc.ErrorInfo instead, with no
errors[] array at all -- so a disabled Sheets/Docs API, the actual
rocketride-org#1694 scenario, never got an errorReason. Now parses both shapes,
falling back further to the coarser error.status when even
ErrorInfo is absent. _is_rate_limit_403 normalizes the
SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE ErrorInfo reasons to match its existing set.

Also:
- calendar's tool description and README now use the same "live
  probe + scope coverage" wording already applied to the other four
  services.
- raise the probe-error truncation cap (200 -> 500 chars) so the
  actionable guidance clause isn't cut mid-sentence.
- a scope-check failure no longer overwrites a probe failure's
  error message; it now reports separately as scopeError (with the
  two tests that asserted the old key updated to match).

---------

Co-authored-by: madhumithachandrasekaran31 <madhumitha2110549@ssn.edu.in>
dk-rocketride added a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 21, 2026
* fix(client-python): cli unicode output on non-unicode consoles (#2119)

* fix(client-python): cli pipeline path task subscription (#2120)

* fix(client-typescript): cli process import for signal handlers (#2121)

* test(client-python, client-typescript): cli coverage (#2123)

* chore: vscode settings (#2131)

* feat(depends): cache the satisfied verdict so cold processes skip the uv resolve (#2126)

* feat(depends): cache the satisfied verdict so cold processes skip the uv resolve

`_processed` only spans one process, so every cold engine process re-ran the
uv dry-run for each requirements file and, on a warm machine, only learned
that everything was already installed — 20-40s behind the engine-global lock.

Persist that verdict under <engine cache>/satisfied/, one file per
requirements file, keyed by everything the resolve consults: the requirements
file, the compiled constraints/overrides/excludes, the interpreter and the
installed dist-info set. A matching key skips the dry-run and the install; any
change reruns them. Lock semantics are unchanged.

Fixes #2089

* fix(depends): fingerprint files pulled in through -r/-c in the verdict key

A change inside an included requirements file left the verdict key unchanged (CodeRabbit on #2126). The key now digests the full include closure, resolved relative to each including file; adds regression tests and docstrings on the new tests.

* fix(depends): join backslash-continued lines before scanning requirement includes

pip and uv treat a trailing backslash as a line continuation, so a continued -r/-c directive was invisible to _requirements_closure (CodeRabbit on #2126). Join continuations before matching; adds a regression test.

* fix(depends): treat an unreadable or unwritable verdict cache as a miss, never a failure

_save_verdict runs on the success path, so an OSError from the cache directory turned a successful resolve or install into a failed depends(); the read side had the same hole via _load_stored_hash. Both are now best-effort, like the progress sidecar (CodeRabbit on #2126).

* fix(depends): never cache a verdict the key cannot compute honestly

Review on #2126 found two ways the cache fails wrong. A non-UTF-8 included file raised UnicodeDecodeError out of _requirements_closure and hard-failed node startup — new, since an included file was previously read only by uv. And an include path with a space captured a name that does not exist, so the real file was never fingerprinted and an edit to it kept a satisfied verdict: a silent stale hit. The decode is now replace-on-error, quoted paths parse, and _verdict_key returns None whenever an input is invisible to it, which degrades to resolving every time. Adds _VERDICT_SCHEMA so a change to the resolve's own arguments retires old verdicts, and makes --rebuild-cache clear the verdicts so a bad state is recoverable without a redeploy.

* fix(depends): refuse the key when site-packages cannot be listed

_installed_fingerprint hashed an empty list on OSError, which is a stable digest — the key would stop noticing installs and every verdict would stay satisfied for ever. It now returns None and _verdict_key refuses, so the failure degrades to resolving. bootstrap() creates the directory before any key is computed, so this cannot fire on the real path.

* fix(depends): verify the verdict cache was actually cleared, and gate on isfile

--rebuild-cache reported a cleared cache even when the directory survived: removeDir returns false and only warns when it is in use (EPERM/EBUSY), so a surviving verdict left depends() skipping the re-resolve the flag exists to force (CodeRabbit on #2126). The task now confirms the directory is gone and fails loudly if it is not, checked on the directory rather than on removeDir's return value, which reports success for an absent directory too. Also takes the review's note that _verdict_key gated on os.path.exists, so an include naming a directory passed the gate and then digested to '' - a stable key over an unreadable input, the shape the refusal exists to prevent.

* seo(docs): add Bing Webmaster verification meta tag (#2140)

Injects msvalidate.01 into every docs.rocketride.org page's <head> via
Docusaurus headTags, which Bing Webmaster Tools scans for site verification.

Scoped to docs.rocketride.org: the packages/docs subpackage is built and
deployed only by .github/workflows/docs.yml to GitHub Pages, and is not
bundled into any self-hosted RocketRide install, so the tag does not ride
into other people's deployments.

Tag value comes from a Bing Webmaster account seeded 2026-08-27 for the SEO
program. The same tag verifies rocketride.org (via Webflow head code) and
news.rocketride.ai (via Ghost code injection); Bing issues one tag per
account.

Public value, safe to commit: the tag proves domain ownership to Bing but
grants no capability by itself. Do not remove after verification succeeds
per Bing's own guidance.

Runbook: ~/Downloads/bing-webmaster-setup.md (Mithilesh, 2026-08-27).

* feat(nodes): add hackjudge_account business-account node (#2136)

* feat(nodes): add hackjudge_account business-account node

Signup, signin, session validate/signout and profile ops inside the
pipeline; resolves tenant_id and tier for the verify flow and
short-circuits invalid sessions. scrypt password hashing with parameters
recorded in the stored hash; session tokens stored only as SHA-256 hashes.
Offline tests cover hashing round-trips and the op surface using the
sys.modules stub pattern from the agent_crewai tests.

Part of the Hack Judge suite (engine, account, store, tokens): four
independently mergeable node PRs wired together by a verify-flow envelope.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(nodes): import the shared stub helper relatively

The test-root guard rightly rejects nodes/test on sys.path (it shadows
node packages of the same name); use the package-relative import the
other suites use instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(nodes): hackjudge_account is a marketplace identity resolver

Review feedback plus the app owner runbook settled this: identity is the
platform's job (manifest authenticated: true hands the app the signed-in
user), so the signup/signin/password/session machinery is deleted. What
remains is what the pipeline needs regardless: resolve the platform org +
user to the app tenant and tier (creating both on first sight, keyed by
marketplace_org_id, user keys scoped per org), stamp them into the
verify-flow envelope, and short-circuit requests without an identity.
Tier stays owned by entitlement, not this node. session_ttl_hours config
is gone; database_url is the only config left.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(nodes): review feedback on hackjudge_account

Schema ships with the node: schema.sql (idempotent DDL for every table the
hackjudge_* nodes touch) plus a README section on applying it. The generic
DATABASE_URL fallback is gone; blank config falls back to
HACKJUDGE_DATABASE_URL only and the node refuses to start without one, so
it can never write tenants into an unrelated database. First-sight
creation is insert-first with ON CONFLICT on the new unique indexes
(tenants.marketplace_org_id, users.external_id) and a re-select, so
concurrent first logins converge on one tenant/user instead of racing
SELECT-then-INSERT.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Poushali Deb Purkayastha <poushali.purkayastha@rocketride.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "feat(nodes): add hackjudge_account business-account node (#2136)" (#2144)

This reverts commit 8bd026e84692096171e99009fa12c66381f8bd0a.

