fix(orb): exclude contributor self-closes from the public homepage counter

[JSONbored]

Summary

recordOrbPrOutcome (the central Orb's terminal-PR-outcome capture feeding the public homepage merged/closed/total counter) recorded a contributor closing their own unmerged PR as an authoritative closed. A contributor can inflate the public counter (or flip a repo's stats) by opening + self-closing PRs — the same poisoning the cloud recordPrOutcome path already guards against, here on the more-visible metric.

Add the same anti-poisoning guard: when the close is unmerged, the actor is not a Bot, and sender.login === pull_request.user.login, early-return (record nothing, leave any prior authoritative row untouched). Merges stay trusted (GitHub enforces merge permission); maintainer and bot closes are authoritative and still recorded.

Surfaced by the 2026-06-27 review-pipeline hardening audit (accuracy).

Scope

• Conventional Commit title; focused (orb/outcomes.ts + its test).
• No site//CNAME/Pages; follows CONTRIBUTING.md.
• Small self-evident parity fix (mirrors the existing cloud guard; no separate issue needed).

Validation

• git diff --check · actionlint · typecheck
• test:coverage — new tests cover every arm of the guard: self-close (records nothing + never overwrites a prior maintainer row), maintainer close (sender≠author → recorded), bot-actor close (recorded even when login matches), close with no author field (not a self-close → recorded); the existing merged + no-sender closed tests cover the !merged and falsy-sender short-circuits.
• test:workers · build:mcp · test:mcp-pack · ui:* · npm audit --audit-level=moderate

If any required check was skipped, explain why:

• No migration/OpenAPI/cf-typegen: a guard on existing logic only.

Safety

• No secrets/wallets/trust-scores exposed.
• No public GitHub text change · auth/CORS N/A — this hardens the integrity of a public metric (anti-poisoning).

Notes

• Runs on the cloud Orb (gittensory-api), which auto-deploys on merge.

[superagent-security]

Superagent didn't find any vulnerabilities or security issues in this PR.

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 95.53%. Comparing base (758e524) to head (d3e0502).
⚠️ Report is 2 commits behind head on main.
✅ All tests successful. No failed tests found.

Additional details and impacted files

@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##             main    #1632   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   95.53%   95.53%           
=======================================
  Files         204      204           
  Lines       22084    22089    +5     
  Branches     7972     7975    +3     
=======================================
+ Hits        21097    21102    +5     
  Misses        412      412           
  Partials      575      575           

Files with missing lines	Coverage Δ
src/orb/outcomes.ts	87.50% <100.00%> (+5.68%)	⬆️

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[loopover-orb]

Tip

🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩🟩

✅ Gittensory review — safe to merge

2 files · 1 AI reviewers · no blockers · readiness 48/100 · CI green · clean

✅ Approved — safe to merge

Review summary
Straightforward parity port of the cloud `recordPrOutcome` anti-poisoning guard to the Orb path. The guard logic is correct: `.toLowerCase()` comparison handles GitHub's case-insensitive logins, the `botWasActor` exemption correctly bypasses the guard for Bot-typed senders even when their login matches the PR author, and the `senderLogin && authorLogin` truthiness checks fail-open (record) when either identity is absent — the right call for a public integrity counter. Tests cover every new branch with real-path payloads and no fabricated impossible states; no schema change means no migration needed.

Signal	Result	Evidence
Code review	✅ No blockers	1 reviewers, synthesized
Linked issue	⚠️ Missing	No linked issue or no-issue rationale found.
Related work	⚠️ 2 scoped overlaps	Top overlaps are listed below; lower-confidence bulk is hidden.
Review load	❌ 8/20	Readiness component derived from cached public PR metadata and labels; size label size:S.
Validation evidence	❌ 5/25	Cached preflight status is hold.
Open PR queue	❌ 3/10	34 open PR(s), 17 likely reviewable, 17 unlinked.
Contributor context	✅ Confirmed Gittensor contributor	JSONbored; Gittensor profile; 80 PR(s), 291 issue(s).
Gate result	✅ Passing	No configured blocker found.

