feat(selfhost): per-repo feature config + all-authors AI review + RAG embed stack

[JSONbored]

Reconciles bb90b64e onto main. Per-repo features.{rag,reputation,unifiedComment,safety} overrides (manifest → GITTENSORY_REVIEW_REPOS allowlist default, byte-identical when unset), the aiReviewAllAuthors opt-in, and a dedicated RAG embed provider (AI_EMBED_BASE_URL).

Resolution: kept main's #1462 AI-review cache + #1425 blacklist + inline-comments on the review path; dropped the batch's head-SHA dedup as superseded by #1462. Migration renumbered 0072→0075. Verified by an adversarial multi-agent review (6 findings, all fixed) + full suite (4733) + 100% patch coverage on measured files. Final batch piece.

[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 95.42%. Comparing base (9e1c351) to head (24ab6af).
✅ All tests successful. No failed tests found.

Additional details and impacted files

@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##             main    #1555      +/-   ##
==========================================
+ Coverage   95.38%   95.42%   +0.04%     
==========================================
  Files         201      202       +1     
  Lines       21598    21672      +74     
  Branches     7807     7831      +24     
==========================================
+ Hits        20601    20681      +80     
  Misses        416      416              
+ Partials      581      575       -6     

Files with missing lines	Coverage Δ
src/api/routes.ts	94.62% <100.00%> (+0.02%)	⬆️
src/db/repositories.ts	96.12% <100.00%> (+<0.01%)	⬆️
src/db/schema.ts	68.32% <ø> (ø)
src/queue/processors.ts	87.61% <100.00%> (+0.18%)	⬆️
src/review/adapters.ts	93.75% <100.00%> (+0.41%)	⬆️
src/review/cutover-gate.ts	100.00% <100.00%> (ø)
src/review/feature-activation.ts	100.00% <100.00%> (ø)
src/selfhost/ai.ts	99.36% <100.00%> (+0.02%)	⬆️
src/selfhost/private-config.ts	100.00% <100.00%> (ø)
src/services/ai-review.ts	98.55% <100.00%> (ø)
... and 3 more

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[superagent-security]

P1: Path traversal in local manifest reader via unsanitized repo name segments

Unsanitized repoFullName substrings are passed to path.join, allowing directory traversal outside the intended config directory.

Sanitize owner and repo components before using them in filesystem paths, rejecting path traversal sequences.

AI prompt

Check if this security scanner issue is valid. If so, understand the root cause and fix it. If appropriate, update or add tests. Keep the change focused and preserve intended behavior.

<file name="src/selfhost/private-config.ts">
<violation number="1" location="src/selfhost/private-config.ts:42">
<priority>P1</priority>
<title>Path traversal in local manifest reader via unsanitized repo name segments</title>
<evidence>In localConfigCandidates, the repo variable from repoFullName.slice(slash + 1) is passed directly to path.join(...). A malicious repoFullName like "a/../../../etc/passwd" produces candidates such as "../../../etc/passwd/.gittensory.yml", which path.join resolves outside the intended GITTENSORY_REPO_CONFIG_DIR when makeLocalManifestReader later joins it with the base directory. This allows reading arbitrary .yml/.yaml/.json files on the filesystem if the repoFullName can be attacker-controlled.</evidence>
<recommendation>Sanitize the owner and repo segments extracted from repoFullName in localConfigCandidates before using them in path components. Reject any segment containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ".." or path separators). Consider validating each component against /^[a-z0-9_.-]+$/ (GitHub naming rules) and returning an empty candidate list for invalid inputs. Add unit tests covering path traversal payloads.</recommendation>
</violation>
</file>