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feat(implementation): enforce capability-tier model bindings at the dispatch seam - #1711

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feat(implementation): enforce capability-tier model bindings at the dispatch seam#1711
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feat/1649-tier-enforcement

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@kyle-sexton kyle-sexton commented Jul 28, 2026

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What

Makes loop-lane model tiering actually take effect. The tiers were documented but nothing bound them
at the point of dispatch, so a lane's stated tier had no mechanism behind it — the binding lived only
in a paste-block admonition a human had to remember to honor.

The binding now lands structurally at the dispatch seam. Two agent definitions gain an explicit
model and effort pairing, implement-dispatch and work-items:work consume it, and the
per-dispatch admonition in prompts/loops/loop-lane-prompts.md is reduced accordingly — the
enforcement is in the seam, not in a reminder.

Effort is bound alongside the model deliberately: tier is not only which model runs, it is also how
much reasoning depth the subtask gets, and binding one without the other leaves half the tier
unenforced.

docs/conventions/loop-lane/README.md §3 is respected throughout — tier definitions stay
abstract, with no model family names in them. Only the seam names concrete models.

The verifier turn cap is removed from phase-verifier rather than raised. A cap only moves the
cliff, and the docs give no error signal an orchestrator could key off, so a truncated audit would
read like a verdict. In its place the agent contracts a positive INCONCLUSIVE token, and the
consuming surfaces now state what to do when they receive one.

Verification

An independent fresh-context verifier audited the diff with the rationale withheld, across three
rounds. Verdict: PASS on all criteria. It ran the cited registry grep verbatim to confirm the
claim about agent model bindings was exhaustive rather than asserted, and it checked each
harness-behavior claim against the fetched sub-agents page rather than taking the author's word.

Two claims were hedged as a result of that check: the depth-limit withholding is described as
inference rather than quotation, since the docs state "reports no error" for a different filter; and
the maxTurns rationale no longer presents an inferred half under a verification stamp.

The one review finding on this PR — that requiring a worktree path in every brief would make a
self-provisioning worker STOP before its mandated first provisioning step — was fixed in 03587cd:
the path is now required of an assigned-worktree brief only, a self-provisioning brief is accepted
on branch name plus provisioning instructions with the path discovered and returned, and the
omission that genuinely must STOP (neither a path nor provisioning instructions) is stated
positively.

Gates green after the merge: check-changed-skills.sh origin/main, check-changelog-parity.sh --check-bump origin/main, markdownlint over all changed markdown.

Versioning

  • work-items 0.30.0main landed 0.26.0 through 0.29.0 while this branch was in review, so
    this branch's entry composes above them and both sides' changelog entries are retained.
  • implementation 0.10.0 — already above main's 0.9.2, so it keeps its number.

Related

Closes #1649

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

kyle-sexton and others added 5 commits July 27, 2026 15:24
…ispatch seam

Add implementer and phase-verifier plugin agents whose model frontmatter
structurally binds the strong capability tier's current alias, route
implement-dispatch's worker and phase-verifier dispatches through them,
and ride the same surface from /work-items:work's fix re-dispatches —
so a fast-tier orchestrator root no longer silently runs implementers
at orchestrator strength via the default model inheritance.

Tier definitions stay order-defined and family-agnostic per the
loop-lane convention §3; the alias binding lives only at the dispatch
seam. The loop-lane worker-lane paste-block admonition reduces to
overrides-only (frontier for security surfaces, haiku for mechanical
pulls), and the Models section's self-diagnosis now records the
structural enforcement. Frontmatter model values and the resolution
order (env, parameter, frontmatter, inherit) verified against
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sub-agents on 2026-07-26.

Closes #1649

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRSgwJ7RN4vPZt4oJAADHy
Independent fresh-context verification surfaced six findings; all fixed:
state the phase-verifier's tool cage as what it enforces rather than
"read-only" (Bash can write, per the named-agent bar); drop the effort
pins and record the session-relative upward-override duty so a session
above the strong tier is never pinned down (frontmatter binds a floor);
give the /work-items:work PR-monitor and post-green review-pass
dispatches explicit per-invocation tier models (reviewer never weaker
than implementer); presence-gate the no-admonition-needed claim on the
implementation plugin being installed; grant the implementer web
research and disclose both tool cages; correct the Models-section
enumeration to name the merge lane's retained opus binding; add the
inherit-value nuance to every CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL claim; and
register both frontmatter binding sites in the plugin philosophy's
dated tier table.

Refs #1649

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRSgwJ7RN4vPZt4oJAADHy
…patch seam

The implementer and phase-verifier agents bound model but left effort to
inherit from the session, so an orchestrator that lowered effort for its
own bookkeeping still silently lowered it for the phase implementation
and its acceptance verdict — the same inheritance hole the model binding
closes, one field over. Both now set effort: high, matching every other
named agent in this marketplace.

Frontmatter model and effort fields and the env, parameter, frontmatter,
inherit resolution order re-verified against
https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sub-agents on 2026-07-27; the two
in-tree verification dates move to that date.

Refs #1649

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRSgwJ7RN4vPZt4oJAADHy
…claims

Verifier findings on the dispatch-seam binding.

phase-verifier carried maxTurns: 30. A turn cap stops a subagent with no
error, so a verifier whose audit outgrows the cap returns a truncated
report that an orchestrator consumes as a verdict — silently downgrading
the very gate this seam exists to make structural. The cap is removed
(an audit's length is set by the diff, and the tool cage already bars
mutation) and the agent is contracted to return INCONCLUSIVE naming what
it could not reach, never a partial PASS.

implementer's cage prose claimed nested dispatch outright; the harness
withholds Agent from a subagent at the spawn-depth limit whatever the
tools list says, so the grant is now stated as conditional with the
doc citation.

PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY read as if the two new agents were the whole
alias-pin recheck list. They are the dispatch seam, not the registry:
the recheck trigger covers every agent-frontmatter model value in the
repo, now pointed at a grep rather than a restated list that would drift.

maxTurns semantics and the depth-limit Agent withholding verified
against https://code.claude.com/docs/en/sub-agents on 2026-07-27.

Refs #1649

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRSgwJ7RN4vPZt4oJAADHy
Second verifier round on the dispatch-seam binding.

INCONCLUSIVE was a one-sided contract: phase-verifier promised to
return it, and nothing consumed it. implement-dispatch's phase-boundary
clause now states the orchestrator's action — the phase stays unmarked,
a fresh verifier is re-dispatched against the gap the return named, and
a second inconclusive return on the same criteria escalates as a
divergence.

Three claims were overstated. The sub-agents page defines maxTurns as
the maximum turns before the subagent stops; that a stop carries no
failure signal is applied inference, and the CHANGELOG now labels it as
such instead of carrying it under the verification stamp. The same entry
said "unlike this marketplace's review agents" when discovery's agents
cap too, and gave a verdict-rendering rationale that covers only the
verifier — the implementer's uncapped surface is now stated on its own
terms, with the brief's scope fence named as its control. implementer's
depth-limit note dropped "silently" for the behavior the page actually
documents.

