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plugins: guard against command injection - #4111

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brandon-paupore-sndk wants to merge 1 commit into
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SanDisk-Open-Source:cmd-injection-protection
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brandon-paupore-sndk wants to merge 1 commit into
linux-nvme:masterfrom
SanDisk-Open-Source:cmd-injection-protection

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@brandon-paupore-sndk

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Prior usage of system() directly allowed for malicious paths to be supplied such that other commands could be executed. This updates all affected call sites in the Sandisk and wdc plugins to avoid the issue.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Lien jeff.lien@sandisk.com

Prior usage of system() directly allowed for malicious paths to be
supplied such that other commands could be executed. This updates all
affected call sites in the Sandisk and wdc plugins to avoid the issue.

Reviewed-by: Jeff Lien <jeff.lien@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Brandon Paupore <brandon.paupore@sandisk.com>
@brandon-paupore-sndk

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This should address the Sandisk and wdc plugin aspects of issue #4092.

@igaw

igaw commented Oct 2, 2026

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The goal is to get rid of calling external programs. See #4114

@igaw igaw closed this Oct 2, 2026
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