components C4: bash-mode (!) input - #296
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Port of TS processBashCommand: a user-typed !command runs DIRECTLY
through the Bash tool call (no registry permission flow — user-typed
commands aren't model-initiated; the tool's defense-in-depth
dangerous-pattern guard still applies and is pinned by a test that
also asserts the permission handler is NEVER consulted), produces no
agent turn, and feeds <bash-input>/<bash-stdout|stderr> user messages
into the conversation so the model sees them next turn.
- conversation integrity (review B1): texts route through the new
AgentBridge.append_user_texts — deferred while a run is in flight
(mid-run appends could interleave a tool_use/result pair, durably
via the persister) and drained in _finish() before the durable
flush, plus at the top of submit() so teardown-window stragglers
land BEFORE the next prompt; this also replaces the app's
_persister reach-in
- UI: echo row mounts synchronously ("running…"), the worker fills
the output in place; BOTH streams render (git/npm write to stderr
with exit 0); shared truncate_body() so panel/stash limits can
never drift; ctrl+o-expandable; sequential-only with honest
refusals (busy agent / bash already running); magenta input accent
on the ! prefix
- divergences documented: no caveat message, both streams escaped,
no PowerShell branch, no live progress/ESC cancel yet (follow-up)
15 tests incl. deferral through a real bridge, exit-143 timeout via
env shrink, !cd cwd-persistence pinned as deliberate TS parity, and
repl dispatch (bash called, agent NOT). Suite baseline-identical.
Critic-approved after one REQUEST CHANGES round.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Jul 7, 2026
…-bash-mode components C4: bash-mode (!) input
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Summary
!commandruns directly through the Bash tool (no permission prompt — pinned by test; the tool's own dangerous-pattern guard still applies), no agent turn, and<bash-input>/<bash-stdout|stderr>user messages reach the conversation (TSprocessBashCommandparity)AgentBridge.append_user_textsdefers mid-run texts and drains them at run end + before the next prompt — a bash completion can never interleave atool_use/tool_resultpair (review blocking find)truncate_body; sequential-only with honest refusals;!input accentTest plan
!cdcwd parity pin, stderr-on-success render, repl dispatch, busy refusal + history🤖 Generated with Claude Code