Refs #1649

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VRSgwJ7RN4vPZt4oJAADHy
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PR Review

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  • Read and analyze all changed files
  • Formulate comprehensive review

Summary

This PR converts the tier-enforcement admonition in loop-lane-prompts.md from a paste-block reminder (that required human memory) into a structural binding in agent frontmatter. The core mechanism is correct and well-executed. The analysis below covers correctness, design alignment, and a few minor observations.


Correctness

Agent frontmatter bindings — correct.
model: opus and effort: high in both implementer.md and phase-verifier.md are aliases (not dated IDs), consistent with loop-lane convention §3 ("Runtime resolution is by model alias only"). The tier definition ("strong tier") stays abstract in the convention doc; only the seam names a concrete alias. This is the correct separation.

effort binding rationale is sound. Binding effort alongside model prevents a session that lowered its own effort for bookkeeping from silently lowering the phase-work effort by inheritance. The PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY.md "Model tiers" correctly identifies this as a floor, not a session-relative value, and documents the upward-only override duty.

Tool cage for phase-verifier — honestly stated. The description says "Its tool cage bars Edit/Write and agent spawning; Bash remains for inspection" rather than calling it "read-only". This correctly follows the plugin philosophy's named-agent bar ("Bash can write; state what the cage actually enforces, never 'read-only'"). The body reinforces this as a contract constraint: "mutating state through it is outside your contract — a verifier that touches the artifact it grades has voided its verdict."

INCONCLUSIVE handling — fully wired. The phase-verifier contracts to return INCONCLUSIVE rather than a partial PASS when it cannot decide every criterion (phase-verifier.md L24–26). The consuming surface in implement-dispatch's "Phase boundaries" correctly re-dispatches a fresh verifier against the named gap rather than accepting partial coverage — and a second inconclusive on the same criteria escalates like a divergence report. The chain is sound.

work/SKILL.md dispatch model coverage — complete. The updated Step 5 correctly names three different dispatch paths and their model rules: (1) implementation dispatches inherit the seam binding structurally via implementation:implementer; (2) branch-owned fix re-dispatches use implementation:implementer when installed, else an explicit strong-tier alias; (3) monitor and post-green review-pass dispatches carry explicit per-invocation models (fast alias and strong alias respectively). No dispatch leaks the lane-root model.

CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL caveat — correctly documented in the gotcha block of implement-dispatch (L109). Any env value other than inherit outranks frontmatter bindings and every deliberate per-dispatch override alike. The loop-lane-prompts templates also warn against exporting this variable.

Audit surface — enumerable. The PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY.md patch adds the git grep -n '^model:' command as the audit path rather than a restated list. Running it against the current tree confirms all ten agent files are accounted for — the two new implementation agents bind opus, the six review agents carry their existing bindings, and the two discovery agents carry inherit by design.

Version bumps — correct. implementation 0.9.2 → 0.10.0 (new agents added) and work-items 0.25.4 → 0.26.0 (dispatch language updated) are appropriate minor version bumps.


Minor Observations

1. "Leave effort at its default" may confuse readers of the Models section.

loop-lane-prompts.md L369:

Leave effort at its default; Opus and Sonnet already default to high in Claude Code.

This applies to lane roots (the /loop launch invocations), but it appears in the same Models section that introduces the structural seam explanation. A reader who notices the agents bind effort: high might wonder why lane roots are told to leave effort at default if agents need to bind it. The current prose explains the rationale (session-level lowering is the risk, not the default), but a short parenthetical at that line clarifying the scope — "(applies to lane-root invocations; agents carry an explicit effort floor in their frontmatter to guard against a session-lowered value)" — would remove the apparent tension without changing any behavior.

2. implementer.md body quotes a source that verifies Agent depth-limit behavior as inference.

implementer.md L26–28 quotes the sub-agents page and flags that the "does its delegated work itself" behavior is from the cited URL. This is correctly hedged as an inference in the body (the PR description notes this explicitly). No action needed; just noting that the inference is load-bearing for anyone who briefs a deeply nested worker expecting fan-out.

3. phase-verifier's INCONCLUSIVE is advisory, not enforced by tooling.

The contract that prevents a partial-pass return is expressed in the body text, not in a tool restriction. An agent could technically return a misleading verdict. This is the expected state — there is no mechanism to enforce the output shape of a free-form response — and the INCONCLUSIVE contract is the right design given that constraint. Worth being aware of when reading verifier returns: the orchestrator should treat any return that does not include per-criterion verdicts for every criterion as implicitly INCONCLUSIVE.


Verdict

PASS. The design is correct, internally consistent, and well-aligned with the loop-lane convention §3 and plugin philosophy. The structural binding replaces a human-memory obligation with a harness-enforced floor, and the INCONCLUSIVE path prevents a truncated audit from reading as a verdict. No blocking issues found.

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Security Review — PR #1711

  • Gather context and understand request
  • Read PR diff and changed files
  • Analyze for security vulnerabilities
  • Post findings

Scope

Reviewed the 11 files changed in this PR only, per the security-review brief. No GitHub Actions workflow files are in scope. Static analysis concerns (unpinned actions, dangerous triggers, permission widening) deferred to zizmor's lane.


Overall verdict

No CRITICAL or IMPORTANT vulnerabilities found. This PR is a net security improvement: it closes a previously-open gap (silent model downgrade by root-session inheritance) and introduces an explicit INCONCLUSIVE return that prevents a truncated verifier audit from being mistaken for a PASS verdict.

Two design-level observations are noted below as SUGGESTION, both arising from the inherent limits of instruction-based tool cages in Claude Code agents rather than from mistakes in this diff.


SUGGESTION — phase-verifier's Bash inclusion means its "cage" is not a structural write restriction

Confidence: HIGH — the limitation is confirmed by the codebase's own philosophy doc.

The phase-verifier agent declares:

tools: "Read, Grep, Glob, Bash"

Its body then says: "Your tool cage deliberately bars Edit/Write and agent spawning; Bash remains available for inspection (diffs, greps, read-only checks), and mutating state through it is outside your contract — a verifier that touches the artifact it grades has voided its verdict."

The safety claim in the final clause ("a verifier that touches the artifact it grades has voided its verdict") is behaviorally true but structurally unenforced: Bash can rm, echo > file, git checkout, and so on. If the verifier uses Bash to modify the code under inspection and then returns PASS, the verdict is contaminated, but nothing in the cage structure stops this.

docs/PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY.md explicitly acknowledges this at the "Named-agent bar" section (lines 521–524):

"On tool cages: an allowlist that includes Bash bars Edit/Write and recursive spawning but is not read-only — Bash can write; state what the cage actually enforces, never 'read-only'"

The philosophy doc captures the limit correctly; the phase-verifier body's phrasing ("mutating state through it is outside your contract") is accurate but softer than the philosophy doc's clarity. Operators relying on the agent definition alone may form a stronger structural independence assumption than the cage actually delivers.

This is not a defect introduced by this PR — it is an inherent Claude Code platform constraint for Bash-capable agents. However, since this PR is the one that creates and publishes the agent definition, it's the right place to flag it. The independence guarantee the verifier provides is behavioral, not structural. No fix is required, but a future hardening pass could consider whether a read-only inspection path (no Bash, or a sandboxed shell with no write permissions) is achievable for the verifier surface.


