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fix(access): ask for the token before trusting a Tailscale login header - #309
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WalkthroughWhen ChangesConfigured Token Access
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to With a token configured, non-paired clients need it, but the access table still says some clients need none. Users may follow conflicting sign-in instructions; update the table. This is a localized documentation issue, so the remaining merge risk is low. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The change strengthens the configured-token boundary without introducing a new access path. Valid tokens and paired devices retain their existing access, while an owner-login header alone no longer bypasses the token requirement. No material security risk introduced or worsened by this PR was identified. Retained concerns Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
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Review comments at @docs/guide.md:
- Line 245: Qualify the access table’s first three rows so they state that
non-paired clients need the configured token when HERDR_WEB_TOKEN is set, while
preserving the no-token access descriptions otherwise. Add guidance that paired
devices use their device credential instead of the token.
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CHANGELOG.mddocs/guide.mdserver/access.test.tsserver/access.tsserver/api.contract.test.ts
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## Change Raises `REMOTE_BUNDLE_VERSION` to 11, so remote PCs get the server-side changes made since `remote-v10`: new tab and split from the sidebar (`tab/create`, `pane/split`), an OmO pane's background tasks and workflows (`pane/omo-tasks`), and the access token asked before a Tailscale login header is trusted (#309). ## Order 1. Merge this PR. 2. Push the `remote-v11` tag on that `main` commit; `remote-bundles.yml` builds and publishes the bundles and the manifest. 3. Only then release the app: an app that carries the new number finds no `remote-v11` manifest before step 2, and every connected PC's bridge counts as incompatible until it is updated. ## Validation `bun run typecheck`, `bun run test:unit` (1031 pass). The bundle build and smoke run in this PR's Remote PC bundles checks.
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Add Portal to "Behind a reverse proxy", right after the 401 check, and mention it in the access table row and the "Do I need Tailscale?" FAQ. From v2.6.0, Portal's --http-route keeps the browser's Host, sends X-Forwarded-For and X-Forwarded-Proto: https, and passes the WebSocket upgrade. The plain `portal expose 7317` sends no X-Forwarded-Proto, so the app's own requests get invalid_origin. The section warns first that a PC running Tailscale must never run Portal without the token: Portal passes a visitor's Tailscale-User-Login on and cannot drop it, and since devswha#309 only the token stops it. It asks for a long random token and repeats the 401 check for the Portal address. Refs devswha#202.
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## Change Step 1 of #202. Adds Portal to **Behind a reverse proxy** in `docs/guide.md`, right after the 401 check. It also mentions Portal in the access table's "A public domain, reverse proxy or Portal" row, adds a bullet to the FAQ "Do I need Tailscale?", and adds a CHANGELOG line. - **Version:** Portal v2.6.1 (released 2026-10-05). From that release `--http-route` keeps the browser's `Host`, sends `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`, and passes the WebSocket upgrade (gosuda/portal-tunnel#545). It can also drop a request header with `--strip-request-header` (gosuda/portal-tunnel#564). The plain `portal expose 7317` sends no `X-Forwarded-Proto`, so a browser gets `invalid_origin`. - **Tailscale, first and in bold:** the command drops a visitor's `Tailscale-User-Login` with `--strip-request-header`, and the warning says to keep that on a PC that runs Tailscale and not to combine Portal with `HERDR_WEB_TAILSCALE_SERVE_ONLY=1`. Since #309 a token also stops a forged header; without one, the header would get a visitor in. - **Command:** split over five lines with `\`, so it reads on a phone. - **Relay:** a relay running Portal's code passes the encrypted bytes on and sees only connection metadata, but it holds its domain's certificate, so the section says to use one you trust. - **Token:** a long random `HERDR_WEB_TOKEN` (`openssl rand -hex 32`), with a pointer to where settings go. - **Address:** v2.6.1 prints an identity-bound address, `https://<name>-<address>.<relay>` (gosuda/portal-tunnel#567). No other identity can take it, even while Portal is stopped, so the section says to use that address and not the short `<name>.<relay>` alias, which can be reused. A v2.6.1 client needs a relay on v2.6.1 or later, which `portal list` shows. - **Check:** the same 401 check as the other proxies, against that address. - The section is a block of paragraphs inside **Behind a reverse proxy**, like the Caddy and nginx examples. A heading after the 401 line would have pulled "Sign out" and the paragraphs after it under Portal. Docs only; no code changes. ## Validation - Checked against `decideAccess` and `cameThroughProxy` in `server/access.ts`, `sameOrigin` in `server/machine-security.ts`, and the current "Behind a reverse proxy" text, at `main` 8a5ac49 (after v0.4.0). - Portal v2.6.1: - every flag in the command exists, and `--strip-request-header` requires `--http-route`, which the command has; - the printed URL is the relay's `canonical_hostname`, `<name>-<40 hex>`, and names are limited to 22 characters (the command's name is 22); - the client refuses a relay that returns no canonical hostname; - `portal list` shows gosunuts.xyz, portal.dawnfullstack.com and kakashit.org on v2.6.1; - the relay reads only the ClientHello for routing (`portal/server.go:808`) and copies bytes (`portal/proxy.go:26`); the tunnel ends TLS (`sdk/listener.go:649`); the relay holds the wildcard certificate (`portal/acme/certificate.go:42`). - Anchors `#behind-a-reverse-proxy` and `#in-a-terminal` render, and the Portal links return 200. - **End-to-end run:** done through gosunuts.xyz (v2.6.1): token sign-in in a real browser, the terminal over `/ws`, pairing a device, the 401 and refusal checks, and the header strip. Push alerts were not tested (the automation browser has no `PushManager`); details in the comment below. Prepared with Claude Code; the claims above are checked against the code they cite. Co-authored-by: Hako <devswha@gmail.com>
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Refs #253 (the second idea listed there; the issue stays open for the first).
What was wrong
On a PC where Tailscale runs, a request naming this PC's Tailscale login in
Tailscale-User-Logingot full access, and that header was checked before the token.tailscale servesets the header for the owner's devices, but any other proxy on the same PC (nginx, Caddy, a tunnel that copies bytes) passes a visitor's own copy through unless told to drop it. So with a public proxy on that PC, settingHERDR_WEB_TOKENdid not keep out a visitor who knew the owner's login.Change
decideAccessasks for the token before it looks at the login header. Order is now: token, paired device, token required (when one is configured), Tailscale login, and the rest as before.What users notice
tailscale servewith no pairing: the token is asked for once on that device. The cookie lasts a year (COOKIE_MAX_AGE_SECONDS), so it is not asked again on each visit.Not covered
A public proxy on a Tailscale PC with no token is still open to a forged header. The guide already says to set a token first and its proxy examples drop the header; #253 keeps the idea of trusting the header only from something that looks like
tailscale serve.Checks
server/access.test.ts: the token case was changed first and failed against the old code (Received: "tailscale"); 10 pass now.server/api.contract.test.ts"pairing and identity": a real server with a token answerstoken_requiredto the owner's login header and lets the same request in with the token; 4 selected tests pass.bun run typecheckpasses.tailscale servein front of a token-protected server, and the token prompt in a browser.