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feat(enforcement): safely start protected guests and bounded agents - #942
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Protected VMs could be provisioned while Off but had no protected live guest/agent startup API. This adds an administrative run from the original creation association: trusted offline VHDX hydration into the original disk file ID, one-use native start, fixed hardware/private storage checks, no NICs, and confirmed Off before registration refresh and removal.
Administrative PS Direct targets only that created VM ID. A fresh Users-only account receives an enforced 512 MiB NTFS quota. Its private, pinned executable starts suspended, joins a kill-on-close Job, passes SID/groups/elevation/session/image/birth checks, and resumes with an explicit environment on a private desktop. The Job limits aggregate memory to 512 MiB and execution to two minutes. Success requires whole-Job and desktop closure. Running VHDX protection uses metadata identity and the private High-integrity namespace because VMMS needs exclusive data access. Unknown settlement retains state.
Native state and Hyper-V cmdlet state must agree before admission. A short native probe confirmed approximately 3.1 seconds of cmdlet lag; bounded re-observation never retries the provider and refuses native state loss. The validator derives the Windows vmWorkerProcess capability and recognizes it only on the original GUID's configuration leaves with finite file masks. Normal principal, High-integrity namespace, media and foreign-file checks remain required; no ACL is broadened or repaired. Startup diagnostics export only scoped event IDs and named numeric error fields.
Validation on exact source 5113e3b:
The user approved only the full guest runner change to windows-2025-vs2026; capacity guards and the 45-minute job limit are preserved. The base image and guest administrative credentials remain trust inputs. This repository administrative API remains separate from ordinary caller launch, provider and production acceptance. The installed-owner dispatcher stays inspection-only; A1-A4 remain UNREVIEWED and launchAllowed=false. Earlier failed observations retain their original results.