SUGGESTION — CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL as a silent global override for all tier enforcement is documented only in loop prompts, not in the agent definitions

Confidence: HIGH — resolution order is confirmed at the cited harness docs page.

The PR correctly documents the model resolution order in implement-dispatch/SKILL.md and in loop-lane-prompts.md:

"Never export CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL — it silently outranks the bindings and every deliberate override alike."

This is correct per the platform docs (model config: environment variables, verified 2026-07-27). The concern is that an operator or CI/CD system that sets CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL in their environment (e.g. to pin a cheaper model for cost control) silently overrides the structural tier enforcement this PR introduces — the very gap this PR is meant to close.

The warning lives in the loop-prompt documentation but not in the implementer.md or phase-verifier.md agent definitions, which are the artifacts operators inspect when reasoning about the tier floor. An operator reading only the agent definition will see model: opus and believe opus is enforced; they will not see the environment variable caveat unless they also read the loop prompts.

Again, not a defect introduced by this PR — the platform behavior is pre-existing and this PR improves documentation of it. The suggestion is to add a one-line note to each agent definition's "Model binding" section naming CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL as the one override that outranks frontmatter. The SKILL.md already carries this; the agent definitions currently do not.


Other surfaces reviewed and found clean

Surface Disposition
Argument parsing (--wave-cap <N>) Floor/ceiling arithmetic described instruction-level; controls concurrency only, not security boundaries. Fractional and < 1 inputs explicitly bounded.
Shell snippets in work/SKILL.md Template/instructional form (LLM-interpreted, not exec'd directly); tracker IDs come from the provider adapter's validated output. No shell injection surface exposed by this diff.
Plugin manifest changes (plugin.json) Version bumps only; no new dependencies, no new mcpServers, no new bin/ entries.
INCONCLUSIVE return token Correctly closes the truncated-audit-as-verdict gap. Orchestrator re-dispatch on INCONCLUSIVE and escalation on second INCONCLUSIVE are both specified.
implementer tool list (Agent included) Nested spawn depth limited by platform; acknowledged in the agent body. Not introduced by this PR's security surface.
CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL: inherit carve-out Correctly excluded from the "outranks" statement ("set to anything but inherit"). No logic error.
Cross-vendor advisor path Presence-gated correctly; fallback to same-vendor fresh-context agent is the stated default.

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💡 Codex Review

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Reviewed commit: 9d466ccb6a

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Comment thread plugins/implementation/agents/implementer.md Outdated
…t to assigned briefs

The worker's STOP list treated an absent worktree path as an omission to refuse
on, unconditionally. That contradicted this same file's own description ("its
assigned or self-provisioned worktree") and the dispatch contract it composes:
under worker-side provisioning the orchestrator deliberately dispatches the first
phase before the worktree exists, and materializing it is the worker's mandated
first step. As written, every first phase of an autonomous run would STOP before
performing the step the brief assigns it.

The requirement now attaches to the assigned-worktree brief, where a path is the
only way the worker learns where to edit. A provisioning brief supplies the
branch and the provisioning instructions instead, and the worker discovers the
path and returns it. The refusal is preserved where it belongs: a brief carrying
neither an assigned path nor provisioning instructions still STOPs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0134vdV1jXJhzpSmeT7y5B8N
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PR Review

  • Gather context and understand the request
  • Read and analyze all changed files
  • Formulate comprehensive review

Summary

This review covers the updated PR state as of commit 03587cd (synchronize trigger). The structural mechanism is correct. One correctness gap in the CHANGELOG is noted, plus two carry-forward observations from the prior review that remain open.


Codex P1 Finding — Resolved

The Codex reviewer flagged that implementer.md unconditionally required a worktree path, which would block every first phase of an autonomous provisioning-side run. Commit 03587cd correctly addresses this.

The fix in implementer.md L12–18 now distinguishes three brief shapes:

Brief type What is required On absence
Assigned-worktree Worktree path STOP
Provisioning Branch name + provisioning instructions Worker materializes the worktree as first step
Neither (catch-all) STOP

The catch-all STOP for a brief carrying neither is preserved, so the safety invariant is maintained. The distinction is correct against the dispatch contract in implement-dispatch's provisioning clause.


Blocking

None. The PR is structurally correct and the P1 regression has been addressed.


Minor — CHANGELOG gap for the worktree-path fix

Commit 03587cd is a behavioral fix to a newly-introduced agent (implementer.md) and touches only that file — no CHANGELOG entry was added. The 0.10.0 section describes the implementer as having a STOP list for missing elements without noting that the worktree-path requirement is conditional. A reader upgrading from 0.9.x to 0.10.0 and building a provisioning brief against the CHANGELOG description would see no indication that the path is not required for provisioning flows.

A one-line addition under 0.10.0 "Changed" (or "Fixed") is sufficient:

Worktree path requirement scoped to assigned-worktree briefs. A provisioning brief supplies branch name and provisioning instructions in place of a path; materializing the worktree is the worker's mandated first step. A brief supplying neither still STOPs.

Fix this →


Carry-forward observations from the prior review (still open)

1. "Leave effort at its default" ambiguity — loop-lane-prompts.md L369

Leave effort at its default; Opus and Sonnet already default to high in Claude Code.

This applies to lane-root invocations, but it appears in the same Models section that introduces the structural seam. A reader who notices that implementer.md and phase-verifier.md bind effort: high explicitly may wonder why lane roots are told to leave effort at default if agents need to bind it. The rationale (session-level lowering is the risk, not the default) is explained nearby, but the scope of this sentence is unstated. A parenthetical — "(applies to lane-root invocations; agents carry an explicit effort floor in their frontmatter to guard against a session-lowered value)" — would remove the apparent tension. No behavior change needed.

2. CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL caveat absent from agent definitions

The override caveat lives in implement-dispatch/SKILL.md L109 and loop-lane-prompts.md, but neither implementer.md nor phase-verifier.md mention that CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL (set to anything but inherit) outranks their model frontmatter. An operator reading only the agent definitions sees model: opus and may form a stronger enforcement assumption than the platform delivers. A one-line note in each agent's "Model binding" section would close the gap.

Both observations are non-blocking suggestions; the enforcement mechanism introduced by this PR is correct as-is.


Verdict

PASS. The structural tier enforcement is sound, the Codex P1 regression is correctly fixed, and the INCONCLUSIVE/re-dispatch chain is complete. The only action item is a CHANGELOG entry for the worktree-path scoping fix.

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Security Review — PR #1711

  • Gather context and understand the request
  • Read PR diff and changed files
  • Analyze for security vulnerabilities (logic flaws, injection, auth gaps, credential handling)
  • Post findings

Scope

Reviewed the 11 changed files in this PR. This re-review follows a synchronize event whose HEAD (14014ea) is a merge of origin/main into the PR branch — the PR's own 11 changed files are materially unchanged from the prior review at 9d466ccb6a. The prior review's two SUGGESTION findings therefore carry forward; the analysis below confirms their status and reports the one new finding the re-review surfaced.

No GitHub Actions workflow files are in scope. Static analysis concerns (unpinned actions, dangerous triggers, permission-widening) deferred to zizmor's lane.


