fix: gate BYOK slop advisory by contributor

src/queue/processors.ts

@@ -949,14 +949,17 @@ export async function runAiSlopForAdvisory(
     author: string | null;
     files: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof listPullRequestFiles>>;
     deterministicBand: SlopBand;
+    confirmedContributor: boolean;
   },
 ): Promise<void> {
   if (!args.advisory.headSha) return;
   try {
     // BYOK (opt-in): reuse the repo's encrypted key + aiReviewByok flag — one BYOK key serves both AI
     // features. A declared provider must match the stored key's provider, else skip BYOK (Workers-AI
-    // fallback). The slop advisory stays advisory-only regardless of which model writes it.
-    const storedKey = args.settings.aiReviewByok ? await getDecryptedRepositoryAiKey(env, args.repoFullName) : null;
+    // fallback). Because BYOK bills the maintainer, only confirmed contributors may use it;
+    // unconfirmed PRs fall back to Workers AI. The slop advisory stays advisory-only regardless of
+    // which model writes it.
+    const storedKey = args.settings.aiReviewByok && args.confirmedContributor ? await getDecryptedRepositoryAiKey(env, args.repoFullName) : null;
     const providerKey =
       storedKey && (!args.settings.aiReviewProvider || args.settings.aiReviewProvider === storedKey.provider)
         ? { provider: storedKey.provider, key: storedKey.key, model: args.settings.aiReviewModel ?? storedKey.model }
@@ -1157,6 +1160,18 @@ async function maybePublishPrPublicSurface(
       scopedOverlapCount: unionScopedOverlapClusters(collisions, pr, preflight.collisions).length,
     });
 
+    if (gateEnabled && author && !publicSurfaceSkipped && !official) {
+      official = await getCachedOfficialMinerDetection(env, author, {
+        targetKey: `${repoFullName}#${pr.number}`,
+        deliveryId: webhook.deliveryId,
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Only CONFIRMED gittensor contributors can be hard-blocked; everyone else (or an unavailable
+    // detection) gets a neutral, non-blocking gate. Gate-only runs still verify confirmation before
+    // evaluating blockers so confirmed contributors cannot bypass a required Gate check.
+    const confirmedContributor = official?.status === "confirmed";
+
     // Anti-slop (#530/#532): only when opted in (slopGateMode !== "off"). Surface the deterministic slop
     // findings as advisory context, and feed the score to the gate (it only blocks under slop: block + the
     // threshold). Loads files lazily so disabled repos pay nothing.
@@ -1175,22 +1190,10 @@ async function maybePublishPrPublicSurface(
       // AI-assisted slop advisory (#533, opt-in). Reuses the already-fetched files; appends at most one
       // advisory-only finding. Deliberately does NOT update slopRisk — only the deterministic core blocks.
       if (settings.slopAiAdvisory) {
-        await runAiSlopForAdvisory(env, { settings, advisory, repoFullName, pr, author, files: slopFiles, deterministicBand: slop.band });
+        await runAiSlopForAdvisory(env, { settings, advisory, repoFullName, pr, author, files: slopFiles, deterministicBand: slop.band, confirmedContributor });
       }
     }
 
-    if (gateEnabled && author && !publicSurfaceSkipped && !official) {
-      official = await getCachedOfficialMinerDetection(env, author, {
-        targetKey: `${repoFullName}#${pr.number}`,
-        deliveryId: webhook.deliveryId,
-      });
-    }
-
-    // Only CONFIRMED gittensor contributors can be hard-blocked; everyone else (or an unavailable
-    // detection) gets a neutral, non-blocking gate. Gate-only runs still verify confirmation before
-    // evaluating blockers so confirmed contributors cannot bypass a required Gate check.
-    const confirmedContributor = official?.status === "confirmed";
-
     // AI maintainer review (opt-in via aiReviewMode). Mutates `advisory` with a consensus defect (if any)
     // BEFORE the gate evaluates, and returns advisory notes for the panel. Inside the try so any AI
     // failure is caught and the gate is still finalized (never left in_progress).

