[Repo Assist] refactor(rust-guard): use field_names constants for full_name/fullName literals

[github-actions]

🤖 This is an automated pull request from Repo Assist, an AI assistant for this repository.

Summary

Closes #11439.

Replaces the raw string literals "full_name" / "fullName" in repo_id_from_repo_object (labels/backend.rs) with field_names constants, matching the convention already used elsewhere in the file (e.g. field_names::LOGIN).

Rationale

repo_id_from_repo_object was the only call site mixing raw string literals with the shared field_names constants module, even though field_names::FULL_NAME already existed and is used in response_paths.rs, helpers.rs, and response_items.rs. There was no existing constant for the camelCase "fullName" variant, so this call site risked a silent typo diverging from the snake_case constant used elsewhere.

Changes

• Added field_names::FULL_NAME_CAMEL = "fullName" next to field_names::FULL_NAME in labels/constants.rs.
• Updated repo_id_from_repo_object in labels/backend.rs to iterate over [field_names::FULL_NAME, field_names::FULL_NAME_CAMEL] instead of raw literals.

Trade-offs

• Purely mechanical, behavior-preserving change — no logic difference.
• Test-only literals (e.g. JSON fixtures in #[cfg(test)] modules) were left untouched, since they are literal JSON payload contents, not guard logic.

Test Status

• cargo build (guards/github-guard/rust-guard) — ✅ succeeded
• cargo test (guards/github-guard/rust-guard) — ✅ 642 passed, 0 failed

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[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — default

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: default AWF (normal container isolation)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A1	MCP	list_issues	3 issues returned	ALLOWED	✅
A2	MCP	list_pull_requests	3 PRs returned	ALLOWED	✅
A3	MCP	get_file_contents (README.md)	content returned	ALLOWED	✅
A4	MCP	list_commits	3 commits returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (add_issue_comment/star/issue_write/create_branch/create_or_update_file/create_pull_request)	all absent from tool catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C1	CLI	list_issues	3 issues returned	ALLOWED	✅
C2	CLI	get_file_contents	content returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	gh unauthenticated (no GH_TOKEN)	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	gh unauthenticated (no GH_TOKEN)	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: All write tools (add_issue_comment, star_repository, issue_write, create_branch, create_or_update_file, create_pull_request) were absent from the MCP tool catalog (backend launched with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 per gh-aw framework). This confirms the backend-level defense-in-depth but does not independently confirm gateway-layer (DIFC/guard) write blocking. Per test plan, this is INCONCLUSIVE, not FAIL.

⚠️ Parts D/E: gh CLI is not authenticated in this environment (no GH_TOKEN). All REST/GraphQL write attempts returned auth errors, not gateway-enforced refusals. Cannot validate token-scope boundary in this run.

No write leaked through any surface. INCONCLUSIVE due to structural test methodology gaps (backend READONLY mode + no gh token), not due to any gateway failure.

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (default AWF runtime) by Read-Only Stress: default runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — gVisor (runsc)

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: gVisor (sandbox.agent.runtime: gvisor)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	list_issues	3 issues returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	list_pull_requests	3 PRs returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	get_file_contents (README.md)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
A	MCP	list_commits	3 commits returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all: unknown tool [-32602]	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	list_issues (github CLI)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
C	CLI	get_file_contents (github CLI)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	—	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	—	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: All 7 write tools absent from the MCP catalog (Error [-32602]: unknown tool). The backend is launched with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1, so write tools are never registered — this confirms the gh-aw framework defense-in-depth guarantee but does not independently confirm mcpg's own DIFC/guard enforcement layer. No writes leaked.

⚠️ Parts D & E: gh is not authenticated in this environment (You are not logged into any GitHub hosts). REST and GraphQL write attempts via gh could not be performed. Authentication gap prevents token-scope boundary validation for this run.

No writes succeeded. All Part A/C reads returned data as expected.

References: §32140209049

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (gVisor runtime) by Read-Only Stress: gVisor runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — docker-sbx

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: docker-sbx (KVM-isolated microVM)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (issues/PRs/file/commits)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all tools absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (list_issues, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	401 unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	401 unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: The github CLI tool catalog exposes exactly 23 read-only tools; all 7 write tools tested (add_issue_comment, star_repository, issue_write, create_branch, create_or_update_file, create_pull_request) were absent (unknown tool [-32602]). This is consistent with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 backend configuration — it confirms gh-aw's own defense-in-depth but does not independently confirm mcpg's DIFC/guard layer, since write tools never reach the gateway.

⚠️ Parts D & E: gh returned 401 Bad credentials for all write attempts. The token in GH_TOKEN is invalid for this environment, so the token-scope boundary cannot be validated. No writes succeeded; no data was created.

No writes leaked. No FAIL conditions.

References: §32140209103

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (docker-sbx runtime) by Read-Only Stress: docker-sbx runtime

[Copilot]

Review details

• Files reviewed: 2/2 changed files
• Comments generated: 0 new
• Review effort level: Balanced