Nits — 5 non-blocking

• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts (authoritative-cases `it`, ~line 66): the single `COUNT(*) = 3` assertion bundles three semantically distinct exemptions — maintainer close, bot-actor close, no-author close — into one count; a single-sub-case regression will not self-identify, requiring a manual bisect. Consider three targeted `expect` calls or three `it` blocks.
• src/orb/outcomes.ts (lines 19–21): the three-line comment block is the longest in the file; 'mirrors the cloud recordPrOutcome anti-poisoning guard — merges stay trusted, bot/maintainer closes are authoritative' covers the intent in one line. The remaining sentences restate the code.
• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts: the sender-absent-but-author-present case (`{ author: 'alice' }`, no `sender` key) is not explicitly exercised in the new tests; it's covered incidentally by the existing pre-guard tests, but an explicit one-liner would nail the `senderLogin = ''` short-circuit branch in the new guard.
• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts (~line 66): split the three authoritative sub-cases into separate assertions so a regression names itself — e.g. `expect(await db(e)...WHERE pr_number=21...n).toBe(1)` repeated for 22 and 23.
• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts: add `closedPr('acme/nosender', 24, null, 100, { author: 'alice' })` → assert `COUNT(*) = 1` to explicitly document and lock the fail-open behavior when the sender field is absent.

Review context

• Author: JSONbored
• Role context: owner (maintainer lane)
• Public audience mode: oss maintainer
• Lane context: Repository registration is not available in the local Gittensory cache.
• Public profile languages: Python, TypeScript, JavaScript, Ruby, Go, Kotlin, MDX, Shell
• Official Gittensor activity: 80 PR(s), 291 issue(s).
• Related work: Items reference the same linked issue feat(anti-abuse): configurable contributor blacklist — auto-label + auto-close banned logins #1425. (issue #1425, PR #1531)
• Related work: Open PR work references issue feat(anti-abuse): configurable contributor blacklist — auto-label + auto-close banned logins #1425. (issue #1425, PR #1531)

Contributor next steps

• Treat this as maintainer-lane context rather than normal contributor-lane activity.
• Explain no-issue PR.
• Review top overlaps.
• Add scope summary.
• Fix blocker.
• Expect slower review.
• Refresh registry data or choose a registered active repo.
• Link the issue being solved, or explicitly explain why this is a no-issue PR.
• Check active issues and PRs before submitting.

Signal definitions

• Related work = same linked issue, overlapping active PRs, or title/path similarity.
• Review load = cached public PR metadata such as size labels, changed paths, and preflight status.
• Open PR queue = repo-wide review pressure; it is not a PR quality failure.
• Contributor context = public GitHub/Gittensor identity context; non-Gittensor status is not a blocker.

Review details

Generated from public PR metadata and the diff. Advisory only; deterministic signals remain authoritative.

Straightforward parity port of the cloud `recordPrOutcome` anti-poisoning guard to the Orb path. The guard logic is correct: `.toLowerCase()` comparison handles GitHub's case-insensitive logins, the `botWasActor` exemption correctly bypasses the guard for Bot-typed senders even when their login matches the PR author, and the `senderLogin && authorLogin` truthiness checks fail-open (record) when either identity is absent — the right call for a public integrity counter. Tests cover every new branch with real-path payloads and no fabricated impossible states; no schema change means no migration needed.

Nits (5)

• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts (authoritative-cases `it`, ~line 66): the single `COUNT(*) = 3` assertion bundles three semantically distinct exemptions — maintainer close, bot-actor close, no-author close — into one count; a single-sub-case regression will not self-identify, requiring a manual bisect. Consider three targeted `expect` calls or three `it` blocks.
• src/orb/outcomes.ts (lines 19–21): the three-line comment block is the longest in the file; 'mirrors the cloud recordPrOutcome anti-poisoning guard — merges stay trusted, bot/maintainer closes are authoritative' covers the intent in one line. The remaining sentences restate the code.
• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts: the sender-absent-but-author-present case (`{ author: 'alice' }`, no `sender` key) is not explicitly exercised in the new tests; it's covered incidentally by the existing pre-guard tests, but an explicit one-liner would nail the `senderLogin = ''` short-circuit branch in the new guard.
• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts (~line 66): split the three authoritative sub-cases into separate assertions so a regression names itself — e.g. `expect(await db(e)...WHERE pr_number=21...n).toBe(1)` repeated for 22 and 23.
• test/integration/orb-outcomes.test.ts: add `closedPr('acme/nosender', 24, null, 100, { author: 'alice' })` → assert `COUNT(*) = 1` to explicitly document and lock the fail-open behavior when the sender field is absent.

_{🟩 Safe / merged · 🟦 Advisory · 🟨 Held for review · 🟥 Blocked / closed}

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