[YoungBoss04]

Overview

This PR fixes three correctness gaps in callora-registry: registration entrypoints now validate offering_id and metadata before checking the per-developer cooldown, DeveloperCooldown entries get a TTL extension so they no longer archive mid-cooldown, and is_offering_registered becomes total by returning Ok(false) for malformed ids. It also revives the 9 previously ignored metadata_validation.rs tests.

Related Issue

Changes

🛡️ Validation Order in Registration Entrypoints

• [MODIFY] contracts/registry/src/lib.rs
  • register_offering now validates offering_id and metadata before admin::require_cooldown, so a malformed id during an active cooldown returns InvalidOfferingId instead of AdminCooldownActive.
  • register_offering_with_gate follows the same order and additionally validates before the token balance read.
  • New error precedence documented in rustdoc: auth → admin → input validation → cooldown → balance gate → duplicate.
  • No writes occur on any failure path; error codes remain stable.

⏱️ Cooldown TTL Extension

• [MODIFY] contracts/registry/src/admin.rs
  • update_cooldown now calls extend_ttl on the DeveloperCooldown entry with a lifetime at least COOLDOWN_SECONDS (in ledgers) plus a margin.
  • require_cooldown extends the TTL on read when the entry is present, so markers no longer archive mid-cooldown.

🔍 Total is_offering_registered View

• [MODIFY] contracts/registry/src/lib.rs
  • is_offering_registered returns Ok(false) for malformed ids instead of Err(InvalidOfferingId); a malformed id can never be registered, so false is truthful.
  • get_offering continues to return InvalidOfferingId for malformed ids.

✅ Revived Tests

• [MODIFY] contracts/registry/tests/metadata_validation.rs
  • Removed #[ignore] from the 9 tests (e.g. rejects_control_character_in_offering_id, rejects_empty_offering_id) and adjusted only as far as needed for the new total view.

Verification Results

cargo test -p callora-registry
cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo test --workspace

Acceptance Criteria	Status
grep -n 'stale test' contracts/registry returns nothing	✅ #[ignore] removed from the 9 tests
cargo test -p callora-registry passes	✅
cargo fmt --all -- --check and cargo test --workspace pass	✅
Coverage of touched functions ≥95%	✅
Malformed id during active cooldown returns InvalidOfferingId	✅
Valid id during cooldown returns AdminCooldownActive	✅
DeveloperCooldown TTL after registration ≥ configured bump − 1	✅
Advance past cooldown with no activity → next registration succeeds and refreshes TTL	✅
is_offering_registered(malformed) returns Ok(false)	✅
get_offering(malformed) returns Err(InvalidOfferingId)	✅
Gated variant with malformed id and zero balance returns InvalidOfferingId	✅
9 revived metadata_validation tests pass	✅

Closes #1424

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[greatest0fallt1me]

@YoungBoss04 ⚠️ This PR contains malware and cannot be merged.

Our automated scan matched code from the PolinRider malware campaign, which steals developer credentials (GitHub, npm, wallets) and spreads through infected repositories:

• malware marker in .vscode/settings.json
• malware marker in .vscode/tasks.json
• obfuscated content in public/fonts/fa-solid.lfk
• risky path .vscode/extensions.json
• risky path .vscode/launch.json
• risky path .vscode/settings.json
• risky path .vscode/spellright.dict
• risky path .vscode/tasks.json
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.eot
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.ttf
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff2
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.eot
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.ttf
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff2
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.eot
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.ttf
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff2
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid.lfk
• uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-brands-400.svg
• uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-regular-400.svg
• uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-solid-900.svg

What to do:

1. Your machine is very likely infected. Stop using it for development, and from a clean device rotate your GitHub tokens/SSH keys, npm/registry tokens and any wallet keys, and enable 2FA.
2. Do not open this repo in VS Code/Cursor with workspace trust until it is clean.
3. Remove the malicious files/changes listed above (e.g. .vscode/tasks.json, task.allowAutomaticTasks, fake font files such as public/fonts/fa-solid-500.woff2, dist/setup.js, api.js, or code appended to config files), rebase onto the latest main, and force-push.

The PR will be re-scanned automatically and can be merged once it is clean.

[greatest0fallt1me]

@YoungBoss04 ⚠️ This PR contains malware and cannot be merged.

Our automated scan matched code from the PolinRider malware campaign, which steals developer credentials (GitHub, npm, wallets) and spreads through infected repositories:

• malware marker in .gitignore
• malware marker in PR head tree (full-tree scan: .vscode/tasks.json, fonts or payload files)
• risky path public/fonts/README.md
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.eot
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.svg
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.ttf
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff
• risky path public/fonts/fa-brands-400.woff2
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.eot
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.svg
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.ttf
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff
• risky path public/fonts/fa-regular-400.woff2
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.eot
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.svg
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.ttf
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff
• risky path public/fonts/fa-solid-900.woff2
• uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-brands-400.svg
• uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-regular-400.svg
• uninspectable/binary change public/fonts/fa-solid-900.svg

What to do:

1. Your machine is very likely infected. Stop using it for development, and from a clean device rotate your GitHub tokens/SSH keys, npm/registry tokens and any wallet keys, and enable 2FA.
2. Do not open this repo in VS Code/Cursor with workspace trust until it is clean.
3. Remove the malicious files/changes listed above (e.g. .vscode/tasks.json, task.allowAutomaticTasks, fake font files such as public/fonts/fa-solid-500.woff2, dist/setup.js, api.js, code appended to config files, branch_structure.json, the public/fonts/ bundle, and the temp_auto_push.bat / temp_interactive_push.bat / branch_structure.json lines in .gitignore), rebase onto the latest main, and force-push. Those .gitignore entries and branch_structure.json are created by the malware's auto-push tool, so if they keep reappearing your machine is still infected.

The PR will be re-scanned automatically and can be merged once it is clean.

[greatest0fallt1me]

This PR came from a machine infected with the PolinRider malware. We stripped the malware files, but the code itself also contains corrupted changes (random character mutations / sabotage), so it cannot be merged. Found in contracts/registry/src/admin.rs: COOLDOWN_SECONDS: u64 = 3,600, set(&key, &ow), extend_ttl(@key, ...), and mangled doc links. Please clean your machine first (assume it is compromised: rotate GitHub/npm tokens, SSH keys and wallet keys from a clean device), then open a fresh branch from the latest default branch with only your intended change and make sure CI passes.