Co-authored-by: Poushali Deb Purkayastha <poushali.purkayastha@rocketride.ai>

* feat(mcp): add resolve_config and scaffold_node, and check providers in validate_pipeline (#2082)

* feat(mcp): add resolve_config, showing what a node actually receives

A .pipe rarely says what a node gets. The engine merges profile defaults and,
when a profile is set, reads the user layer only from the sub-object named after
that profile, so a key written beside it is discarded in silence. The author of
#1989 lost a day to exactly that, and the schema cannot express it: a schema
describes what a field is, not that this field in this profile will be dropped.

resolve_config runs the config through the same Config.getNodeConfig a node calls
at load, and returns the resolved result plus the keys the resolver discarded,
with a hint naming the object they belong in.

Resolution has to happen engine-side. getServiceSchemas copies 15 keys into the
catalog and preconfig is not among them (services.cpp:2100-2148), so profile
resolution cannot be reproduced from rrext_services or /services.

The tool reaches the engine through the existing seam rather than importing
Config directly. modules/mcp/engine.py states that tools depend only on the
EngineClient protocol so a later revision can swap the WS SDK for in-process
calls without touching tool code; a direct import would have made this the first
tool to break that. So this adds rrext_resolve_config next to rrext_services and
rrext_validate, the matching SDK method, and one line on each side of the seam.

Both argument checks default only a genuinely absent config: `or {}` would
coerce a falsy non-object such as [] and skip the type check entirely. A test
caught that.

doc.md gains the tool row and its count moves to 28.

* feat(mcp): add scaffold_node, emitting a node that loads on the first try

Authoring a node means discovering its contract by failure, and the documented
contract is wrong in three places, so reading the docs first does not help:

- preconfig is marked optional in README-node-schema.md, but
  Config.getNodeConfig raises without it and nearly every IGlobal calls that at
  load. Of 170 services*.json in the tree, the only ones without preconfig are
  global-field files with no protocol plus a handful whose IGlobal never calls
  it.
- depends() is documented as running in __init__.py, and the same page then
  contradicts itself. The real nodes call it from IGlobal.beginGlobal, and any
  third-party import has to follow it.
- The "Adding a New Node" example shows a plain class with a process() method,
  which nothing in the engine calls. The contract is IGlobalBase/IInstanceBase.

Two more the docs omit: a services.json without protocol is not registered as a
service at all, and register must be filter or endpoint or the node loads but
can never be instantiated. The provider name is the protocol, which is the
mistake the issue opens with.

scaffold_node emits all of that correctly, including the parent
local_nodes/__init__.py and the local_nodes.<name> import path. class_type and
lane_out are checked against the live catalog rather than a list here, so the
allowed sets follow the engine instead of drifting as nodes are added.

It returns files rather than writing them. _common.load_pipeline already refuses
server-side reads because an MCP caller could otherwise reach the server's disk;
writing deserves the same stance.

The tests assert the emitted skeleton against the engine's real requirements:
every generated Python file parses, the manifest carries the four keys that stop
a node loading, depends() is in IGlobal and not __init__.py, and the handler
matches the requested lane. Dropping preconfig from the template fails them.

doc.md gains the tool row and its count moves to 29.

* fix(client-python): let a non-object config reach the engine's type check

resolve_config defaulted with `config or {}`, which coerces a falsy non-object
such as [] into {} and hides the mistake the engine would have reported. Only an
absent config is defaulted now, matching the handler it calls.

* fix(mcp): report a config key the profile overwrote, not just an absent one

resolve_config decided a key was discarded by checking whether it was missing
from the resolved config. Nearly every profile in the catalog declares apikey,
so an apikey written beside "profile" comes back present, holding the profile's
value rather than the author's, and the tool stayed silent on the exact case it
exists to surface.

A key now counts as discarded when what the node receives differs from what the
author wrote. Found by calling the tool over the MCP transport against a real
llm_openai profile; the unit test missed it because its stub returned a resolved
config without the key at all.

* refactor(mcp): give the catalog lookups one job each

_catalog_values branched on whether its key argument was the string 'lanes',
so one function carried two different traversals. Splitting them drops the
branch and the stringly-typed parameter, and the lane names are now filtered
for strings the way the class types already were.

* fix(mcp): harden scaffold_node against catalog and argument shapes

Three defects found in review:

A catalog entry whose classType is a bare string was iterated character by
character, so 'text' admitted 't', 'e' and 'x' as class types and rejected the
real one. Introduced when the lookup was split in two; the container check that
guarded it is back.

Dispatch does not apply the tool's inputSchema, so a non-string name reached the
regex and raised TypeError instead of returning an actionable answer. Name, both
lanes and class_type are now checked for type first.

lane_in was validated only against the local handler templates, never against
the catalog, so a lane with a template but no engine support produced a manifest
with an input lane nothing serves.

Also corrects the introspection group heading in doc.md, which still counted 5
tools and did not list scaffold.py as a source.

* fix(mcp): report every profile sibling key, not only one whose value changed

Comparing the resolved value against the author's missed the sibling that
happens to match the profile's own value. The resolver never read that line
either, so staying quiet left the author believing it was in effect when the
key inside the profile is what applied.

With a profile set every sibling is discarded, so the value is not worth
comparing and the check is simpler for it.

* fix(mcp): keep a supplied falsy argument out of the scaffold defaults

lane_in, lane_out and class_type defaulted with `or`, so a supplied 0, '' or []
became the fallback and never reached the type check that would have reported
it. Defaulting now applies only to an absent or null argument, matching the
handler this PR already corrected on the client side.

* feat(mcp): flag a component whose provider the engine cannot serve

validate_pipeline passed a pipeline naming a provider that does not exist, so a
typed name validated clean and failed later at run time. The engine's provider
lookup lives in validate_pipeline.cpp's single-component path, which the whole
pipeline path never reaches.

The tool now checks each component against the engine's service catalog after
the engine's own validation, and reports the component id with the name it could
not resolve. The names come from the engine, so no rule moves into the client,
and engine findings are added to rather than replaced.

Closes the third of the four tools #1989 asked for; it was previously treated as
already shipped in #1880, which covers the structural half only.

* fix(mcp): report only the config keys a profile actually discarded

resolve_config reported every sibling of the selected profile, so it named
parameters on all 34 components in the repo's own pipelines that select one,
and told the author to move it inside the profile object. parameters is not
node configuration: the engine validates and consumes it on its own path
(pipeline_config.cpp Rule 5 and Rule 6), and moving it would break the
component. name is the same shape, and an editor-saved config keeps a
sub-object per profile, so an unselected profile read as a discarded key too.

Structural keys and the service's own profile names are now excluded. Over the
same pipelines the report goes from 34 components to 1, and that one is a real
finding: search_exa carries apikey beside the profile.

The existing test passed because its config was hand-written with only apikey
beside the profile. The new one is shaped like a real .pipe.

Also drops the return in the scaffolded handler's preventDefault call, which
raises, matching how the real nodes write it.

* fix(examples): repair the two component configs these tools surfaced

Both are real defects the PR's own additions found in shipped examples.

document-processor names provider "anonymize", but that node declares
"protocol": "anonymize_text://" and the provider is the protocol minus the
scheme, so no such service exists and the component could never instantiate.
The new provider check in validate_pipeline flags it; the old validator
resolved the definition and silently ignored the miss.

exa-search-working carries apikey beside "profile", where getNodeConfig never
reads it, so the pipe named "working" resolved its key to the profile's empty
default. Moving it inside the profile object is correct under the current
resolver and under the one #2039 and #1979 propose. resolve_config reports it.

