[bherila]

Motivation

• Prevent AI chat routes (create/read/send) from being used to exfiltrate sensitive provider data (deployment logs, alert rules) when callers only hold broad ProjectsRead/ProjectsWrite permissions.
• Ensure provider-specific permission boundaries (e.g. deployments:read, otel:read) are enforced before seeding or replaying hidden system context to the AI backend.

Description

• Add fn required_permission(&self) -> Option<Permission> to the ConversationContextProvider trait so providers can declare a domain-specific read permission.
• Require Permission::DeploymentsRead for the DeploymentChatProvider and Permission::OtelRead for the AlertChatProvider so their seeded context cannot be accessed without the matching permission.
• Implement ConversationService::authorize_context(...) to centrally enforce a provider's required_permission and its existing authorize hook before seeding or replaying context.
• Call authorize_context from the HTTP handlers that create a conversation, fetch conversation history, and send a message so sensitive seeds are checked before being persisted, shown, or sent to the AI backend.
• Add small unit tests in the service test module exercising the new authorization behavior and update the StubProvider test helper to cover required_permission.
• Add an ## [Unreleased] CHANGELOG.md entry documenting the security fix.

Testing

• Ran cargo check --lib -p temps-ai-chat which completed successfully.
• Ran cargo test --lib -p temps-ai-chat and all tests in the crate passed (75 passed; 0 failed).
• Verified git diff --check reported no whitespace or diff errors.

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Codex Task

[github-actions]

📓 Changelog preview

This is what your commits will add to the generated CHANGELOG.md at release time (via git-cliff). Do not edit CHANGELOG.md by hand — it is generated from your Conventional Commit messages.

## [Unreleased]

### Fixed

- **ai-chat:** Enforce context seed permissions

[bherila]

The functional change was carried into upstream security-hardening PR gotempsh#676 and its merged replacement gotempsh#677. Upstream gotempsh#676 explicitly lists this fork PR in its source coverage.

Fork main has now been fast-forwarded to upstream main at 7250ab59b38d3138014ade7f5d6391c856eaa4f7. Closing this obsolete fork PR as part of the upstream synchronization; its branch history is retained.