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Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 40: Checkout of untrusted code in a non-privileged context - #2319
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don-petry wants to merge 2 commits into
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Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 40: Checkout of untrusted code in a non-privileged context#2319don-petry wants to merge 2 commits into
don-petry wants to merge 2 commits into
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…ode in a non-privileged context Copilot Autofix Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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Dev-Lead — review-changes (applied)Changes committed and pushed. Requested items addressed:
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| run: | | ||
| ref="$AGENT_REF" | ||
| if [ -z "$ref" ]; then | ||
| ref="main" | ||
| fi | ||
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| # Block untrusted PR refs and unsafe ref formats. | ||
| if [[ "$ref" =~ ^refs/pull/ ]]; then | ||
| echo "::error::inputs.agent_ref must not be a pull-request ref: $ref" | ||
| exit 1 | ||
| fi | ||
| if [[ "$ref" =~ ^[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$ ]]; then | ||
| echo "::error::inputs.agent_ref must not be a raw commit SHA: $ref" | ||
| exit 1 | ||
| fi | ||
| if [[ "$ref" == *".."* || "$ref" == *":"* || "$ref" =~ [[:space:]] ]]; then | ||
| echo "::error::inputs.agent_ref contains unsafe characters: $ref" | ||
| exit 1 | ||
| fi | ||
| if [[ ! "$ref" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._/-]+$ ]]; then | ||
| echo "::error::inputs.agent_ref contains invalid characters: $ref" | ||
| exit 1 | ||
| fi | ||
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| echo "SAFE_AGENT_REF=$ref" >> "$GITHUB_ENV" |
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Operational notice acknowledged: CodeRabbit is informing us that automatic review was skipped because the PR is in draft status. This is not a code defect — it is an optional configuration matter. No changes to the PR itself are needed. |
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Dev-Lead — fix-bot-comment (no-changes)Agent reasoning |
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This is an operational notice — the bot is unable to generate a review due to unsupported file types. All CI checks pass; there are no code issues to address. |
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Dev-Lead — fix-bot-comment (no-changes)Agent reasoning |
This was referenced Oct 12, 2026
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Potential fix for https://github.com/petry-projects/.github-private/security/code-scanning/40
Best fix: validate and constrain
inputs.agent_refbefore checkout, and fail closed on unsafe values. This keeps existing functionality (still allows intended pinned channels/branches/tags) while preventing PR refs/SHAs/paths that could be attacker-controlled in untrusted contexts.In
.github/workflows/dev-lead-reusable.yml, add a new step immediately before “Checkout dev-lead scripts” that:inputs.agent_refwith fallback tomain.refs/pull/*, raw 40-hex SHAs, traversal characters, whitespace, or other non-safe characters.SAFE_AGENT_REF) into$GITHUB_ENV.Then change the checkout step’s
reffrom${{ inputs.agent_ref }}to${{ env.SAFE_AGENT_REF }}.No new dependencies are needed; shell validation is sufficient.
Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.
Problem
See the linked issue.
Risk
Medium — changes GitHub Actions workflow behavior, which is exercised only post-merge; verify via the affected workflow runs.
Test plan
No test files were added or updated. Verification:
bash scripts/dev-lead-lint.sh(shellcheck --severity=warning) ran pre-commit; the existing CI (bats + lint) guards the change.Rollback
Revert this PR. No non-revertible side effects (no tags, migrations, or external state).
Monitoring
Watch the affected workflow run(s) in the Actions tab and this PR's Lint check for regressions.