test/unit/ai-slop.test.ts

@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ describe("runAiSlopForAdvisory (processor wiring)", () => {
       author: "alice",
       files,
       deterministicBand: "elevated",
+      confirmedContributor: true,
     });
     expect(adv.findings.map((f) => f.code)).toEqual([AI_SLOP_FINDING_CODE]);
   });
@@ -283,7 +284,7 @@ describe("runAiSlopForAdvisory (processor wiring)", () => {
     const noSha = advisory();
     delete (noSha as Partial<Advisory>).headSha;
     const run = vi.fn();
-    await runAiSlopForAdvisory(enabledEnv(run), { settings: noByok, advisory: noSha, repoFullName: "acme/widgets", pr, author: "alice", files, deterministicBand: "low" });
+    await runAiSlopForAdvisory(enabledEnv(run), { settings: noByok, advisory: noSha, repoFullName: "acme/widgets", pr, author: "alice", files, deterministicBand: "low", confirmedContributor: true });
     expect(noSha.findings).toEqual([]);
     expect(run).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
@@ -298,14 +299,15 @@ describe("runAiSlopForAdvisory (processor wiring)", () => {
       author: "alice",
       files,
       deterministicBand: "clean",
+      confirmedContributor: true,
     });
     expect(adv.findings).toEqual([]);
   });
 
   it("is fail-safe: a thrown error (broken DB) yields no finding and never throws", async () => {
     const adv = advisory();
     const env = { ...enabledEnv(async () => ({ response: slopJson() })), DB: undefined } as unknown as Env;
-    await expect(runAiSlopForAdvisory(env, { settings: noByok, advisory: adv, repoFullName: "acme/widgets", pr, author: "alice", files, deterministicBand: "high" })).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+    await expect(runAiSlopForAdvisory(env, { settings: noByok, advisory: adv, repoFullName: "acme/widgets", pr, author: "alice", files, deterministicBand: "high", confirmedContributor: true })).resolves.toBeUndefined();
     expect(adv.findings).toEqual([]);
   });
 
@@ -330,10 +332,41 @@ describe("runAiSlopForAdvisory (processor wiring)", () => {
       author: "alice",
       files,
       deterministicBand: "elevated",
+      confirmedContributor: true,
     });
     // The advisory came from the BYOK provider (high band → finding), and Workers AI was never called.
     expect(adv.findings.map((f) => f.code)).toEqual([AI_SLOP_FINDING_CODE]);
     expect(fetchMock.mock.calls[0]?.[0]).toBe("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages");
     expect(run).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
+
+  it("does not use the maintainer BYOK key for unconfirmed contributors", async () => {
+    const run = vi.fn(async () => ({ response: slopJson({ band: "high" }) }));
+    const env = createTestEnv({
+      AI: { run } as unknown as Ai,
+      AI_SUMMARIES_ENABLED: "true",
+      AI_PUBLIC_COMMENTS_ENABLED: "true",
+      AI_DAILY_NEURON_BUDGET: "100000",
+      TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET: "ai-slop-byok-test-encryption-secret-32b",
+    });
+    await upsertRepositoryAiKey(env, { repoFullName: "acme/widgets", provider: "anthropic", key: "sk-ant-byok-slop-9999", model: null });
+    const fetchMock = vi.fn(async () => new Response(JSON.stringify({ content: [{ type: "text", text: slopJson({ band: "high" }) }] }), { status: 200 }));
+    vi.stubGlobal("fetch", fetchMock);
+    const adv = advisory();
+    await runAiSlopForAdvisory(env, {
+      settings: { aiReviewByok: true } as RepositorySettings,
+      advisory: adv,
+      repoFullName: "acme/widgets",
+      pr,
+      author: "mallory",
+      files,
+      deterministicBand: "elevated",
+      confirmedContributor: false,
+    });
+
+    expect(adv.findings.map((f) => f.code)).toEqual([AI_SLOP_FINDING_CODE]);
+    expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(run).toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
 });