chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/text to v0.41.0

[Copilot]

Routine patch bump of the direct dependency golang.org/x/text, originally proposed by Repo Assist but blocked because go.mod/go.sum are protected files.

Changes

• go.mod — golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 → v0.41.0
• go.sum — updated hashes for x/text v0.41.0; go mod tidy also advanced the indirect golang.org/x/tools entry v0.47.0 → v0.48.0 to match the new x/text module graph

No source changes; x/text is used only transitively for text handling and this release carries no behavioral changes affecting this codebase.

• Fixes [Repo Assist] chore(deps): bump golang.org/x/text to v0.41.0 #11783

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

Updates the direct golang.org/x/text dependency while preserving compatibility with Go 1.26.4.

Changes:

• Bumps golang.org/x/text from v0.40.0 to v0.41.0.
• Refreshes checksums, including x/tools v0.48.0 required by the updated module graph.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
go.mod	Updates the direct x/text dependency.
go.sum	Records matching x/text and x/tools checksums.

Review details

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• Files reviewed: 1/2 changed files
• Comments generated: 0
• Review effort level: Balanced

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — default

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: default AWF (normal container isolation)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (list_issues/PRs/commits, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all 7 tools ABSENT from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (list_issues, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B gap: All 7 write tools (add_issue_comment, star_repository, issue_write, create_branch, create_or_update_file, create_pull_request) were absent from the 23-tool MCP catalog. The backend is launched with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1, so tools are never registered. This confirms the gh-aw defense-in-depth guarantee but cannot independently confirm gateway-level DIFC/guard enforcement. No writes leaked.

⚠️ Parts D+E gap: gh CLI is not authenticated in this environment (GH_TOKEN not set). All REST and GraphQL write attempts returned a "set GH_TOKEN" error before reaching the GitHub API. Gateway-level REST/GraphQL write blocking via token-scope boundary could not be validated. No writes leaked.

References: §32740931990

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (default AWF runtime) by Read-Only Stress: default runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — docker-sbx

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: docker-sbx (KVM-isolated microVM)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (issues/PRs/file/commits)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all 7 tools ABSENT from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (list_issues, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	401 Bad credentials	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	401 Bad credentials	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: All 7 write tool targets (add_issue_comment, star_repository, issue_write, create_branch, create_or_update_file, create_pull_request) were absent from the MCP tool catalog. The gateway exposed exactly 23 read-only tools (mirroring GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 backend config). Since no write tool was present in the catalog, gateway-level DIFC enforcement could not be independently exercised — refusal proves backend/toolset config, not the gateway's own blocking layer. Recorded as INCONCLUSIVE per methodology.

⚠️ Parts D & E: gh CLI has an invalid GH_TOKEN in this environment (401 Bad credentials on every call). All REST write and GraphQL mutation attempts returned 401 — this is an authentication gap, not confirmed gateway enforcement. The token-scope boundary cannot be validated for this run.

No writes leaked. The security posture for this runtime appears correct, but the methodology gaps above mean gateway-layer enforcement was not independently confirmed on this run.

Run: §32740932078

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (docker-sbx runtime) by Read-Only Stress: docker-sbx runtime