Over every pipeline in the repo, resolve_config now reports no discarded keys.

* docs(nodes/llm_qwen): fix broken link to sync_models tool (#2147)

The link pointed at ../../../../tools/sync_models/README.md, a repo-relative
path that resolves to /tools/sync_models/README.md in the built docs URL
space. The docs subpackage does not include tools/, so Docusaurus's broken-
link check throws and the Docs workflow fails on every push touching a node
README (last two runs on develop failed with this signature).

Point it at the file on GitHub instead. Docusaurus treats absolute URLs as
external and skips them, users see the same content, and the docs deploy
unblocks.

Same fix would apply to any other node README that links repo-relative into
tools/ or scripts/; leaving that sweep out of scope so this is a minimal
unblock.

* feat(nodes): add authoritative_overlay SEC cross-check (#1485)

* feat(nodes): add authoritative_overlay node for financial auditing (#1430)

- Created  node to cross-check extracted financial answers against official regulator data.
- Added local snapshot testing connectors for SEC, IFRS, Companies House, and EDINET.
- Implemented logic to abstain and drop answers when a mismatch is detected.

* feat(nodes): add fail-closed numeric validation to authoritative_overlay

* fix(authoritative-overlay): fix test framework compatibility

* resolve coderabbit issues

* fix(authoritative_overlay): address maintainer PR feedback

* refactor the node by migrating to live SEC API & address review feedback

Cleaned up the working tree by removing all unrelated scratch files and mock snapshots. Replaced the static connector mock with a live integration to the SEC EDGAR API using a configurable CIK. Fixed normalization bug for parenthesized numbers, corrected config field naming conventions, and dropped empty boilerplate functions.

* fix(authoritative_overlay): scope SEC matches to a filing period

Stop treating any historical company-concept value as a verification, emit a matching answer once, and keep overlay unit tests isolated for engine CI.

* fix(ai,client-python,client-typescript): give task failures a machine-readable code (#2127)

* fix(ai,client-python,client-typescript): give task failures a machine-readable code

A dead task token was indistinguishable from a live one: every task lookup
failure raised a bare RuntimeError, and the only signal a client had was the
English sentence, so applications matched on prose that a reword or a
translation would silently break. The SDKs then appended a developer
troubleshooting checklist to that message, which reached end users verbatim.

Engine: a TaskError carrying a code (TASK_NOT_REGISTERED, TASK_AMBIGUOUS,
TASK_COMPLETED, TASK_STOPPED) at the registry lookups and the readiness wait.
It subclasses RuntimeError and the messages are unchanged, so existing handling
and existing string matches keep working.

Protocol: DAPBase.build_exception copies a string `code` off the exception onto
the DAP error packet, next to `message`. Additive — a plain exception still
produces a byte-identical packet.

SDKs: `code` and `hint` on DAPException (optional readonly fields in
TypeScript, properties in Python), and DataPipe.open() keeps the server's
message as the message with the checklist moved to `hint`.

Fixes #2097

* fix(ai,sdk): complete the typed-error contract and stop chat() discarding it

Addresses CodeRabbit on #2127: authenticate() now raises TaskError like every other task lookup; the Python open() hint named a mimetype keyword that does not exist (the parameter is mime_type); the TS guide claimed every exception extends DAPException, which LoginAttemptCancelledError does not; and chat() rewrapped typed exceptions in a plain Error, so callers on the most common path could not read code or hint.

* test(client-typescript): pin chat() rethrowing typed exceptions

The chat() rethrow was the only change in this PR with no regression test behind it. Without it the first test fails with 'Received constructor: Error'; the second pins that non-DAP failures are still normalised to a plain Error.

* test(client-typescript): fail inside the pipe path in the normalisation test

The old test passed an undefined question, which trips chat()'s empty-question guard before a pipe exists — it exercised the catch without reaching the path it names. The stubbed request now rejects with a plain Error from inside open() (CodeRabbit on #2127).

* docs(ai,server): correct authenticate()'s Raises and scope codes to command replies

* fix(ai): fall back to a message when a stopped task has no exitMessage

* fix(ai): correct every false Raises claim in task_server, and let remove_task reach its typed error

Audited all eight remaining ValueError: docstring claims against each function's actual raise paths rather than fixing an arbitrary subset (CodeRabbit and review on #2127). Five stated ValueError for a failure that is now TaskError, and restart_task's claim was false only in its first clause; get_task_control, start_task and restart_task's remaining clauses are backed by live raises and are left alone. get_task, get_task_status and attach_task propagate both, verified by calling them. Separately, remove_task popped without a default, so an unknown token raised KeyError before the TaskError guard below it could run - the failure reached the caller unclassified, which is the thing this PR exists to fix.

* test(ai): pin that remove_task classifies an unknown token

The registry pop had no default, so the TaskError guard beneath it was unreachable for the one case it was written for. Reverting pop(token, None) to pop(token) fails this test with KeyError: 'tk_unknown'.

* fix(models/ocr): use OS trust store for model downloads; route polars via lts-cpu wrapper (#1175)

* fix(models/ocr): use OS trust store for model downloads; route polars via lts-cpu wrapper

- ssl: install truststore and inject it into the default SSL context so
  HTTPS model downloads use the full OS trust store, fixing "unable to get
  local issuer certificate" behind TLS-intercepting proxies (falls back to
  certifi).
- polars: route OCR polars imports through ai.common.polars, which installs
  polars-lts-cpu and removes any transitively-pulled plain polars, fixing
  SIGILL / SEH 0xc000001d on x86_64 hosts without AVX2/FMA.

Fixes #1162

* refactor(models/ocr): lazy SSL injection, lock polars cleanup, fix comments

Address review feedback on the TLS trust-store / polars-lts-cpu fix:

- SSL injection is now lazy and process-scoped to local mode. ai.common.ssl
  exposes an idempotent ensure() guarded by a module-level flag, called from
  BaseLoader._ensure_dependencies (the chokepoint every local load() hits)
  before the per-class requirements guard, instead of running eagerly at
  ai.common.models import. Remote-mode dispatch processes never import ML
  libraries or download weights, so they no longer pay for the injection.
- The polars-lts-cpu cleanup (pip uninstall + force-reinstall) now runs under
  the same install.lock FileLock that depends() uses. pip() runs raw with no
  locking, so concurrent worker startups could otherwise interleave and
  corrupt site-packages mid-rewrite.
- Replace the silent `except: pass` in both shims with debug logging so a
  skipped cleanup/injection is observable.
- Document that the version('polars') check queries the distribution name
  (not the import name), which is why it detects the transitive plain wheel.
- Correct the nodes/ocr/requirements.txt comment: listing polars-lts-cpu does
  not stop a transitive plain `polars` from installing; the runtime cleanup is
  what makes lts-cpu authoritative.
- Note that the kokoro spaCy-wheel `pip install <url>` validates TLS with
  pip's own CA bundle and is not covered by the in-process ssl injection.

* refactor(models): drop polars lts-cpu shim, import engLib directly

B1: the polars AVX2 crash no longer reproduces against currently-resolved
versions, so the wrapper is dropped rather than kept as a permanent shim.

  * img2table resolves to 2.0.0, whose metadata declares no polars
    dependency and whose wheel contains no reference to polars in any
    module, so nothing pulls plain polars in transitively any more.
  * polars 1.43.2 moved its compiled runtime into separate
    polars-runtime-32/64/compat distributions and selects the baseline
    build by default, so the plain wheel no longer requires AVX2.
  * polars-lts-cpu is frozen at 1.33.1, so keeping the pin would hold the
    OCR node ten minor versions behind.
  * the only polars call site, to_ocr_dataframe(), belongs to the
    img2table v1 plug-in contract, which v2 replaced with of(). It is not
    reachable on a fresh install.

ai/common/polars and the ocr requirements pin are removed, and the OCR
node returns to its develop state.

