fix(emails): BCC scrape-alert recipients — never a shared cross-tenant To: line

[sweetmantech]

Summary

The "{artist} has new posts on Instagram" alert resolved every watcher of a social across all customer accounts into a single visible To: line — live evidence on the tracking issue shows a customer manager, an internal account, and a label contact (sam.palm@wmg.com) all mutually visible on one send. This PR hard-codes the privacy boundary: to is always our own from-address (Resend requires non-empty to), all recipients ride bcc.

Tracking issue: recoupable/chat#1855 (PR #1 of 6 — ships first and alone; nothing gates it).

What changed

• lib/apify/sendApifyWebhookEmail.ts: to: [RECOUP_FROM_EMAIL] + bcc: emails (the Resend wrapper already passes bcc through natively — no wrapper change).
• lib/apify/__tests__/sendApifyWebhookEmail.test.ts (new): asserts recipients land in bcc, and a guard-rail test that to/cc never contain more than our own address regardless of recipient count — so a future platform copy-paste can't reintroduce the leak.

Tests

RED→GREEN: 2 new assertions failed against the old implementation (to: emails), pass after (3/3). eslint clean.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

---

Summary by cubic

Fixes a privacy leak in Instagram scrape-alert emails by moving all recipients to BCC and setting To to our own sender address. Prevents cross-tenant addresses from being visible to each other (recoupable/chat#1855).

• Bug Fixes
  • Update sendApifyWebhookEmail to use to: [RECOUP_FROM_EMAIL] and bcc: emails.
  • Add tests enforcing BCC-only recipients, to/cc limited to our address, and no send when recipient list is empty.

^{Written for commit 4f04c68. Summary will update on new commits.}

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Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
api	Ready	Preview	Jul 9, 2026 4:08pm

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Review details

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📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between 1b8012b and 4f04c68.

⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)

• lib/apify/__tests__/sendApifyWebhookEmail.test.ts is excluded by !**/*.test.*, !**/__tests__/** and included by lib/**

📒 Files selected for processing (1)

• lib/apify/sendApifyWebhookEmail.ts

✨ Finishing Touches

🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)

• Create PR with unit tests
• Commit unit tests in branch fix/scrape-alert-bcc

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[cubic-dev-ai]

No issues found across 2 files

Confidence score: 5/5

• Automated review surfaced no issues in the provided summaries.
• No files require special attention.

Architecture diagram

sequenceDiagram
    participant Caller as Apify Webhook
    participant Handler as sendApifyWebhookEmail
    participant Wrapper as sendEmailWithResend
    participant Resend as Resend API

    Note over Caller,Handler: Privacy boundary: watchers from different tenants

    Caller->>Handler: sendApifyWebhookEmail(profile, emails)

    alt emails is empty
        Handler-->>Caller: return null (no email sent)
    else emails non-empty
        Handler->>Handler: generate email body from profile

        Note over Handler: To: always our own address<br/>BCC: all recipients (cross-tenant safe)

        Handler->>Wrapper: sendEmailWithResend({ to: [RECOUP_FROM_EMAIL], bcc: emails, ... })

        Wrapper->>Resend: POST /emails (to=bcc set)
        Resend-->>Wrapper: success response
        Wrapper-->>Handler: result (e.g., { id })

        Handler-->>Caller: return result
    end

Loading

<sub>Auto-approved: Fixes email privacy by moving all recipients to BCC; adds tests for the new behavior. Small, isolated change with low risk.

Re-trigger cubic</sub>

[sweetmantech]

Preview verification — 2026-07-09

Preview: https://api-o0lgjbsm6-recoup.vercel.app (confirmed built from PR head f178c94, deployment Ready 2026-07-06T21:54:03Z).

Method: created an isolated [TEST] artist under my own account watching instagram.com/natgeo (a social watched by no other tenant — fan-out audited via account_socials → account_artist_ids → account_emails before sending: exactly ['sweetmantech@gmail.com']), then ran the real chain: POST /api/socials/{id}/scrape on the preview → Apify run → ACTOR.RUN.SUCCEEDED webhook dispatched to the preview's /api/apify → alert email sent by the PR code. Send verified against Resend's stored record via GET /api/admins/emails?email_id=….

#	Check	Expected	Actual on preview	Result
1	E2E chain fires the PR code	scrape → webhook → email	run TuV7U7TXngr6uEFmD SUCCEEDED; Apify dispatch 2026-07-09T15:38:15Z → preview /api/apify HTTP 200; 12 posts + social persisted; sentEmails.id returned	✅
2	to is only our own address	to: [RECOUP_FROM_EMAIL]	Resend record 1a2769e9-224a-49d1-a324-5e474e7078f5: to: ["Agent by Recoup <agent@recoupable.dev>"]	✅
3	recipients ride bcc	bcc: emails	bcc: ["sweetmantech@gmail.com"], cc: [], last_event: delivered (2026-07-09 15:42:13 UTC)	✅
4	No customer address in visible headers	to/cc never carry more than our own address	visible headers contain only agent@recoupable.dev; recipient appears in bcc only	✅
5	Webhook rejects malformed JSON	200 + error body (Apify contract)	POST /api/apify body not json → HTTP 200 {"status":"error","error":"Invalid JSON"}	✅
6	Webhook rejects missing fields	200 + error body	{"eventData":{}} → HTTP 200 {"status":"error","missing_fields":["eventData","actorId"]}	✅
7	Scrape trigger auth	401 without credentials	POST /api/socials/{id}/scrape no auth → HTTP 401	✅
8	Scrape unknown social	404	id 00000000-… → HTTP 404 Social profile not found	✅
9	Unit suite	3/3 green	CI test check SUCCESS on f178c94	✅

Notes:

• The live send exercised a single-recipient fan-out (the only safely isolatable one — every pre-existing social's watcher set includes external customers). The multi-recipient guard-rail (25 recipients, to/cc still only our address) is covered by the new unit test in this PR and is green in CI.
• Replaying the identical webhook payload produced a second identical email: the no-newness-gate defect is intact as expected — that is api#759's scope, not this PR's.
• The delivered body is still LLM-generated and contains "Apify" — unchanged here as expected; deterministic template is api#761's scope.
• Test fixture fully cleaned after verification: [TEST] artist deleted via DELETE /api/artists/{id}, plus the 2 test socials rows, 12 posts, 12 social_posts, and their post_comments removed; no account_socials links remain.

Verdict: the privacy invariant this PR ships is live and correct on the preview. LGTM to ship first and alone per the chat#1855 sequencing.

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