Overall verdict

No new CRITICAL or IMPORTANT vulnerabilities found. The two SUGGESTION findings from the 2026-07-28 security review carry forward unaddressed — they are correctly described as inherent platform constraints rather than defects in this diff. One new SUGGESTION is reported below.


SUGGESTION — implementer Agent tool grants open-ended nested prompt composition, not bounded sub-dispatch

Severity: SUGGESTION
Confidence: MEDIUM — the Agent tool's behavior is confirmed by the harness docs; the exploitability depends on whether attacker-controlled content can reach the implementer's context.

The implementer agent includes Agent in its tool cage:

tools: "Read, Edit, Write, Grep, Glob, Bash, WebFetch, WebSearch, Skill, Agent"

The body correctly notes the platform depth limit ("Claude Code withholds Agent from a subagent already at the spawn-depth limit"). However, the structural constraint is on depth only — it is not a constraint on what the implementer may put in a nested agent's system prompt. When an LLM uses the Agent tool, it authors the sub-prompt verbatim. A confused or adversarially-influenced implementer could therefore spawn a nested agent with an arbitrary system prompt — one that names a broader tool set, bypasses the brief's scope fence, or instructs the nested agent to exfiltrate content — without the orchestrator having visibility before dispatch.

The attack path requires content from the work tracker (issue title, body, labels) to survive the plan stage, the brief-composition stage, and the implementer's own reasoning intact enough to influence its sub-dispatch prompt. Each stage includes an LLM that should resist simple injection, making direct exploitation low-probability. The risk is non-zero because brief content is LLM-synthesized from issue content, and the implementer receives that brief with no further sanitization.

The Bash tool in the same cage is already a higher-capability surface — direct shell access is a more direct exfiltration path than nested dispatch. The Agent finding is distinct because Bash output is visible in the transcript while a nested agent's transcript is not surfaced to the orchestrator by default, making a confused sub-dispatch harder to detect.

This is not a defect introduced by a specific line in this diff — it is the inherent trust model for any agent whose cage includes Agent and whose prompts are derived from user-controlled tracker content. Worth flagging because this PR formalizes the implementer definition as the published dispatch surface for the marketplace.


Carry-forward findings from the 2026-07-28 review

Both SUGGESTION findings reported in the prior review remain open and were not addressed by this PR:

1. phase-verifier Bash inclusion — cage is not a structural write restriction.
The phase-verifier's tools: "Read, Grep, Glob, Bash" means Bash can write, delete, and execute — the independence guarantee is behavioral only. The agent body correctly states this ("mutating state through it is outside your contract") but the prior review's framing is accurate: an operator reading only the agent definition may form a stronger structural-independence assumption than the cage delivers. Confirmed as an inherent platform constraint, not a defect; no fix is required by this PR.

2. CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL override documented in SKILL.md and loop prompts but absent from agent definitions.
An operator reading only implementer.md or phase-verifier.md sees model: opus and will infer the floor is enforced, without seeing that CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL (set to any value other than inherit) outranks frontmatter. The warning lives in implement-dispatch/SKILL.md (L109) and loop-lane-prompts.md (L355–358) only. Still a documentation gap at the agent-definition layer.


Other surfaces reviewed and found clean for this re-review

Surface Disposition
Merge content from origin/main Six merged commits (bb0efe6, 3fcc50e, 8bd86e3, 326a8e6, c9879fb, 8a926ac, a09efd7) touch unrelated plugins; none intersect the 11 PR files. No new security surface.
03587cd (worktree-path fix merged from main) Scopes the worktree-path STOP to assigned-worktree briefs only. Correctness fix; reduces erroneous STOP paths. No security regression.
implementer model/effort frontmatter binding Correctly aliases rather than pinning a dated model ID. No trust boundary change.
phase-verifier INCONCLUSIVE contract Orchestrator re-dispatch on second inconclusive is specified; no new silent-PASS surface beyond what prior review noted.
Brief scope fence (ALLOWED/FORBIDDEN) Instruction-enforced only; no new structural mechanism. Pre-existing design constraint, not introduced by this PR.

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PR Review

  • Gather context and understand the request
  • Read and analyze all changed files
  • Assess Codex P1 finding against implementer.md
  • Formulate comprehensive review

Codex P1 Finding — Addressed

The Codex P1 comment flagged that implementer.md blocked autonomous first-phase dispatch by requiring a worktree path unconditionally, before the worker has provisioned one. That finding was valid when filed.

It was resolved by commit 03587cd ("fix(implementation): scope the implementer's worktree-path requirement to assigned briefs"), which is now in this branch. The current implementer.md L13–18 correctly draws the two-form distinction:

A worktree path is required of an assigned-worktree brief only. Under worker-side provisioning the brief carries the branch name and provisioning instructions in place of a path by design: materializing that worktree is then your mandated first step, and you discover the path there and return it — never STOP over its absence. What is never optional is one of the two: a brief that names neither an assigned path nor provisioning instructions is the omission that STOPs.

No action needed. The Codex finding is closed.


Review

The 2026-07-28 Claude review was comprehensive and remains accurate for the core substance of the PR. This pass covers the complete diff independently, with particular attention to the changes introduced after that review.

Structural binding — correct. Both implementer.md and phase-verifier.md carry model: opus and effort: high as aliases, not dated IDs. Tier definitions remain abstract in the convention doc; only these seam files name a concrete alias. The PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY.md audit path (git grep -n '^model:' -- 'plugins/*/agents/*.md') is self-maintaining and avoids the restated-list problem.

Worker-side provisioning path — correct (post-fix). The STOP condition is now "neither assigned path nor provisioning instructions," which is the correct predicate. Autonomous first-phase dispatch correctly reaches provisioning before it would ever evaluate a path requirement.

implement-dispatch dispatch step — correct. Step 2 names implementation:implementer as the subagent type explicitly. The upward-only model override rule is clearly stated. The CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL caveat at L109 covers the one remaining bypass vector.

INCONCLUSIVE chain — complete. phase-verifier contracts INCONCLUSIVE when it cannot decide every criterion; implement-dispatch's Phase boundaries section re-dispatches on gap and escalates like divergence on a second INCONCLUSIVE. The chain is closed.

loop-lane-prompts.md — consistent. Both instances of the "Dispatch model" block (worker lane at ~L450 and the second instance at ~L1280) are updated identically, replacing the "Dispatch model, every dispatch" mandatory-override rule with the narrower "overrides only" rule now that the seam enforces the common case. The CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL warning is present in both.

work-items:work Step 5 Execute — correctly states that when implementation is installed the tier binding is inherited structurally and no per-dispatch model admonition is needed, and when it is absent every source-touching dispatch carries an explicit alias. Three dispatch paths (implementer agent, monitor, post-green review) are each correctly characterized.

Version bumpsimplementation 0.9.2 → 0.10.0 (two new agents added, minor bump appropriate) and work-items 0.25.4 → 0.26.0 (dispatch language updated, minor bump appropriate).

Most recent merge commit (e02e6e8) brings in only .github/standards/runner-policy/policy.json (+9 lines) — a standards sync with no interaction with the PR's substance.


Verdict

PASS. The Codex P1 finding was valid and has been resolved. The tier enforcement lands structurally at the dispatch seam as intended, the INCONCLUSIVE path is fully wired, and the worker-side provisioning distinction is correct. No blocking issues found.