B4: ai.common.ssl imports engLib.debug directly instead of proxying it
behind a try/except no-op. engLib is built into the engine, so the
fallback masked import errors rather than guarding a real absence.

* fix(ai): make the SSL trust store fallback reachable and the guard race-free

- Move depends(requirements) inside the guarded block. It ran before the
  try, so a failed install propagated out of ensure() and the documented
  certifi fallback was never reached.
- Set the one-shot guard after the attempt finishes, under a lock. It was
  set up front, so a second thread could return while the first was still
  injecting and then download weights through an unpatched SSL context.
  A failed attempt is still recorded, so a broken environment is not
  re-run through the install lock on every later load().
- Declare certifi in requirements.txt. The fallback imports it, so it can
  no longer depend on a transitive copy being present. Note truststore's
  Python 3.10+ floor there as well.

* fix(store_pinecone): read list_indexes() entries that are IndexModel objects (#1990)

* fix(store_pinecone): read list_indexes() entries that are IndexModel objects

pinecone-client returns IndexModel description objects from list_indexes()
from v7 onward, not the dicts earlier releases yielded. The connection probe
calls .get() on each entry, which those objects do not have, so it raises
'IndexModel' object has no attribute 'get'.

requirements.txt pins no version, so which shape arrives depends on when the
dependency was resolved. The failure also only appears once the index exists:
next() stops evaluating the predicate on an empty account, so a fresh install
looks healthy and every run afterwards fails.

Adds a small accessor that reads either shape, including nested description
objects such as spec, rather than pinning a client version.

Fixes #1984

* fix(store_pinecone): detect serverless by value, and cover both entry shapes

Addresses review feedback on the serverless compatibility check.

IndexSpec.to_dict() emits every variant it knows about, unset ones included,
so a pod-based index describes itself as {'serverless': None, 'pod': {...}}.
The key-membership test therefore reported every pod-based index as
serverless and emitted the opposite compatibility warning to the one the user
needs. Verified against pinecone 9.1.0.

The membership test predates this branch, but it was unreachable while the
probe still crashed on IndexModel.get(), so this fix is what exposes it.

Extracts _is_serverless() so the check is unit-testable without the probe, and
adds regression tests for both entry shapes: pod and serverless, as dicts and
as description objects. The tests fail against the key-membership check and
pass against the value check.

* Update nodes/src/nodes/store_pinecone/IGlobal.py

---------

Co-authored-by: Alexandru Sclearuc <asclearuc@gmail.com>

* feat(tika): support RAR5 archives via 7-Zip-JBinding (#1176)

* feat(tika): support RAR5 archives via 7-Zip-JBinding

Tika's junrar-backed RarParser throws on RAR v5 (the default WinRAR format
since 2013). Add net.sf.sevenzipjbinding plus a RarSevenZipParser that
auto-detects RAR4/RAR5 and routes entries through the configured
EmbeddedDocumentExtractor; ConfigBuilder swaps the parser and TikaApi
initializes the native binding once per JVM.

Fixes #1163

* refactor(tika): bulk RAR extraction, per-entry encryption handling, ASF header

Address review feedback on the 7-Zip-JBinding RAR parser:

- Replace per-entry extractSlow() with a single IInArchive.extract(int[],
  false, callback) pass. extractSlow re-decompresses from the start of the
  archive on every call, which is O(n^2) on solid RAR archives; the bulk
  call decompresses once while preserving solid-block ordering. Each entry
  is spooled to a temp file and dispatched to the embedded extractor as it
  completes, so peak disk usage stays at one entry.
- Stop aborting the whole archive on the first encrypted entry. Encrypted
  entries are now logged and skipped per-entry, consistent with how
  unreadable headers and failed extractions are handled; an
  EncryptedDocumentException is surfaced only when every entry is encrypted
  (the archive as a whole is unreadable).
- Switch the file's license header from MIT/Aparavi to the Apache ASF
  header used by sibling parsers, since handleEntryMetadata is ported from
  Tika's Apache-2.0 PackageParser.
- Document the frozen sevenzipjbinding 16.02-2.01 security posture in the
  pom alongside the dependency.

* fix(tika): gate the RAR parser swap on 7-Zip init, harden init and cleanup

- ConfigBuilder replaced Tika's RarParser unconditionally, so when the
  7-Zip-JBinding native library failed to load the config removed the only
  working RAR parser and installed one that cannot run. Gate the swap on
  TikaApi.isSevenZipReady() and keep junrar (RAR4) when it is not.
- TikaApi.init() checked and assigned `initialized` without synchronization,
  so two callers could both pass the guard and race into
  initSevenZipFromPlatformJAR(). Make init() synchronized and the flag
  volatile.
- Narrow the init catch from Throwable to Exception | LinkageError. A missing
  or incompatible native library arrives as UnsatisfiedLinkError, which
  LinkageError still covers, while OutOfMemoryError and StackOverflowError now
  propagate instead of being logged and ignored.
- Close and delete the entry still in flight when bulk extraction aborts.
  setOperationResult() handles the normal path, but 7-Zip-JBinding does not
  promise a matching call once a callback throws, and on Windows the open
  handle also stops TemporaryResources from deleting the file.

* fix: reject conflicting media lane in audio_player (#1966) (#2010)

* fix: reject conflicting media lane in audio_player

* fix: reject repeated BEGIN on the active lane

---------

Co-authored-by: Mayuresh Pandey <mayuresh@nybsys.com>

* fix: do not wait for playback drain when no audio was written (#2028)

Co-authored-by: Mayuresh Pandey <mayuresh@nybsys.com>

* fix(sync_models): stop shipping a max_tokens the provider rejects (#2160)

* fix(sync_models): reject output token values that equal the context window

LiteLLM and OpenRouter report max output tokens as the context window for
some models. That value reaches the provider as max_tokens and the call is
rejected with a 400. Discard such a candidate and try the next source; the
fallback default no longer overwrites a limit already in the catalogue.

Fail the sync when a profile still has modelOutputTokens equal to
modelTotalTokens, and cover every llm_* node with a catalogue test.

* fix(sync_models): scope the output-token check to providers that cap completions

Equality between modelOutputTokens and modelTotalTokens only proves a broken
value where the provider enforces a completion limit below its window. OpenAI
rejects an oversized max_tokens outright and litellm swaps the fields for
Anthropic, so both opt in via output_limit_below_context. Mistral and xAI accept
max_tokens up to the window and publish no separate limit, which is why every
source reports the two values as equal there — applying the check globally would
have replaced correct data with the 4096 default.

The gate now fails only for native profiles on an opted-in provider, skips
deprecated ones and any model confirmed in model_output_tokens.overrides, and
reports the rest as a note.

The four gpt-5-*-chat-latest profiles carried 16384 in both fields, hand-entered.
16384 is their real output limit; the context window was the wrong one — both
models.dev and litellm report 128000 — so the window is corrected instead. They
were also truncating prompts at 16k.

* fix(llm): warn when a custom profile sets max_tokens above what the model accepts

A custom profile carries whatever the author typed and the model sync never
sees it, so nothing catches an oversized max_tokens before the request goes
out. The provider answers with a 400 naming a limit the author never saw, and
by then the value may not even be in the pipeline file any more.

