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fix(server): guard existing workspace git mutations #24

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ba0ed65
fix(server): check current authority before git mutations
alimek Oct 11, 2026
34141ec
fix(server): preserve workspace denial through Git fallbacks
alimek Oct 11, 2026
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145 changes: 130 additions & 15 deletions apps/server/src/auth/CommandAuthorization.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
import type { WorkspaceActionAdmission } from "./workspaceReadAccess.ts";
import {
AuthOrchestrationOperateScope,
AuthSourceControlWriteScope,
EnvironmentAuthorizationError,
ProjectId,
ThreadId,
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -30,6 +32,8 @@ import {
toSafeThreadAttachmentSegment,
} from "../attachmentStore.ts";

const isEnvironmentAuthorizationError = Schema.is(EnvironmentAuthorizationError);

/** App-owned work opts in explicitly; external calls must reload device authority. */
export const trustedMutationAuthority = Symbol("trusted mutation");
const registeredCommandWorkspace = Symbol("canonical launch workspace");
Expand All @@ -54,10 +58,90 @@ export const withRegisteredCommandWorkspace = (
authority === trustedMutationAuthority
? authority
: { ...authority, [registeredCommandWorkspace]: workspace };
const sourceControlLink = Symbol("checked source-control link");
export type SourceControlLinkAuthority = {
readonly [sourceControlLink]: {
readonly workspace: WorkspaceActionAdmission;
readonly command: Extract<
OrchestrationV2ServerCommand,
{ readonly type: "thread.pull-request.link" }
>;
};
};
export type CommandAuthority = MutationAuthority | SourceControlLinkAuthority;
/** A checked Git action may link only its original thread, using the existing command lock/commit. */
export const checkedSourceControlLinkAuthority = (
workspace: WorkspaceActionAdmission,
command: Extract<OrchestrationV2ServerCommand, { readonly type: "thread.pull-request.link" }>,
): SourceControlLinkAuthority => ({ [sourceControlLink]: { workspace, command } });
export const isCheckedSourceControlLinkAuthority = (authority: CommandAuthority) =>
typeof authority === "object" && sourceControlLink in authority;
const linkAdmission = (authority: CommandAuthority) =>
typeof authority === "object" && sourceControlLink in authority
? authority[sourceControlLink]
: undefined;
/** Filesystem admission stays outside SQL, after the existing thread lock is acquired. */
export const beforeSourceControlLinkEffect = (authority: CommandAuthority) => {
const link = linkAdmission(authority);
return link === undefined ? Effect.void : link.workspace.beforeEffect(link.workspace.input.cwd);
};
const sourceControlDenied = () =>
new EnvironmentAuthorizationError({
requiredScope: AuthSourceControlWriteScope,
message: "This connection cannot link this Git action's pull request.",
});
const authorizeSourceControlLink = Effect.fnUntraced(function* (
sql: SqlClient.SqlClient,
authority: SourceControlLinkAuthority,
commandId: CommandId,
command?: OrchestrationV2ServerCommand,
) {
const { workspace, command: original } = authority[sourceControlLink];
if (
original.type !== "thread.pull-request.link" ||
original.source !== "created" ||
workspace.scope !== AuthSourceControlWriteScope ||
workspace.input.threadId !== original.threadId ||
original.commandId !== commandId ||
(command !== undefined && command !== original)
)
return yield* sourceControlDenied();
yield* workspace.checkSql;
if (workspace.authority === trustedReadAuthority) return;
const current = yield* workspace.authority.current;
if (!current.scopes.includes(AuthSourceControlWriteScope)) return yield* sourceControlDenied();
const owner = yield* sql<{ readonly project: string }>`
SELECT t.project_id AS project FROM orchestration_v2_projection_threads t
JOIN projection_projects p ON p.project_id = t.project_id
WHERE t.thread_id = ${original.threadId} AND t.deleted_at IS NULL AND p.deleted_at IS NULL
`;
if (
owner.length !== 1 ||
owner[0]!.project !== workspace.projectId ||
!resourceGrantAllowsProject(current.resourceGrant, ProjectId.make(owner[0]!.project))
)
return yield* sourceControlDenied();
const receipts = yield* sql<{
readonly kind: string;
readonly id: string;
readonly type: string;
}>`
SELECT aggregate_kind AS kind, aggregate_id AS id, command_type AS type FROM orchestration_command_receipts WHERE command_id = ${commandId}
UNION SELECT aggregate_kind, stream_id, 'thread.pull-request.link' FROM orchestration_events WHERE command_id = ${commandId}
`;
if (
receipts.some(
(r) =>
r.kind !== "thread" || r.id !== original.threadId || r.type !== "thread.pull-request.link",
)
)
return yield* sourceControlDenied();
yield* workspace.checkSql;
});
export type CommandAdmission =
| typeof trustedMutationAuthority
| {
readonly authority: MutationAuthority;
readonly authority: CommandAuthority;
readonly command: OrchestrationV2ServerCommand;
readonly projectId?: ProjectId;
};
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -169,16 +253,22 @@ const currentMutationGrant = Effect.fnUntraced(function* (authority: MutationAut
/** Rejected receipts do not retain original source participants; opaque diagnostics are not admission. */
export const receiptForMutationAuthority = Effect.fnUntraced(
function* <T extends Pick<CommandReceiptV2, "status" | "error">>(
authority: MutationAuthority,
authority: CommandAuthority,
receipt: T,
) {
if (receipt.status !== "rejected") return receipt;
const grant = yield* currentMutationGrant(authority);
const link = linkAdmission(authority);
const grant =
link === undefined
? yield* currentMutationGrant(authority as MutationAuthority)
: link.workspace.authority === trustedReadAuthority
? undefined
: (yield* link.workspace.authority.current).resourceGrant;
return grant !== undefined && (grant.projects.mode !== "all" || grant.providers.mode !== "all")
? { ...receipt, error: "Previously rejected." }
: receipt;
},
Effect.mapError(() => mutationDenied()),
Effect.mapError((error) => (isEnvironmentAuthorizationError(error) ? error : mutationDenied())),
);

