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fix(codex): classify revoked native sessions without stale attribution - #6515
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…its last plan ChatGPT revokes every session of an account whose plan changes (for example Pro to Free) and answers usage reads with 401 `token_invalidated`, while the access token's `exp` is still in the future. The main-account probe treated that 401 as transient, so the account kept `needsReauth: false`, its plan and quota went to null, and nothing told the operator to sign in again. - `token_invalidated` joins the terminal auth codes (one list, now shared with the CLI projection). - The quota-refresh diagnostic carries the terminal provider code (`quotaRefresh.code`), a fixed vocabulary, so a caller can say why. - A main row quarantined by this call's 401 reports `reauthReason: "unauthorized"` instead of `refresh_failed`. - A failed usage read keeps the last-known plan instead of nulling it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Included review availability: This review used your included allowance. Your plan provides up to 10 included reviews per hour; 1 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe main Codex account probe now classifies terminal auth responses and includes recognized codes in quota-refresh diagnostics. Account snapshots expose refresh outcomes only for live data and retain the last-known plan after failed reads. Tests and documentation cover these changes. ChangesCodex auth diagnostics
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The change clarifies when a revoked session requires sign-in, preserves the last-known plan, and limits diagnostics to recognized codes. No confirmed issue warrants delaying merge. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🔵 Low · up to The change tightens failure attribution and quarantines recognized revoked sessions rather than granting access. Credential and freshness checks limit stale-response effects. Native-client credential replacement and integrated release behavior remain unverified. Retained concerns Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
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Review comments at @src/codex/auth-api/account-list.ts:
- Around line 370-371: Update the reauthentication-status mapping that checks
liveQuotaRefresh so it reports "unauthorized" only when the current refresh
classified the 401 as terminal and created the reauthentication mark; otherwise
keep "refresh_failed". Add a regression test for an existing mark followed by a
live bare 401.
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📒 Files selected for processing (13)
devlog/_plan/261003_release_native_accounts/000_public_scope.mddocs-site/src/content/docs/reference/configuration/server.mdscripts/test-layout/layout.jsonsrc/codex/auth-api/account-list.tssrc/codex/auth-api/main-account-probe.tssrc/codex/auth-api/pool-quota-probe.tssrc/codex/quota-refresh-outcome.tsstructure/dashboard-and-usage.mdtests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.tstests/codex-integration/codex-main-token-invalidated.test.tstests/codex-integration/main-account-hard-lock-recovery.test.tstests/fixtures/test-layout-expected.jsontests/providers/provider-quota.test.ts
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Owner-authorized progressive maintainer integration into dev for release stabilization; this records an integration/security decision, not a self-approval. I reviewed the native quota/auth response classification, diagnostic projection and both attribution repairs. Only allowlisted terminal provider codes are exposed; a bare 401 from a verifiably live token stays transient. Last-known plan is retained as diagnostic context, not fresh quota or entitlement. A current terminal probe result plus the existing identity-generation fence now attributes unauthorized; a transient 401 cannot relabel an earlier refresh failure, and an old diagnostic cannot label a replacement credential. The private terminal-result marker is not added to the public DTO/cache. Independent review and the exact regression cases cover these distinctions. The failed intermediate CI is retained: provider-quota's unknown-plan count changed because last-known plan retention is intentional. Only that changed diagnostic expectation was corrected; coverage-only presentation, zero included accounts and no numeric fallback assertions remain. The later causal-attribution P2 was reproduced and fixed, with expired-token 401, allowlisted 403, transient 401 and stale-generation coverage retained. All currently published review findings are resolved. I also checked the live integration delta and conflict-free union. Current dev's request/error, Ollama replay and Antigravity pricing changes do not replace this native-main quota/auth code. Both test registries remain in parity, the original/new registrations survive, and the repository's actual line-cap evaluator passes the merged tree. Source #6496's contributor credit is retained. No live revoked-account or packaged/native-client behavior is inferred from synthetic tests; final independent integrated regression and full cross-platform CI remain required before release. Hosted receipt: https://github.com/lidge-jun/opencodex/actions/runs/37132811309, attempt 1, pull_request, tested head |
Carry the credential-provenance and refresh work from #6507 (6108244 and 7ffd1a8). Bind native refusal to the physical profile and grant, preserve caller-owned credentials across preview and retry, and retain only fixed refresh diagnostics. Keep terminal-probe attribution from the parent #6515 correction. Co-authored-by: Vadym O <bolein95@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Summary
8b645854fcae802c93c516a10245f9c3b7eabb76). A recognizedtoken_invalidatedresponse now marks the native main account as needing sign-in and retains its last-known plan. Live bare 401s and generic 403/5xx responses retain their transient behavior.This is the quota/probe slice. Stored-main refresh/provenance work follows separately; coordinator owns integration, source-PR disposition and release verification.
Verification
bun test tests/codex-integration/codex-main-token-invalidated.test.ts tests/codex-integration/codex-auth-api.test.ts tests/codex-integration/main-account-hard-lock-recovery.test.ts tests/cli/cli-account.test.ts tests/test-layout.test.ts tests/test-layout-tooling.test.ts: 588 pass / 0 fail.bun test tests/providers/provider-quota.test.ts: 175 pass / 0 fail. The retained known plan changes the unknown-plan diagnostic count; stale/missing quota exclusions and all numeric-fallback assertions remain unchanged.bun run typecheck,bun run privacy:scan,bun run structure:check,bun scripts/file-size-ratchet.ts, andgit diff --check: pass.bun run buildindocs-site: pass (561 pages, 77,929 internal links).lane=allevidence.Current head:
2a665a16af8b205f9512923039ca4126c10554cd. Fresh Cross-platform CI37132811309, pull_request attempt1: SUCCESS, including all four test shards and applicable gates at this exact head. Native diagnostic/desktop jobs outside ordinary PR coverage remain unverified. The accepted causal-attribution review finding is fixed with internal terminal-probe provenance: pre-existing reauth plus a transient bare/unknown 401 keepsrefresh_failed; expired-token terminal 401 and allowlisted terminal 403 reportunauthorized. The stale-generation regression remains. New matrix: 6 pass / 3 fail before the fix; 750 pass / 0 fail across five focused auth/quota/CLI/provider files after it, plus independent 9 pass / 0 fail. Same independent security closure review: PASS; typecheck/privacy/structure/whitespace pass.Checklist
Co-authored-by: Vadym O bolein95@gmail.com
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) noreply@anthropic.com
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