feat(auth): persist the GitHub user-to-server token from login - #6125
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Closes #6114 completeGitHubWebOAuth/pollGitHubDeviceFlow fetched a real GitHub user-to-server token during login, used it once to verify identity via GET /user, then discarded it -- so a CLI/AMS process had no way to authenticate git operations without a separately-configured GITHUB_TOKEN PAT set up outside loopover-mcp login entirely. Persist the token encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM, same envelope as the existing BYOK/Linear key stores) in a new isolated auth_session_github_tokens table -- kept off the auth_sessions row itself so the session lookup used on every authenticated request never touches it. Expose it via a new session-scoped POST /v1/auth/github/token endpoint (never reachable by the static mcp/api identities, never cached, never bundled into any existing login response). revokeSession now deletes the stored token too, not just the loopover session. Missing TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET warns and continues rather than blocking login -- unlike the BYOK/Linear key stores there is no re-mint-on-demand fallback for a user's own OAuth token, so a silent skip would otherwise be undiagnosable later when AMS's token fetch comes up empty.
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Superagent didn't find any vulnerabilities or security issues in this PR. |
Bundle ReportChanges will increase total bundle size by 1.63kB (0.05%) ⬆️. This is within the configured threshold ✅ Detailed changes
Affected Assets, Files, and Routes:view changes for bundle: loopover-uiAssets Changed:
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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
❌ Your patch status has failed because the patch coverage (97.14%) is below the target coverage (99.00%). You can increase the patch coverage or adjust the target coverage. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #6125 +/- ##
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Coverage 95.31% 95.31%
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Files 595 595
Lines 47100 47132 +32
Branches 15032 15038 +6
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+ Hits 44893 44924 +31
- Misses 1476 1477 +1
Partials 731 731
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Closes #6114
Summary
loopover-mcp login's device-flow/web-OAuth exchange minted a real GitHub user-to-server token, used it exactly once to verify identity (GET /user), then discarded it. AMS's git operations had no way to reuse it and required a separately-configuredGITHUB_TOKENPAT.TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRET, reusingencryptSecret/decryptSecret) in a new isolated table (auth_session_github_tokens) — mirroringrepository_ai_keys/repository_linear_keys's existing pattern rather than a column onauth_sessionsitself, so the session lookup used on every authenticated request never touches it.POST /v1/auth/github/tokenendpoint fetches the live token on demand. Session-only (the staticmcp/apishared-secret identities are rejected), never cached (Cache-Control: no-store), never bundled into any existing login response.revokeSessionnow deletes the stored token too, not just the loopover session.TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_SECRETwarns and continues rather than blocking login — unlike the BYOK/Linear key stores (which throw), there's no re-mint-on-demand fallback for a user's own OAuth token the waysrc/orb/broker.tshas for installation tokens, so silently dropping it would leave AMS's later token-fetch failing with no diagnosable trail back to the cause.isProtectedPathwould have documented this new endpoint as public (it special-cased only/v1/auth/extension/sessionamong/v1/auth/*paths as requiring auth).Test plan
test/unit/auth-github-token.test.ts(16 tests): encrypted round-trip, no-op when no token supplied, warn-not-throw on missing encryption key, null (not throw) on wrong/rotated key, replace-on-reauth (not duplicate), revocation deletes the token, delete-when-absent is a no-op, never appears in the session-creation audit event, end-to-end persistence through both the device-flow and web-OAuth login paths, and the new route's auth gating / 404-when-unavailable / no-store header / telemetry-without-the-token-value.npx vitest runacross the new file +auth.test.ts+linear-key.test.ts+openapi.test.ts— all green.security.ts,github-oauth.ts, andrepositories.ts(verified via the raw v8 coverage JSON directly against the exact new line ranges, since the aggregate file-level percentage understates it forrepositories.ts— a ~8000-line file).npm run db:migrations:check/db:schema-drift:check/ui:openapi:check/ui:openapi:settings-parityall pass.npm run test:cigate green (twice — once pre-rebase, once post-rebase onto freshorigin/main).