Resolve the configured model name against the node's own catalogue: most custom
profiles name a model that is also a profile there, which gives a real
completion limit to compare against. Anything above it is named with both
numbers. Without a catalogue match, fall back to reporting output equal to the
context window. Catalogue entries whose own output equals their window are
skipped as a comparison basis - that value is the window, not a limit.

* fix(sync_models): check hand-written token limits before the clamp, and keep the sync PR flowing

Review feedback.

The runtime check ran after validate_max_tokens, so a value the provider would
reject could be clamped into a plausible one with nothing left to report. It now
reads what the author wrote. It also keyed off profile == 'custom', which misses
the profile-less direct-config form and llm_openai_api, whose default profile is
'custom' so an omitted key resolves there without the literal ever appearing.
The trigger is now the presence of a hand-supplied token field at either config
level, which is what actually distinguishes an author's value from the
catalogue's. Added a notice for output above the configured window, since that
clamp was silent too.

Pin the four gpt-5-chat-latest windows in token_limit_overrides: the
modelTotalTokens merge path overwrites unconditionally, and a source reporting
no context window for these could let the wrong value back in and recreate
output == total on a gated profile.

The gate's exit 1 aborted the scheduled job before the keyless sync and the
Create Pull Request step, so one stale profile would have halted model updates
for all 12 providers every week with nobody paged. The sync steps now continue
on error, the PR is created either way with the gate findings rendered into its
body, and a final step fails the run so it stays visibly red.

Overrides no longer count as confirmed limits under --no-config-overrides,
where they are not applied to the catalogue either.

* fix(llm): decide the rejection warning on the value that is actually sent

The check read the configured value, but validate_max_tokens caps it before the
request goes out: 128,000 configured under a 16,384 window is sent as 16,384,
which the provider accepts. Saying it would be rejected was wrong in exactly
the case where the cap saves the call.

Compare the effective value - min(output, total, MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS) - against
the model's limit, and report the cap itself separately, since that is silent
too and reads at run time as the model refusing to write more.

* fix(config): name a config key that is almost, but not quite, a real one (#2166)

* fix(config): name a config key that is almost, but not quite, a real one

A key the engine does not recognise is copied into the merged config and never
read again, so the node runs with a default the author believes they overrode.
Nothing warns at publish time or at run time; the pipeline reads as correct.

The distance between the typo and the symptom is what makes it expensive:
'outputTokens' instead of 'modelOutputTokens' does not fail, it sends a
different max_tokens and surfaces much later as an intermittent provider 400.

Warning on every unrecognised key was not an option: 15 nodes read keys their
services.json never declares (score, similarity, renderChunkSize, table), and
flagging those on every run would teach people to ignore the message. So the
check reports only a near-certain miss - a known key that ends with the
unknown one, which is the dropped-prefix mistake, or a difflib match at 0.9.
Measured against the whole catalogue: zero valid keys flagged, and a test
holds that line for the 120 services.json files.

* fix(config): a casing-only key is a mistake too, and the catalogue sweep must not run on nothing

merge() keys off the exact spelling, so MODELOUTPUTTOKENS overrides nothing and
the node runs on the default - the same failure the warning exists for. It was
being treated as acceptable; it now suggests the canonical key.

The catalogue test swallowed load failures and would have passed while checking
zero files, which is how an earlier wrong repo-root path went unnoticed. It now
lets the error surface and asserts the sweep actually covered the catalogue.

* fix(config): catalogue metadata is not a configuration key

title, modelSource, deprecated, deprecatedBy, deprecatedSince and migration are
what the catalogue records about a profile, not what a pipeline sets. Counting
them as known keys meant a near-miss could be answered with one of them - a
typo suggesting 'deprecated' as the key the author meant.

* fix(text-output): install smbprotocol at module level and fix anonymize crash (#1178)

* fix(text-output): install smbprotocol at module level and fix anonymize crash

- Move depends() to module level in endpoint.py so smbprotocol is always
  installed regardless of OPEN_MODE.
- Fix STATUS_HEAP_CORRUPTION in anonymize by removing the ThreadPoolExecutor
  from glinerRecognizer.predict(); GLiNER/PyTorch is not thread-safe and
  concurrent calls on the same model corrupt the native heap.

Fixes #1165

* Remove 'name' property from text output services

* fix(text-output): define the SMB fields the parameters object references

The build validated services.json and rejected it:

  Exit: InvalidName (ap:0x27) services.cpp:428
  Field name smb.storePath was not found in .../text_output/services.json

text_output.target.parameters listed smb.storePath, smb.server,
smb.username and smb.password, but no field by those names exists in the
node or in nodes/src/nodes/core. The engine resolves every referenced
property against a definition, so the node failed to load and the build
died on all three platforms.

storePath is already a core field, so it is referenced bare, matching
local_text_output. server, username and password have no core definition,
so they are defined locally under the node namespace, matching the
store_astra pattern where astra_db.api_endpoint reaches the node as
api_endpoint. That lines the shape up with what endpoint.py already
reads: parameters.get('server'), get('username'), get('password') and
get('storePath').

The password field is marked secure with a password widget and the
127-character limit that validateConfig already enforces.

* fix(text-output): fail validation on SMB config errors, keep reachability advisory

The connect() probe this PR enabled reported every failure as a warning, so a
rejected credential or a wrong share name passed validateConfig.

Split the two cases instead:

- EACCES, EPERM and ENOENT fail validation. Each is a configuration mistake
  the user has to fix. connect() already tolerates ENOENT on the store path
  (it is created on first write), so an ENOENT arriving here came from the
  share root and means the share name is wrong.
- Everything else stays a warning. Validation also runs on the Platform host,
  which often has no route to the customer's share, and rejecting a correct
  configuration there was the reason the probe had been commented out.

Also document both lifecycle no-ops in IGlobal, and correct the README, which
still claimed the connection was not tested during configuration validation.

* fix(text-output): classify SMB failures by NtStatus, scope credentials, keep GLiNER parallel

The errno-based split shipped in the previous commit did not work. Verified
against smbprotocol 1.17.0:

- SMBAuthenticationError derives from SMBException, not OSError, so a rejected
  credential carried no errno and was downgraded to a warning. That is the one
  case the README called a blocking configuration mistake.
- STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED is absent from SMBOSError's errno table, so it arrives
  with errno 0 and the EACCES branch never fired either.
- errno EPERM comes from STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION ("file in use by another
  process"), which is transient, so treating it as a config error was wrong.

Classify on NtStatus instead, with an explicit SMBAuthenticationError branch.
Rejected, wrong or expired credentials, access denied, privilege not held, a
missing share (STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME) and missing names or paths now fail
validation. Timeouts, dropped transports, refused connections and sharing
violations warn without rejecting.

Also:

- Register credentials with register_session() against the configured server
  instead of the process-wide ClientConfig singleton. Validation runs this now,
  so one endpoint could otherwise overwrite the credential another endpoint was
  already connected with.
- Restore the GLiNER thread pool and hold a lock around predict_entities only.
  Removing the pool fixed the crash but serialized chunking, offset arithmetic
  and overlap filtering with it. Output is unchanged: results are sorted and
  deduplicated before returning, verified identical to the sequential version
  across multi-chunk, overlap-boundary and dense-entity inputs.
- Correct the README, which described the old global credential registration.

Tests: 25 for validateConfig covering both failure classes, the smbprotocol
hierarchy facts the classification depends on, and probe scope; 11 for
predict() covering absolute offsets, overlap dedup, single-chunk input,
determinism across runs, forward-pass serialization and label batching.