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Security Review — PR #1711

  • Gather context and understand request
  • Read PR diff and changed files
  • Analyze for security vulnerabilities (logic flaws, injection, auth gaps, credential handling)
  • Post findings

Scope

Reviewed the 11 changed files in this PR at HEAD e02e6e8. This re-review follows the second synchronize event; the PR's own 11 changed files are materially unchanged from the prior re-review at 14014ea. The merge commit (e02e6e8) absorbs only a4d9a2d (standards sync), which adds .github/standards/runner-policy/policy.json — a managed linter-policy file, no interaction with this PR's implementation surfaces. No new security surface is introduced by the merge.

No GitHub Actions workflow files are in scope. Static analysis concerns deferred to zizmor's lane.


Overall verdict

No new CRITICAL or IMPORTANT vulnerabilities found. The three SUGGESTION findings from the prior reviews carry forward unaddressed; they are correctly characterized as inherent platform constraints rather than defects in this diff. All are confirmed against the current tree.


Carry-forward findings confirmed at HEAD

SUGGESTION 1 — phase-verifier Bash inclusion; cage is not a structural write restriction

phase-verifier.md L4: tools: "Read, Grep, Glob, Bash". The body correctly states ("mutating state through it is outside your contract"), and docs/PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY.md's named-agent bar section (verified in tree) confirms the limit: an allowlist that includes Bash is not read-only. The independence guarantee the verifier provides is behavioral, not structural. Confirmed as an inherent platform constraint; no fix required by this PR.

SUGGESTION 2 — CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL override absent from agent definitions

The override caveat appears in implement-dispatch/SKILL.md L109 and loop-lane-prompts.md L355–358, but neither implementer.md nor phase-verifier.md carry a note in their "Model binding" sections. An operator reading only the agent definitions sees model: opus and may conclude the floor is enforced unconditionally. Still an open documentation gap at the agent-definition layer; a one-line note in each agent's Model binding section would close it.

SUGGESTION 3 — implementer Agent tool grants open-ended nested prompt composition

implementer.md L4: tools: "..., Agent". The depth limit is structural; the content of a nested agent's system prompt is not. An adversarially-influenced implementer (via issue content surviving the plan and brief-composition stages) could spawn a nested agent with a broader or differently-scoped prompt — one the orchestrator cannot inspect before dispatch. The attack path requires content injection to survive multiple LLM reasoning stages, making direct exploitation low-probability. The Bash tool in the same cage remains the higher-capability surface; this finding is distinct because nested agent transcripts are not surfaced to the orchestrator by default. Confirmed as an inherent trust-model concern for any agent whose cage includes Agent and whose prompts derive from tracker content.


Other surfaces reviewed and found clean for this re-review

Surface Disposition
a4d9a2d standards sync (.github/standards/runner-policy/policy.json +9 lines) Managed linter-policy file; no intersection with the 11 PR files or with any security surface
--wave-cap <N> argument from user_config Operator-controlled scalar; instruction-level interpretation only, no shell execution surface from the config value itself
Orchestrator use of worker-returned worktree path (git -C <path>, --worktree <path>) Worker is a trusted subagent; git operations on an invalid path fail gracefully; path manipulation requires the worker to be compromised, which presupposes the Agent-tool injection path already noted in SUGGESTION 3
PR body read-modify-write (gh pr view … --json body, then gh pr edit --body-file -) Correctly described as read-modify-write; the Closes #N keyword from the branch name is preserved by construction; no new closing-keyword injection surface beyond what any body-editing flow already carries
Worker early-push checkpoint Pushes to the feature branch before orchestrator verification — expected and documented; the build/test gate and acceptance-criteria verifier still gate the phase before [DONE] marking
implementer.md / phase-verifier.md CHANGELOG entry for worktree-path scoping fix Correctness gap (noted in prior review); not a security surface
Version bumps (implementation 0.10.0, work-items 0.26.0) No new dependencies, no new mcpServers, no new bin/ entries

kyle-sexton added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 29, 2026
…hapes, record the review boundary (#1712)

## What

Three loop-lane convention notes, all in
`docs/conventions/loop-lane/README.md`, batched because they
touch the same document.

**#1655 — pin the "`/loop` runs the prompt fresh, not the session"
distinction.** A relaunch is the
only context reset a loop lane gets; the note records that and points at
the authoritative surface in
`claude-ops` `lanes` rather than restating it.

**#1656 — reconcile the two launch shapes.** Supplying an interval
converts the loop to a cron
schedule subject to scheduler jitter; omitting it hands the delay to
Claude per iteration. Both are
current and neither deprecates the other. A lane always omits the
interval, and the note now gives
the load-bearing reason: a self-paced loop can end itself, which is how
a drain lane honors its own
stop condition, while a fixed-interval loop runs until stopped by hand
or until the seven-day expiry.
This reconciles which shape applies where and changes neither — it does
not endorse fixed intervals
for lanes.

**#1658 — record the fresh-context review boundary as an explicit
decision**, with its rationale and
a revisit condition, rather than leaving it as unstated practice.

## Verification

An independent fresh-context verifier audited the diff with the
rationale withheld and returned
**SHIP**: all eight of its earlier findings resolved, all three
acceptance criteria satisfied, no new
contradiction introduced. It did not trust its own passing link check —
it ran a negative control
with deliberately bogus anchors and confirmed exit 2 with `Cannot find
fragment`, proving
`include_fragments = "full"` genuinely validates the new anchors rather
than silently passing.

Every upstream claim was re-fetched from the official docs rather than
recalled, and the §4 seven-day
expiry statement was broadened to cover both launch shapes with its
stamp refreshed, since the prior
stamp covered only the self-paced half.

Gates: markdownlint 0 errors; `lychee --offline` 0 errors.

## Related

- Refs #1690, #1710, #1711, #1707 — sibling loops-webinar PRs. **Version
note:** concurrent PRs stage
competing versions for `docs/conventions/loop-lane/CHANGELOG.md`, and
`§Versioning` is silent on
entry ordering. The version here is correct as of this branch's merge
base; whichever of these PRs
  lands later will need to renumber and restack its entry.
- Refs #1657 — content-trust audit of the lane intake surfaces; no
overlap with these notes.

Closes #1655
Closes #1656
Closes #1658

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kyle-sexton added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 29, 2026
… and read the merge class from the label only (#1721)

## Summary

The #1657 design audit found this stack's autonomous work-item lanes
carry well-developed
*write-authority* provenance controls — who may merge, what may dispatch
— and no *content-trust*
boundary: nothing told an agent that externally-authored item and PR
prose is data to be evaluated
rather than instruction to be followed. This closes the two gaps the
audit ranked as carrying live
risk today, G1 (#1713) and G6 (#1289).

**G1 — the read-trust boundary now exists, stated once and cited
everywhere it binds.**
New `plugins/work-items/reference/item-content-trust.md` is its
canonical home: item-derived text
(title, body, comments, and any linked PR's text and diff) is data
describing the work, never
instruction to the agent reading it; the boundary keys on the surface
the text arrived on rather
than on who wrote it, so it applies to a teammate's item exactly as to a
stranger's; an item whose
text instructs the agent is a finding to report, not a request to
satisfy. The reference also owns
the escalation route, the widening rule, and the rule for handing item
text to a subagent.

