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Scoped credential handling #4794

Description

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Problem: Multi-tenant use of installation credentials hasn't been explicitly verified — today's behavior is proven for a single installer, not for many simultaneous tenants.

Area: Platform / Security

Proposal: Confirm and, where needed, harden that installation credentials are time-limited and scoped strictly to their own repo, verified explicitly under concurrent multi-tenant load rather than assumed from single-tenant behavior.

Deliverables:

  • Verified, documented behavior (with tests) that one tenant's credentials cannot be used against another tenant's repo under any code path.

Acceptance criteria:

  • A test attempting to use tenant A's execution context to act on tenant B's repo fails.

Boundaries:


Part of #4778.


Reconciliation decision (#5669, resolved 2026-07-15): NOT a duplicate of #4941/#5225 -- #5225 explicitly disclaims the overlap in its own text ("a different concern from Rent-a-Loop's #4794... do not merge the two issues"). This issue verifies what a rented job is allowed to touch at runtime; #4941/#5225 are about AMS's own identity layer and how AMS custodies/rotates its own operational secrets across tenants. Keep all three open independently; this issue stays blocked on #4783 only.

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maintainer-onlyOwner-only work — yields no Gittensor points.roadmapOn the Wave-2 agent-layer roadmap board (project 9)

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