* fix(sync_models): stop shipping retired models, and let the sync find them (#2162)

* fix(nodes): deprecate claude-opus-4-1, retired by Anthropic

Anthropic retired claude-opus-4-1-20250805 on 2026-08-05 and the API now
answers not_found_error. The profile is still offered, so anyone selecting it
gets failing requests that never reach the usage page.

The model sync cannot reach this on its own: the profile carries
modelSource: openrouter, so _source_is_authoritative() lets only OpenRouter
deprecate it, and OpenRouter still lists anthropic/claude-opus-4.1 with no
expiration date. Marked by hand until that gap is closed.

* fix(sync_models): a hand-marked deprecation is no longer undone by the sync

_source_is_authoritative received two vocabularies and recognised neither
fully: the deprecation path passes display labels ('Anthropic API'), the
enrichment path passes internal keys ('openrouter'), and the function compared
against 'provider API' and 'OpenRouter'. So the native API could never
deprecate a profile, and OpenRouter could never lift one - the reverse of what
the docstring describes. Normalise both vocabularies to one key.

That fix alone would delete the deprecation added in this branch on the next
run, since OpenRouter still lists claude-opus-4.1. So record deprecatedBy when
the sync marks a profile, and only lift a mark the sync itself made. A profile
deprecated by hand carries no deprecatedBy and stays: a provider that keeps
listing a model it has retired is precisely why someone marks one by hand, so
seeing it in the listing again is not evidence to the contrary.

Without this the four hand-marked gemini profiles would be reinstated on the
next sync with a Gemini key, since models.list() still returns retired models.

* fix(sync_models): decide deprecation authority on canonical source keys

Review feedback on the ownership model.

The lift required deprecatedBy to name the same source that is running, but the
OpenRouter expiration branch stamps a mark without checking authority and can
therefore mark a 'provider' profile. Matching on the stamp left that profile
deprecated with no source able to clear it - worse than the behaviour it
replaced. Any source with authority over the profile may now lift a mark the
sync applied; hand-applied marks carry no deprecatedBy and stay protected
either way.

Authority is decided on canonical keys ('provider'/'openrouter'/'litellm')
threaded from primary_source, replacing the label heuristic that would have
granted provider authority to any future '<Something> API' string. The display
label stays prose for the migration message.

A mark left standing while the source lists the model again is now reported
instead of landing in unchanged, which surfaces the existing hand-marked
profiles that need a one-time decision.

* fix(sync_models): a standing deprecation mark is not a pure skip

has_changes() drove an early return that rendered a provider as SKIPPED and
moved on, so a provider whose only finding was a profile listed again while
still deprecated had that finding dropped from both the console output and the
PR body - the exact case the previous commit added the report line for.

* feat(sync_models): re-verify catalogue models by calling them

The smoke gate validates additions only: a model already in services.json is
accepted without being called, so one that entered correctly and was retired
six months later stays in the catalogue forever. The live test does not catch
it either - it asks the listing endpoint, and providers keep returning models
they have retired, with generateContent among the supported methods, refusing
only when the model is actually called.

--verify-existing calls every active profile and deprecates the ones the
provider reports as gone, carrying over the replacement the provider names when
it names one. Only a message identifying the model as unavailable qualifies; a
rate limit or a permission error never deprecates anything.

That evidence bypasses the authority rule, deliberately. Absence from a listing
means little across sources - an OpenRouter alias missing from a provider's API
is expected - but a direct refusal does not: a profile discovered through
OpenRouter is just as unusable once the provider behind it has retired the
model, and OpenRouter will keep listing it regardless.

The gemini live test now makes one real call per profile instead of trusting
the listing, which is the check it always claimed to be.

* fix(nodes): deprecate the five gemini profiles the API refuses to run

Verified with a real generateContent call per profile against a current key,
which is what --verify-existing does: models/gemini-2.5-pro, 2.5-flash,
2.5-flash-lite, 2.5-pro-preview and 2.5-pro-preview-05-06 all answer 404,
'no longer available to new users'. All five are still listed by models.list()
with generateContent among their supported methods, which is why nothing had
noticed.

Google names the replacement for three of them and those go into the migration
notes; the two preview IDs are simply gone with nothing suggested.

Also repointed two existing notes: gemini-2.0-flash and 2.0-flash-lite were
directing people to 2.5-flash and 2.5-flash-lite, both of which are in this
same batch. Every migration target now resolves to a profile that runs.

* fix(sync_models): classify a failed call, and keep call-made marks out of the listing path

Two problems the larger scope introduced.

A call-verified retirement was stamped deprecatedBy: 'provider', which the lift
path reads as ordinary listing evidence. The premise of the feature is that the
provider still lists the model, so the next scheduled run - which never passes
--verify-existing - would find it listed, find the provider authoritative, and
resurrect it, deleting the replacement note. With the flag on every run it would
churn every other run. Such a mark now records 'provider-call', deliberately
outside SOURCE_KEYS so the listing path cannot touch it, and is lifted only by a
call that passes.

Retirement was decided by substring matching a flattened string, and the guard
meant to keep transient errors out never ran, because base.py passed reason (a
str) where an Exception was expected. Worse, the patterns matched access-gated
404s: OpenAI answers 'does not exist or you do not have access to it' for a
retired model and for one the key cannot reach, and Anthropic returns
not_found_error for org-restricted models, so a CI key without a tier would have
deprecated every gated-but-live model in one run.

Classification moves to the smoke layer and reads the typed exception. A bare
404 is now 'missing' - reported, never acted on - and only a provider stating
the model is gone yields 'retired'. Verified against the live Gemini API: the
three models Google declares retired classify as retired, the two ambiguous 404s
as missing, a live model passes.

* fix(sync_models): an OpenRouter expiry only deprecates what OpenRouter owns

The expiration branch changed deprecation state with no authority check, so an
entry OpenRouter marks expired could deprecate a 'provider' or 'manual' profile
whose model the native API still serves - and a keyless run is enough to do it.

This is the smallest of the two fixes offered in review; the other one (letting
an authoritative source lift any sync-applied mark) is already in. Both belong:
one stops the wrong profile being marked, the other stops a mark being stranded.
Ownership now reads the same in every direction - absence, expiry and lifting -
while a direct call still overrides it, since a model that will not run is gone
whoever discovered it.

* fix(sync_models): a majority of retirements is an API failure, not a catalogue dying

Review feedback, and the loose end in the verification: a retirement message is
per-model evidence, but a break one level up produces the same message for every
model at once. Retire an API version and every call answers with the same 404
carrying the same wording - which is exactly what the retirement phrases match -
and a single run would deprecate the whole provider.

Above half the verified models, the run now deprecates nothing, moves those
findings to the unverified list and warns. Providers do not retire most of a
catalogue at once, so a majority verdict says more about the API than about the
models; a real mass retirement is then applied deliberately rather than swept in.

The threshold check is a named function so the boundary is pinned by tests
rather than inferred from a run: five of twenty-six is believed, exactly half is
not a majority, and a verified count of zero is never judged.

* fix(nodes): map the SMB password text_output added (#2192)

#1178 gave text_output a password field for SMB shares but did not regenerate
the credentials catalog, so nodes:credentials-check fails on develop and takes
every PR that rebases onto it down with it.

Curated rather than left as the generated stub: the field is optional in
services.json, so required is false, and the title says what it is instead of
repeating the path.