Every surface that reads an item now carries the headline sentence plus
one line on what the
boundary bites hardest there, and cites the reference for the rest:

- `work-items` — `triage`, `decompose`, `work`, `work-loop`,
`attend-queue`
- `source-control` — `babysit-loop`, which reads PR text, diffs, and the
linked item
- `prompts/loops/loop-lane-prompts.md` — the parked-decision burn-down
block, which states outright
  that it invokes no skill and inlines every contract it needs

**G6 — no author-editable body field remains an input to the merge
partition.**
`babysit-loop`'s rung partition accepted "the triage stamp in the item
body **or** labels", so a
`Work-class: C<n>` trailer an item's own author can write decided merge
eligibility. It now reads
the class from the provider-permissioned `work-class:` label only —
applying a label takes triage or
write permission on the base repository, the same permission surface the
C5 trust test already keys
on, while a body is editable by an author who need hold none. A trailer
stays legitimate as the
operator's own record and as a proposal, is reported as such, and never
partitions. The three
surfaces the audit found in conflict — `babysit-loop/SKILL.md`,
`loop-lane-prompts.md`, and
`admission-policy.md` — now agree, and the lane prompts' readiness query
reports the label count and
the body-trailer migration backlog as separate figures instead of their
union.

Two smaller things fell out of doing this properly. `work-loop`'s
existing refusal of a
body-recorded ratification phrase justified itself from a work-class row
whose executable test reads
a *pull request*, which an issue does not have; the refusal is unchanged
and now derives from the
standing rule it is an instance of. And the reference's tightening-only
carve-out names its one
shipped instance and the configuration that would void it.

Reuse over invention throughout: the wording generalizes `work-loop`'s
existing body-prose refusals
rather than adding a parallel mechanism, and the subagent rule cites
`babysit-prs`'s existing
quoted-untrusted-data delimiter rather than restating it.

## Acceptance criteria

Against #1713:

- [x] Each named surface carries the instruction — `triage`,
`decompose`, `work-loop`, `work`,
      `attend-queue`, and the lane launch prompts.
- [x] Single-sourced: one authoritative statement in
`item-content-trust.md`, referenced from each
      surface, not six independent rewordings.
- [x] Traceable to the existing `babysit-prs/reference/orchestration.md`
pattern rather than newly
invented — the subagent rule cites that file's Worker Prompt Template
for the delimiter shape
      and wording.

Against #1289:

- [x] One contract owns where the admission work class comes from and
the other cites it —
`admission-policy.md` owns the rule; `babysit-loop` and
`item-content-trust.md` quote and cite
      it.
- [x] The rule states whether an agent-applied stamp is admissible: the
class is read only from a
surface whose write authority the provider enforces, and every lane
prompt forbids a lane from
      writing either the label or the trailer.
- [x] `babysit-loop`'s partition text matches the winning rule.
- [x] A lane cannot satisfy its own merge gate by stamping the item it
is working.

**Consumer impact.** A repository that recorded work classes only as
body trailers had a
merge-eligible population under the old reading and has an empty one
under this one: everything
there is human-merge, the shipped baseline, until `work-class:` labels
follow the trailers. The
change is strictly narrowing — nothing merges that would not have merged
before. The C4/C5 floor is
untouched; it always tested the pull request rather than the linked
item's stamp.

## Test plan

All gates green against `origin/main`:

- `bash scripts/check-changed-skills.sh origin/main` — 6 skills, 0
failed. Lines against the 500
hard cap: `babysit-loop` 477, `work-loop` 343, `work` 238,
`attend-queue` 204, `triage` 179,
  `decompose` 179.
- `node scripts/validate-plugin-contracts.mjs` — 43 setup skills, 2119
plugin files.
- `bash scripts/check-changelog-parity.sh --check` and `--check-bump
origin/main`.
- `npx markdownlint-cli2` over every changed `.md` — 0 errors.
- `plugins/work-items/skills/work-loop/evals/evals.json` validated
against
  `plugins/skill-quality/reference/evals.schema.json`.
- `bash scripts/validate-plugins.sh` — manifests and catalog.

One eval case added (`work-loop`, id 4, part of #1717): an item whose
body carries both an embedded
directive and a self-stamped work class, asserting the lane evaluates
the text, refuses both, and
reports what the text asked for.

Verification was run by an independent fresh-context reviewer against
the diff and the audit, with
the authoring rationale withheld. It returned five findings, all fixed
in `451fe3f6`: two surfaces
that inherit no skill's copy of the rule and so had none (`babysit-loop`
and the parked-decision
block), a carve-out claim stated unconditionally that only holds at the
shipped cap-ceiling
defaults, an eval expectation asserting a disposition the admission gate
does not reach, and two
unwrapped lines. `decompose` was added afterwards from #1713's own
surface list.

**Versioning.** `work-items` 0.25.4 → 0.26.0, `source-control` 0.33.2 →
0.34.0 — next minor at this
merge base. Both numbers are also staged by sibling PRs (#1690 and #1710
for both plugins, #1711 for
`work-items`); whichever of these lands second renumbers.
`docs/conventions/loop-lane/CHANGELOG.md`
is deliberately untouched: `docs/conventions/loop-lane/README.md` states
the merge partition's class
requirement neutrally as "recorded class" and never names the source, so
the convention text does
not change here.

**Audit gaps NOT addressed**, still open and separately tracked: #1714
(G2/G3), #1715 (G4/G5 — the
refusal's justification is corrected here, the underlying
issue-provenance ambiguity is not), #1716
(G7), #1717 (G10, beyond the one eval case above), #1718 (issue-shaped
provenance signal).

## Related

- Closes #1713 — G1, the missing content-trust instruction on every
intake surface.
- Refs #1289 — G6, the contract disagreement over whether a repo-local
stamp may supply the
  merge-admission work class.
- Note on #1289: this PR tightens the consuming side (the partition
reads the label only), but
#1289 is `needs-human, work-class: structural` and owns the underlying
contract decision, whose
acceptance criterion is still an unaccepted suggestion. It is
referenced, never closed — a
  maintainer closes it once that decision is made.
- Refs #1657 — the audit that produced this scope. It stays open: the
gaps beyond G1 and G6 are
  still a live operator decision.
- Concurrent PRs sharing changelog and manifest surfaces with this one:
#1690 (#1650), #1707
(#1652/#1654), #1710 (#1648), #1711 (#1649), #1712 (#1655/#1656/#1658).

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
kyle-sexton added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 29, 2026
…only) (#1719)

Phase 1 of #1651: turn each loop lane's spend from a blind spot into a
measured one, by recording a
per-cycle `usage_sample` in the lane telemetry state block that already
exists. Nothing reads the
field back. Phase 2 — a budget config key — is deliberately **not**
designed here, and no threshold,
cap, warning, pause, backoff, pacing change, or merge-rung change
derives from the sampled value.

