Update Fleet-maintained apps - #45904
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WalkthroughThis pull request updates release metadata for four macOS maintained applications by bumping their version numbers in Possibly related PRs
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 inconclusive)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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🧹 Nitpick comments (1)
ee/maintained-apps/outputs/whatsapp/darwin.json (1)
12-12: WhatsApp installer integrity is not verified.The
sha256: "no_check"setting means downloaded installers are not cryptographically verified, creating a security risk if the download is compromised. This appears to be intentional due to WhatsApp's dynamic download URL, but consider whether there's an alternative approach to verify installer integrity.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@ee/maintained-apps/outputs/whatsapp/darwin.json` at line 12, The manifest uses the insecure setting sha256: "no_check" which skips integrity verification for the WhatsApp installer; replace this with a concrete verification step: change the sha256 value to the actual checksum computed from the official installer or implement a dynamic checksum-fetch routine that retrieves a signed checksum or signature file from WhatsApp (or a trusted mirror) and verifies the downloaded binary before install; update the code that reads the sha256 field (the manifest entry "sha256") to fail the install on mismatch and document the process for keeping the checksum updated when the WhatsApp download URL changes.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Nitpick comments:
In `@ee/maintained-apps/outputs/whatsapp/darwin.json`:
- Line 12: The manifest uses the insecure setting sha256: "no_check" which skips
integrity verification for the WhatsApp installer; replace this with a concrete
verification step: change the sha256 value to the actual checksum computed from
the official installer or implement a dynamic checksum-fetch routine that
retrieves a signed checksum or signature file from WhatsApp (or a trusted
mirror) and verifies the downloaded binary before install; update the code that
reads the sha256 field (the manifest entry "sha256") to fail the install on
mismatch and document the process for keeping the checksum updated when the
WhatsApp download URL changes.
ℹ️ Review info
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
ee/maintained-apps/outputs/arc/darwin.jsonee/maintained-apps/outputs/grammarly-desktop/darwin.jsonee/maintained-apps/outputs/raycast/darwin.jsonee/maintained-apps/outputs/whatsapp/darwin.json
Automated ingestion of latest Fleet-maintained app data.
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