const authorizeProjects = Effect.fnUntraced(function* (
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -633,11 +723,19 @@ export const authorizeAttachmentClaim = Effect.fnUntraced(
export const authorizeCommand = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.command")(
function* (
sql: SqlClient.SqlClient,
authority: MutationAuthority,
authority: CommandAuthority,
command: OrchestrationV2ServerCommand,
creatingThread?: { readonly threadId: ThreadId; readonly projectId: ProjectId },
) {
const grant = yield* currentMutationGrant(authority);
if (linkAdmission(authority) !== undefined)
return yield* authorizeSourceControlLink(
sql,
authority as SourceControlLinkAuthority,
command.commandId,
command,
);
const mutationAuthority = authority as MutationAuthority;
const grant = yield* currentMutationGrant(mutationAuthority);
if (grant === undefined) return;
if (command.type === "thread.create" && command.importedNativeThread !== undefined) {
// An unregistered native session has no project owner. Restricted callers cannot claim it.
Expand All @@ -656,7 +754,10 @@ export const authorizeCommand = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.command")(
if (creatingThread !== undefined) {
if (command.type !== "message.dispatch" || command.threadId !== creatingThread.threadId)
return yield* mutationDenied();
yield* authorizeMutationTarget(sql, authority, { ...creatingThread, allowCreate: true });
yield* authorizeMutationTarget(sql, mutationAuthority, {
...creatingThread,
allowCreate: true,
});
}
const targets = commandTargets(command);
if (targets.project !== undefined) yield* authorizeProjects(sql, grant, [targets.project]);
Expand All @@ -670,13 +771,13 @@ export const authorizeCommand = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.command")(
`;
if (existing.length > 0) yield* authorizeMutationThread(sql, grant, targets.createdThread);
if (command.type === "thread.create")
yield* authorizeMutationTarget(sql, authority, {
yield* authorizeMutationTarget(sql, mutationAuthority, {
threadId: command.threadId,
projectId: command.projectId,
allowCreate: true,
});
}
yield* authorizeCommandWorkspace(sql, grant, command, authority);
yield* authorizeCommandWorkspace(sql, grant, command, mutationAuthority);
const runIds = [
...("runId" in command ? [command.runId] : []),
...("parentRunId" in command ? [command.parentRunId] : []),
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -821,19 +922,26 @@ export const authorizeCommand = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.command")(
.map((a) => a.id),
);
},
Effect.mapError(() => mutationDenied()),
Effect.mapError((error) => (isEnvironmentAuthorizationError(error) ? error : mutationDenied())),
);

/** Inspect raw receipt participants before EventStore decodes any stored payload. */
export const authorizeCommandReceipt = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.commandReceipt")(
function* (
sql: SqlClient.SqlClient,
authority: MutationAuthority,
authority: CommandAuthority,
commandId: CommandId,
includeDeleted = true,
includeDeletedProject = false,
) {
const grant = yield* currentMutationGrant(authority);
if (linkAdmission(authority) !== undefined)
return yield* authorizeSourceControlLink(
sql,
authority as SourceControlLinkAuthority,
commandId,
);
const mutationAuthority = authority as MutationAuthority;
const grant = yield* currentMutationGrant(mutationAuthority);
if (grant === undefined) return;
const owners = yield* sql<{ readonly kind: string; readonly id: string }>`
SELECT aggregate_kind AS kind, aggregate_id AS id FROM orchestration_command_receipts WHERE command_id = ${commandId}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -884,7 +992,7 @@ export const authorizeCommandReceipt = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.commandR
sql,
{ projectId: ProjectId.make(path.project), threadId: ThreadId.make(path.thread) },
path.path,
authority,
mutationAuthority,
commandId,
);
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1023,7 +1131,7 @@ export const authorizeCommandReceipt = Effect.fn("resourceAuthorization.commandR
}
}
},
Effect.mapError(() => mutationDenied()),
Effect.mapError((error) => (isEnvironmentAuthorizationError(error) ? error : mutationDenied())),
);

export const authorizeCommandAdmission = Effect.fnUntraced(function* (
Expand All @@ -1041,6 +1149,11 @@ export const authorizeCommandAdmission = Effect.fnUntraced(function* (
target.commandType !== admission.command.type)
)
return yield* mutationDenied();
if (linkAdmission(admission.authority)) {
yield* authorizeCommand(sql, admission.authority, admission.command);
yield* authorizeCommandReceipt(sql, admission.authority, commandId);
return;
}
if (admission.projectId !== undefined) {
const rows = yield* sql<{ readonly project: string }>`
SELECT t.project_id AS project FROM orchestration_v2_projection_threads t
Expand All @@ -1049,7 +1162,9 @@ export const authorizeCommandAdmission = Effect.fnUntraced(function* (
`;
if (rows.length !== 1 || rows[0]!.project !== admission.projectId)
return yield* mutationDenied();
yield* authorizeMutationTarget(sql, admission.authority, { projectId: admission.projectId });
yield* authorizeMutationTarget(sql, admission.authority as MutationAuthority, {
projectId: admission.projectId,
});
}
yield* authorizeCommand(sql, admission.authority, admission.command);
yield* authorizeCommandReceipt(sql, admission.authority, commandId);
Expand Down
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