## The signal, and why it is not a token count

The issue title says "token usage". This ships **window-percentage**
usage instead, because no token
count is readable at a lane's cycle boundary. What each lane actually
records is the reading its
rate-limit guard step already took that cycle:

- **Field:** `rate_limits.five_hour.used_percentage` /
`rate_limits.seven_day.used_percentage`
- **Produced by:** `plugins/rate-limit-guard/scripts/statusline-tee.sh`,
which selects `rate_limits`
  out of the status-line stdin payload and atomically rewrites
  `~/.claude/rate-limit-guard/rate-limits.json`
- **Doc:** <https://code.claude.com/docs/en/statusline> —
`used_percentage` is 0–100, `resets_at` is
Unix epoch seconds, and `rate_limits` appears only for Claude.ai
subscribers after the session's
first API response, with each window independently absent. Re-verified
2026-07-28; no drift.

Because the guard step already holds this value, the invariant costs a
write, not an observation.

**Why not tokens.** `context_window.total_input_tokens` /
`total_output_tokens` are documented as
token counts *currently in the context window, from the most recent API
response* — cumulative
session totals only before Claude Code v2.1.132. The `/usage`, `/goal`,
and `/workflows` figures the
issue cites are interactive displays, not values a skill body can parse
at a cycle step.

**One signal does exist, and is recorded as deferred rather than
denied.** `cost.total_cost_usd` is
documented as the session's client-side accumulated cost, resetting on
`/clear` — machine-readable
and session-scoped, so it *would* attribute to a single lane. The tee
does not forward it. Widening
the tee is a `rate-limit-guard` change (its own bump plus a
reader-contract amendment) and is out of
scope for a measure-only item, so this PR records it as the deferred
candidate with its trigger
rather than claiming no signal exists.

## Caveats, re-derived rather than inherited

The issue's acceptance criterion names "approximate, machine-local".
Both are recorded, but
attributed to what they actually describe:

- **Approximate** was a `/usage` caveat and does not hold for
`used_percentage`, which the
status-line schema documents without qualification. The real bound is
the guard's staleness rule,
so the sample is described as a snapshot no fresher than that rule
allows.
- **Machine-local** describes the *tee file* — last-writer-wins, no
account identifier — not the
  reading, which is account-scope. The two are now stated separately.
- **Disclosed gap:** the tee refreshes only while an interactive session
renders a status line, and
a lane is by construction a `claude --bg` session. An unattended lane
with no interactive window
open samples `null` every cycle. An empty sample therefore means
*unobserved*, never zero. This is
stated rather than glossed, because the framing "the reading is already
in hand" otherwise hides
  it.

## Scope

- Extends the existing `#502` durable-state block in both loop lanes —
no second telemetry
mechanism. `plugins/claude-ops/skills/lanes/scripts/telemetry-upsert.sh`
is body-opaque and
validates no schema, so it needs no change; nothing else in the repo
parses the state block.
- The schema tag stays `@1`: the added key is additive-optional and no
reader validates the shape.
- The attended `attend-queue` lane is unaffected — §4 binds loop lanes,
and that lane holds no
  durable-state block.
- `plugins/autonomy/reference/` is untouched. That tree holds the OTLP
telemetry contract, not the
lane state-block shape; the shape lives in the loop-lane convention and
the two lane bodies.

## Versioning — renumbered as predicted

The competing numbers this PR's table anticipated all landed first, so
every version here was
re-derived against `origin/main` at merge time rather than against this
branch's original merge
base:

| File | Now | Superseded by what landed |
|---|---|---|
| `docs/conventions/loop-lane/CHANGELOG.md` | `6.0.0` | #1690 took
`4.0.0`, #1710 took `5.0.0` |
| `plugins/source-control` | `0.39.0` | #1690 `0.35.0`, #1710 `0.36.0`,
plus `0.37.0` and `0.38.0` landing mid-merge |
| `plugins/work-items` | `0.29.0` | #1690 `0.27.0`, #1710 `0.28.0` |

The loop-lane bump stays **major** on the convention's own discriminator
— §4 states loop-layer
invariants and this adds one every loop-lane body must carry. The
competing minor reading (a field
nothing reads back changes no behavior) is recorded in the entry per the
established pattern. The
convention entry was also moved back to the top of its changelog, where
the merge had left it below
the entries that landed ahead of it.

`§Versioning` re-derivation trigger 2 is satisfied: the status-line
claim was re-verified against its
cited page and the stamp refreshed, recorded as a changelog entry.
`rate-limit-guard`'s reader
contract carries its own 2026-07-23 stamp on the same page; it is
unchanged by this PR and its
refresh belongs to that plugin's own bump.

## Composition with the two features that landed first

Both lane bodies now carry three loop-layer features in one cycle step
and one state block: the
no-progress streak (#1648), the escalation record write (#1650), and
this usage sample. Composing
them pushed `babysit-loop`'s `SKILL.md` past the 500-line hard cap, so
two things were tightened
without changing any contract:

- The usage-sample prose in **both** lane bodies keeps the field
contract (the `at` semantics, every
`null` rule, the delta's roll-over and first-cycle cases) and cites §4
for the single permitted
readback, the preceding-interval delta, and the three bounding
properties — all of which §4
already states in full. §4's own wording changed from "recorded
alongside the sample in each lane
  body" to "held by citation from each lane body" to match.
- `babysit-loop`'s telemetry upsert mechanics — the singleton lookup and
the creation-race reconcile
— moved to `reference/telemetry-upsert.md`, beside the
`pre-escalation-dispatch.md` and
`no-progress-detector.md` spokes already there. Still inlined in this
plugin rather than invoked
  from `claude-ops`, for the same reason as before.

## Verification

Gates green after the merge: `check-changed-skills.sh` (babysit-loop
486/500 and work-loop 451/500
against the hard 500-line cap, both re-measured with all three features
composed),
`check-changelog-parity.sh --check` and `--check-bump origin/main`, and
markdownlint over every
changed markdown file. No `evals.json` is touched.

A fresh-context verifier audited the diff with the rationale withheld
and traced the tee's producer
and the live status-line doc independently. Its findings drove the
cumulative-cost correction, the
caveat re-attribution, the background-session disclosure, and the
removal of a cited precedent that
did not exist. Its remaining version-collision finding is the table
above.

## Related

- #1690 (#1650) — merged; took loop-lane `4.0.0` and both plugin bumps,
and writes the escalation
  record into the same cycle step this PR extends
- #1710 (#1648) — merged; took loop-lane `5.0.0` and both plugin bumps,
and adds the no-progress
  streak to the same state block and cycle step
- #1712 (#1655/#1656/#1658) — took loop-lane `3.1.0`
- #1711 (#1649) — stages a `work-items` bump; still open
- #1707 (#1652/#1654) — concurrent lane work, no file overlap
- Phase 2 (`*_session_token_budget`) stays deferred until this sampling
produces data, per the
  issue's own staging.

Closes #1651

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
main landed work-items 0.29.0 while this branch was in review, so this
branch's entry moves to 0.30.0 in both the changelog and the manifest,
with both sides' entries retained. `implementation` 0.10.0 already sits
above main's 0.9.2 and keeps its number.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TkLLDcB8Ht2tm3j688F5ZP
@claude

claude Bot commented Jul 29, 2026

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Claude finished @kyle-sexton's task in 2m 19s —— View job


PR Review

  • Gather context and understand the request
  • Inspect the latest merge commit and diff since last review
  • Confirm carry-forward observations from prior reviews
  • Formulate and post final review

Summary

This review covers HEAD 15081a8 — a merge of origin/main (d826b5c, standards sync) into this branch. The 11 PR files are materially unchanged from the e02e6e8 review. The only substantive change introduced by the merge is a version conflict resolution in work-items.