* feat(tool_notion): add Notion tool node (#2141)

* feat(tool_notion): add Notion tool node

Exposes a Notion workspace (search, pages, databases) to agents as
eight tools, targeting the 2025-09-03 database/data-source API split
(Notion-Version 2026-03-11) rather than the older single-database
shape. No live workspace has exercised this end-to-end, so the node
is marked experimental.

* fix(tool_notion): address CodeRabbit findings on parent type, title property, trash field, and write retries

Verified each finding directly against developers.notion.com before
applying:

- parent.type must be "page_id"/"data_source_id", not the bare
  "page"/"data_source" the create-page body was sending.
- A data source's title property isn't always called "Name" (e.g.
  "Task") -- look it up from the schema instead of guessing.
- The update-page and get-page paths used a nonexistent "archived"
  field; the real fields are "in_trash" (request) and "in_trash"/
  "is_archived" (response).
- Writes (create/update/append) no longer retry: Notion has no
  idempotency key for these endpoints, so retrying a mutation whose
  response was lost to a connection error risked creating duplicate
  pages or content.
- notion_append_content now batches into groups of <=100 blocks and
  rejects lines over 2000 characters, matching Notion's documented
  request limits.
- Pin requests>=2.34.2 as a baseline floor.

Declined: collapsing credentials.json's two apikey catalog entries
into one. Verified via credentials.py that this does make both
entries required for "configured" status, but the same generator
output (a prefix-keyed path plus a node-name-keyed path, both
required) already exists uncurated on every other tool_* node with a
single apikey field (tool_apify, tool_exa_search, tool_deepl,
tool_tavily) -- a pre-existing, repo-wide generator behavior, not a
defect introduced by this node.

* fix(tool_notion): drop the nonexistent is_archived fallback in notion_get_page

Re-verified against Notion's page object reference and changelog:
"archived" was deprecated in April 2024 and fully removed/renamed to
"in_trash" in API version 2026-03-11 -- they are the same state under
old/new names, not two independent fields. The "is_archived" name
came from an earlier, less authoritative fetch and doesn't actually
exist on the current page object; reading it was harmless (always
None) but implied a real field that isn't there.

* docs(tool_notion): add shared-surface entries for the Notion node

Adds the three shared-surface pieces flagged in review: the node
catalog row in docs/README-nodes.md, the CHANGELOG entry, and the
generated params block in the node's README.

---------

Co-authored-by: madhumithachandrasekaran31 <madhumitha2110549@ssn.edu.in>

* fix(ai): retry without stop param on 400 unsupported_parameter (#1544)

Catch provider 400s that reject ReAct stop/stop_sequences (including Anthropic message-only bodies) and retry once before any chunks are emitted, without dropping token-usage metering from the Adapter.

* feat(tool_crustdata): add Crustdata company/people search as an agent tool (#2130)

* feat(tool_crustdata): add Crustdata company/people search as an agent tool

Adds tool_crustdata, giving an agent B2B discovery: company_search and
person_search against Crustdata's filter-based /company/search and
/person-docs/search API. Same pattern as tool_exa_search (single API
key, plain requests, no vendor SDK, structured {success, ...} JSON
returns, no pipeline lanes).

UNVERIFIED SURFACE (#2129): built from Crustdata's public docs, not
against a live account. The filters shape (list of {filter_type, type,
value}) and both endpoints are corroborated across multiple doc pages,
but the exhaustive filter_type enum and exact response envelope
aren't confirmed -- response parsing is deliberately defensive
(_extract_records tries several plausible top-level keys) rather than
assuming one exact shape. Marked experimental for the same reason.

Also registers the node's mock apikey in the dynamic test framework's
per-node credential table (nodes/test/framework/pipeline.py), matching
every other apikey-gated tool node -- without it the framework's own
pipeline-open test fails on the empty placeholder key that ships in
the real default profile.

* fix(tool_crustdata): correct the search contract per Crustdata's real API reference

CodeRabbit's review on #2130 flagged that the endpoint/filter shape
this node shipped with didn't match Crustdata's current API. Verified
independently by fetching docs.crustdata.com's own versioned reference
pages directly (not paraphrased) -- three prior research passes (mine,
CodeRabbit's, and a third-party dev's notes) had disagreed with each
other, so this reads the primary source rather than trusting any one
of them:

- person_search now hits /person/search, not /person-docs/search.
- filters are now a list of {field, type, value} conditions the node
  wraps into Crustdata's {op, conditions} group form, not a bare array
  of {filter_type, type, value} sent as-is.
- pagination is now cursor-based (cursor in, next_cursor/total_count
  out), not the page integer the node sent before -- Crustdata's API
  doesn't have a page parameter at all.
- limit range widened to the documented 1-1000 (was 1-100, an
  invented number).
- added an optional sorts passthrough, since Crustdata's docs warn a
  missing/changed sort order invalidates the pagination cursor.

Also, from CodeRabbit's other two findings:
- IGlobal.beginGlobal() no longer raises out of the engine lifecycle
  on a malformed defaultLimit (e.g. an empty string from a hand-edited
  .pipe file bypassing the UI's own type coercion) -- extracted
  _coerce_limit(), used by both beginGlobal and a new validateConfig
  warning, with tests for the malformed-input paths.
- test_timeout_is_reported_as_a_structured_error_not_raised now mocks
  time.sleep like the other retry tests; it was previously the one
  test in the suite that actually slept out its ~14s of backoff.

The module docstring, README, and services.json capability comment
are updated from "unverified surface" to "verified against Crustdata's
reference, not yet against a live account" -- the schema is no longer
a guess, only the untested runtime behavior (plan-tier gating, the
full per-entity field enum) remains open per #2129.

* fix(tool_crustdata): drop all_of from the generic match parameter

CodeRabbit's second review pass on #2130 flagged that 'match' offered
'all_of' as a third option alongside 'and'/'or'. Verified independently
against the actual OpenAPI schema for the company search endpoint
(docs.crustdata.com/api-reference/company-apis/search-companies-with-
indexed-fields-only): its op enum is exactly ['and', 'or'] -- all_of
isn't a company-search option at all.

Person search does document all_of, but it isn't a generic combinator:
it's constrained to a single nested-array field path (employment,
education, ...), rejects scalar fields, can't hold negation operators,
and can't nest another all_of/has_all inside it. None of that fits a
flat "combine any conditions" match parameter shared by both tools, so
it's dropped from the schema entirely rather than exposed and silently
misbehaving on the conditions an agent actually sends.

* fix(tool_crustdata): use shared post_with_retry, coerce per-call limit

Addresses joshuadarron's review on #2130: the hand-rolled retry loop
dropped ConnectionError retries (the same regression tool_tavily shipped
and fixed); switching to the shared post_with_retry helper fixes that and
matches the tool_tavily/tool_v0/tool_deepl convention. Also reuses
_coerce_limit for the per-call "limit" argument so a stringy value like
"50" from the model isn't silently discarded, and adds tool_crustdata to
the docs/README-nodes.md catalog.

* fix(tool_crustdata): patch tenacity.nap.time.sleep, not nap.sleep

CodeRabbit caught it on #2130: tenacity's BaseRetrying binds its sleep
default at import time (sleep: Callable = sleep), so patching the
tenacity.nap.sleep attribute afterward doesn't touch the callable
Retrying actually invokes. It still calls time.sleep under the hood, so
that's the real patch target. Confirmed empirically — the previous target
let real sleeps run (test file took ~44s), the fix drops it to ~0.3s
with identical assertions passing.

