[dependabot]

Bumps actions/download-artifact from 7 to 8.

Release notes

Sourced from actions/download-artifact's releases.

v8.0.0

v8 - What's new

[!IMPORTANT] actions/download-artifact@v8 has been migrated to an ESM module. This should be transparent to the caller but forks might need to make significant changes.

[!IMPORTANT] Hash mismatches will now error by default. Users can override this behavior with a setting change (see below).

Direct downloads

To support direct uploads in actions/upload-artifact, the action will no longer attempt to unzip all downloaded files. Instead, the action checks the Content-Type header ahead of unzipping and skips non-zipped files. Callers wishing to download a zipped file as-is can also set the new skip-decompress parameter to true.

Enforced checks (breaking)

A previous release introduced digest checks on the download. If a download hash didn't match the expected hash from the server, the action would log a warning. Callers can now configure the behavior on mismatch with the digest-mismatch parameter. To be secure by default, we are now defaulting the behavior to error which will fail the workflow run.

ESM

To support new versions of the @actions/* packages, we've upgraded the package to ESM.

What's Changed

• Don't attempt to un-zip non-zipped downloads by @​danwkennedy in actions/download-artifact#460
• Add a setting to specify what to do on hash mismatch and default it to error by @​danwkennedy in actions/download-artifact#461

Full Changelog: actions/download-artifact@v7...v8.0.0

Commits

• 3e5f45b Add regression tests for CJK characters (#471)
• e6d03f6 Add a regression test for artifact name + content-type mismatches (#472)
• 70fc10c Merge pull request #461 from actions/danwkennedy/digest-mismatch-behavior
• f258da9 Add change docs
• ccc058e Fix linting issues
• bd7976b Add a setting to specify what to do on hash mismatch and default it to error
• ac21fcf Merge pull request #460 from actions/danwkennedy/download-no-unzip
• 15999bf Add note about package bumps
• 974686e Bump the version to v8 and add release notes
• fbe48b1 Update test names to make it clearer what they do
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

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[github-actions]

supply-chain-guard Scan Report

WARNING: Findings were detected.

Canonical JSON report: 3 reportable finding(s).

## 🛡️ supply-chain-guard Scan Report

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Tool | `supply-chain-guard v6.0.10` |
| Target | `.` |
| Type | directory |
| Time | 2026-09-09T22:55:13.431Z |
| Commit | `837f5b01c0768ee36f99b4817f765f286d120e1b` |
| Detection Set | `v6.0.10 (20140 entries, generated 2026-09-02T00:00:00.000Z)` |
| Duration | 1245ms |
| **Risk Score** | **9/100** (LOW) |

### Summary

Scanned 83 of 88 files.

🟡 1 medium | 🔵 2 low

### Findings

#### 🟡 [MEDIUM] Workflow requests OIDC id-token:write permission. If combined with unreviewed third-party actions or outbound curl, an attacker can steal the OIDC token to impersonate the workflow's cloud identity.

- **Rule:** `GHA_OIDC_WRITE_PERM`
- **File:** `.github/workflows/release.yml:388`
- **Match:** `id-token: write`
- **Recommendation:** Audit all steps in this workflow when id-token:write is set. Ensure no third-party action or run step can exfiltrate the OIDC token. Scope permissions as narrowly as possible.

#### 🔵 [LOW] Action "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v6.0.10" uses a version tag instead of a commit SHA. Tags can be force-pushed to point to different commits.

- **Rule:** `GHA_TAG_NOT_SHA`
- **File:** `.github/workflows/supply-chain-guard.yml:25`
- **Match:** `homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v6.0.10`
- **Recommendation:** Consider pinning this action to a full commit SHA for maximum security. Tags can be moved to point to malicious code.

#### 🔵 [LOW] Action "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v6.0.10" is from third-party owner "homeofe". Third-party actions can be compromised.

- **Rule:** `GHA_THIRD_PARTY_ACTION`
- **File:** `.github/workflows/supply-chain-guard.yml:25`
- **Match:** `homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v6.0.10`
- **Recommendation:** Pin "homeofe/supply-chain-guard@v6.0.10" to a specific commit SHA and audit the action source code before use.

### Recommendations

- Review the listed findings and assess whether they represent legitimate functionality or potential threats.

---
*Generated by [supply-chain-guard](https://github.com/homeofe/supply-chain-guard)*