Version Conflict Resolution — Correct

Main landed work-items 0.29.0 while this branch was in review. The merge resolves:

  • work-items: 0.26.0 (branch) vs 0.29.0 (main) → 0.30.0 in both plugin.json and CHANGELOG.md, with both entries retained.
  • implementation: 0.10.0 (branch) already sits above main's 0.9.2; no change needed.

The resolution is correct. The CHANGELOG retains the full 0.29.0 entry from main and places the 0.30.0 entry on top of it, preserving the changelog's monotone ordering.


Carry-forward Observations — Status Unchanged

All three non-blocking observations from prior reviews remain open:

1. "Leave effort at its default" scope is unstated — loop-lane-prompts.md ~L380

Leave effort at its default; Opus and Sonnet already default to high in Claude Code.

This applies to lane-root invocations but sits in the same Models section that introduces the structural seam binding (where implementer.md and phase-verifier.md each bind effort: high explicitly). A reader may wonder why agents bind effort if the defaults are already high. A parenthetical clarifying scope — "(applies to lane-root invocations; agents carry an explicit effort floor in their frontmatter to guard against a session-lowered value)" — would close the apparent tension. No behavior change.

2. CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL override absent from agent definitions

Neither implementer.md nor phase-verifier.md names CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL as the one bypass that outranks their model frontmatter. The caveat lives in implement-dispatch/SKILL.md (L109) and loop-lane-prompts.md but not in the agent definitions an operator reads when reasoning about the tier floor. A one-line note in each agent's Model binding section would close the gap. Fix this →

3. CHANGELOG gap for the worktree-path scoping fix

The 0.10.0 section describes the tier binding and dispatch cadence thoroughly but contains no explicit note that the implementer.md agent's worktree-path STOP requirement is conditional on brief type (assigned vs. provisioning). A reader upgrading from 0.9.x against the CHANGELOG entry alone would not know the path is optional for provisioning briefs. A "Fixed" bullet under 0.10.0 covering commit 03587cd would close this. Fix this →


Verdict

PASS. The merge is clean, the version conflict resolution is correct, and the PR's structural enforcement mechanism is unchanged. All three carry-forward observations remain non-blocking suggestions.

@claude

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Security Review — PR #1711

  • Gather context and understand request
  • Read PR diff and changed files
  • Analyze for security vulnerabilities (logic flaws, injection, auth gaps, credential handling)
  • Post findings

Scope

Reviewed the 11 changed files in this PR at HEAD 15081a8. This re-review follows a synchronize event; the merge commit absorbs only d826b5c (standards sync — .github/standards/runner-policy/policy.json), a managed linter-policy file with no intersection with any of the 11 PR files. The PR's own implementation surfaces are materially unchanged from the prior re-review at e02e6e8.

No GitHub Actions workflow files are in scope. Static analysis concerns deferred to zizmor's lane.


Overall verdict

No new CRITICAL or IMPORTANT vulnerabilities found. The three SUGGESTION findings from prior reviews all carry forward unaddressed; they are correctly characterized as inherent platform constraints rather than defects in this diff. All confirmed against the current tree.


Carry-forward findings confirmed at HEAD

SUGGESTION 1 — phase-verifier Bash inclusion; cage is not a structural write restriction

Severity: SUGGESTION | Confidence: HIGH

phase-verifier.md L4: tools: "Read, Grep, Glob, Bash". The body correctly states that mutating state is outside the agent's contract, and PLUGIN-PHILOSOPHY.md's named-agent bar section (lines 521–524, confirmed in tree) is explicit: an allowlist that includes Bash is not read-only — Bash can write, delete, and execute. The behavioral independence guarantee is sound but not structural. An operator reading only the agent definition may form a stronger structural-isolation assumption than the cage actually delivers.

No fix required by this PR; the limit is an inherent Claude Code platform constraint for Bash-capable agents.


SUGGESTION 2 — CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL override absent from agent definitions

Severity: SUGGESTION | Confidence: HIGH

The override caveat appears in implement-dispatch/SKILL.md L109 and loop-lane-prompts.md L367–370, but neither implementer.md nor phase-verifier.md note in their Model binding sections that CLAUDE_CODE_SUBAGENT_MODEL set to any value other than inherit outranks frontmatter. An operator reading only the agent definitions sees model: opus and may conclude the floor is unconditionally enforced — the very gap this PR aims to close can be silently re-opened by a CI/CD environment variable. A one-line note in each agent's Model binding section would close the documentation gap.

Fix this →


SUGGESTION 3 — implementer Agent tool grants open-ended nested prompt composition

Severity: SUGGESTION | Confidence: MEDIUM

implementer.md L4: tools: "..., Agent". The depth limit is structural; the content of a nested agent's system prompt is not. An adversarially-influenced implementer — via issue content surviving the plan-stage and brief-composition-stage LLM reasoning intact enough to alter its sub-dispatch — could author a nested agent prompt that bypasses the brief's scope fence or instructs the nested agent to exfiltrate content, without the orchestrator having visibility before dispatch. Nested agent transcripts are not surfaced to the orchestrator by default, making a confused sub-dispatch harder to detect than a Bash write (which appears in the transcript).

The attack path requires attacker-controlled content to survive multiple LLM reasoning stages, making direct exploitation low-probability. The Bash tool in the same cage remains the higher-capability direct exfiltration surface. This is an inherent trust-model concern for any agent whose cage includes Agent and whose prompts derive from tracker content; no fix is required by this PR.


Other surfaces reviewed and found clean

Surface Disposition
d826b5c standards sync merge .github/standards/runner-policy/policy.json only; no intersection with the 11 PR files
--wave-cap <N> from user_config Operator-controlled scalar; instruction-level LLM arithmetic only, no shell execution surface from the config value itself
Worker-returned worktree path (git -C <path>) Worker is a trusted subagent; git rejects invalid paths gracefully; exploitability presupposes the Agent-tool injection path in SUGGESTION 3
gh pr view … --json bodygh pr edit --body-file - Read-modify-write correctly described; Closes #N preserved by construction; no new injection surface beyond what any body-editing flow already carries
Claim script invocation ("$TRACKER" claim "<id>") Instructional form, LLM-interpreted; <id> comes from the adapter's validated output; no shell injection surface exposed by this diff
implementer.md / phase-verifier.md model/effort frontmatter Alias-based (not dated IDs); tier definitions remain abstract in convention doc; correct per loop-lane §3
INCONCLUSIVE chain Two INCONCLUSIVEs on the same criteria escalate like a divergence report; no infinite-loop surface
Version bumps (implementation 0.10.0, work-items 0.30.0) No new dependencies, no new mcpServers, no new bin/ entries

@kyle-sexton
kyle-sexton merged commit 970d0cb into main Jul 29, 2026
33 checks passed
@kyle-sexton
kyle-sexton deleted the feat/1649-tier-enforcement branch July 29, 2026 20:46
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Make loop-lane model tiering effective: enforce tier model bindings at the dispatch seam

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