---------

Co-authored-by: madhumithachandrasekaran31 <madhumitha2110549@ssn.edu.in>
Co-authored-by: Dylan Savage <130109357+dylan-savage@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(gcp): implement native nodes for firestore, gcs, and vertex ai (… (#1608)

* feat(gcp): implement native nodes for firestore, gcs, and vertex ai (#1515)

* fix pr #1608 issues including GCP auth keys, Firestore startup, linting, and docs

* Fix data url parsing by checking for data: prefix instead of comma

* fix(gcp): address PR #1608 review feedback

Apply OAuth scopes for service-account auth, ship Vertex as tool-only
without process-global aiplatform.init, and harden GCS downloads plus
Firestore startup probing.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

* added an adc test with custom scopes

* fix(gcp): address remaining PR #1608 review feedback

Place node icons beside services.json, ship Vertex as tool_vertex_search, bound GCS temp files, and add unit tests plus catalog/CHANGELOG rows.

* fix(gcp): stop GCS/Vertex tests from clobbering the real ai package

Replacing ai with a non-package stub leaked into later node tests on CI and failed the OS matrix Test step.

* fix(gcp): import tool_function from rocketlib like every other node

ai.common.tool does not exist, so the engine failed to load the new
Firestore/GCS/Vertex nodes during the OS-matrix Test step. Use
rocketlib.tool_function with input_schema and the args-dict invoke
contract, and restore sys.modules around the unit-test imports.

* fix(gcp): stub google.auth so CI gcp_auth tests can run without the SDK

CI pytest does not install google-auth, and ROCKETRIDE_MOCK google
has oauth2 but no auth submodule. Validate config before the import
so missing-key and unknown-type errors do not depend on the SDK.

* fix(gcp): stop gcp_auth tests from unloading native google modules

Windows workers crash if google.protobuf is popped from sys.modules.
Load the google package before stubbing auth, and only mark google-auth
import targets as missing.

* fix(gcp): restore google-auth sys.modules slots after gcp_auth tests

* resolving code rabbit comments

* chore(nodes): add MIT license headers to new GCP node files

The ten new files added for the Firestore, GCS, and Vertex Vector Search
nodes shipped without the license header every other node source file
carries (635 of 650 before this change; all five recently merged node
suites are at 100%).

Uses the same header variant as the sibling shared-auth modules in
nodes/src/nodes/core (google_access.py, microsoft_access.py).

Comments only: no code moved, ruff check/format clean, nodes:test
unchanged at 3984 passed / 239 skipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvgPXbYqQoi7xyC5J4QVXb

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Dylan Savage <130109357+dylan-savage@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Dylan Savage <dylanmsavage@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tool_google_workspace): make check_connection actually probe the API (#1700)

* fix(tool_google_workspace): make check_connection actually probe the API

connection_ok was derived only from local checks (client constructed,
token scopes claimed) for gmail/drive/docs/sheets, since check_connection
called _check_connection_impl() without a probe. calendar was the only
service with a live probe wired, so a disabled Google API on the caller's
project was invisible everywhere else — connection_ok: true while every
real call 403'd.

- Wire a live probe for gmail (users().getProfile), drive (about().get),
  and docs/sheets (a made-up-id get(), swallowing the expected 404 since
  neither API has a list/about endpoint to probe cheaply).
- _check_connection_impl no longer defaults to True when no probe runs;
  it reports 'unknown' instead, and fixes a bug where the scope-coverage
  check could silently coerce that sentinel back to a bool.
- execute() now attaches the structured Google reason code (e.g.
  accessNotConfigured vs forbidden vs rateLimitExceeded) to raised
  errors, surfaced as errorReason.

Closes #1694

* test,docs(tool_google_workspace): decouple test fixtures, fix scope-check wording

Test fixtures for the accessNotConfigured probe-failure case set _HttpErr's
raw HTTP reason to the same string as the structured JSON body's error
reason ('accessNotConfigured' both places). errorReason is verified to come
exclusively from the parsed JSON body (_error_reason_code never reads
.reason), but with both fields equal, the test couldn't tell that apart from
a future…
AviNormie pushed a commit to AviNormie/rocketride-server that referenced this pull request Nov 9, 2026
…API (rocketride-org#1700)

* fix(tool_google_workspace): make check_connection actually probe the API

connection_ok was derived only from local checks (client constructed,
token scopes claimed) for gmail/drive/docs/sheets, since check_connection
called _check_connection_impl() without a probe. calendar was the only
service with a live probe wired, so a disabled Google API on the caller's
project was invisible everywhere else — connection_ok: true while every
real call 403'd.

- Wire a live probe for gmail (users().getProfile), drive (about().get),
  and docs/sheets (a made-up-id get(), swallowing the expected 404 since
  neither API has a list/about endpoint to probe cheaply).
- _check_connection_impl no longer defaults to True when no probe runs;
  it reports 'unknown' instead, and fixes a bug where the scope-coverage
  check could silently coerce that sentinel back to a bool.
- execute() now attaches the structured Google reason code (e.g.
  accessNotConfigured vs forbidden vs rateLimitExceeded) to raised
  errors, surfaced as errorReason.

Closes rocketride-org#1694

* test,docs(tool_google_workspace): decouple test fixtures, fix scope-check wording

Test fixtures for the accessNotConfigured probe-failure case set _HttpErr's
raw HTTP reason to the same string as the structured JSON body's error
reason ('accessNotConfigured' both places). errorReason is verified to come
exclusively from the parsed JSON body (_error_reason_code never reads
.reason), but with both fields equal, the test couldn't tell that apart from
a future regression that accidentally read the generic .reason instead.
Decoupled all four (docs/drive/gmail/sheets): .reason is now 'Forbidden',
'accessNotConfigured' stays only in the JSON payload. Verified by temporarily
making _error_reason_code read exc.reason directly -- all four then fail
with 'Forbidden' != 'accessNotConfigured' as expected, confirming they'd
catch that exact regression; reverted and confirmed the real implementation
passes all four again.

README diagnostics bullets (docs/drive/gmail/sheets) said check_connection
"verifies that granted OAuth scopes cover the configured access tier and
probes the API" as one combined behavior. _check_connection_impl runs the
live probe unconditionally regardless of auth type, but only runs
token_scope_report inside `if auth_type == 'user':` -- service-account
connections get probed but never get a scope check (there's no per-user
grant to check). Reworded to state the two facts separately with their
actual conditions.

* fix(tool_google_workspace): parse the One Platform error shape, fix calendar docs drift

_error_reason_code only read the legacy error.errors[] body (Gmail,
Drive). Sheets and Docs are One Platform APIs and carry the reason
in error.details[] as a google.rpc.ErrorInfo instead, with no
errors[] array at all -- so a disabled Sheets/Docs API, the actual
rocketride-org#1694 scenario, never got an errorReason. Now parses both shapes,
falling back further to the coarser error.status when even
ErrorInfo is absent. _is_rate_limit_403 normalizes the
SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE ErrorInfo reasons to match its existing set.

Also:
- calendar's tool description and README now use the same "live
  probe + scope coverage" wording already applied to the other four
  services.
- raise the probe-error truncation cap (200 -> 500 chars) so the
  actionable guidance clause isn't cut mid-sentence.
- a scope-check failure no longer overwrites a probe failure's
  error message; it now reports separately as scopeError (with the
  two tests that asserted the old key updated to match).

---------

Co-authored-by: madhumithachandrasekaran31 <madhumitha2110549@ssn.edu.in>
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tool_google_workspace: connection_ok reports true when the Google API is disabled

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