Add internal health route, without which main didn't start - #14
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- Update requirements.md req 16.1 with RES-001 system-defaults description - Add GET/PUT /api/settings/agent-defaults/resources to architecture.md - Move AgentDefaultResourcesUpdate from settings.py to models.py (Invariant #14) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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* feat(resources): add system-wide agent CPU/memory defaults with per-agent override Adds GET/PUT /api/settings/agent-defaults/resources (admin-only) so instance admins can set fleet-wide CPU (number of processors) and memory limits. Container creation falls back: per-agent DB limit → system default → hardcoded. Also fixes pre-existing '4Gi' → '4g' bug in crud.py (Docker rejects IEC suffix) and tightens the fallback ordering in lifecycle.py to include system defaults. Fixes #611 Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): update agent-resource-allocation with RES-001 system defaults Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(resources): address PR #613 review — docs and model placement - Update requirements.md req 16.1 with RES-001 system-defaults description - Add GET/PUT /api/settings/agent-defaults/resources to architecture.md - Move AgentDefaultResourcesUpdate from settings.py to models.py (Invariant #14) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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* feat(soft-delete): admin recovery endpoints for agents + schedules (#834 Phase 1c) Closes the user-facing side of the soft-delete story. Pre-#834 recovery was a direct-DB `UPDATE deleted_at = NULL` — unauditable, required shell access, soft-deleted set wasn't surfaced anywhere. Endpoints (admin-only, all audit-logged): GET /api/admin/soft-deleted/agents list soft-deleted agents with `deleted_at` + `purge_eta` (= deleted_at + agent_soft_delete_retention_days) POST /api/admin/soft-deleted/agents/{name}/recover clear deleted_at; 404 if not in the soft-deleted set GET /api/admin/soft-deleted/schedules[?agent_name=...] list soft-deleted schedules; purge_eta from schedule_soft_delete_retention_days POST /api/admin/soft-deleted/schedules/{id}/recover same shape as the agent variant Recovery is metadata-only: flipping deleted_at back to NULL makes the row reappear via all the user-facing read paths Phase 1a+1b filtered. For agents, the container is NOT recreated automatically; the operator does that explicitly via POST /api/agents/{name}/start. The preserved workspace volume keeps the agent's files intact. DB helpers (mirror Phase 1a/1b shape): - AgentOperations.recover_agent_ownership / list_soft_deleted_agents - ScheduleOperations.recover_schedule / list_soft_deleted_schedules (latter takes optional agent_name to scope per agent) All four refuse live rows (returns False / 404). All return False for nonexistent ids — admin endpoint translates to 404. Stacked on #839 (Phase 1b schedules). Stack: #838 (1a) → #839 (1b) → this (1c). Merge order matters because the schedule helpers live on Phase 1b's branch. Live verification on the running stack: 1. CREATE agent + schedule, soft-delete both 2. GET /api/admin/soft-deleted/agents → match found, purge_eta=2026-11-10 (180d from now) 3. GET /api/admin/soft-deleted/schedules?agent_name=X → 1 row, purge_eta=2026-06-13 (30d from now) 4. POST recover agent → 200, deleted_at cleared in DB ✓ 5. POST recover schedule → 200, deleted_at cleared ✓ 6. POST recover on now-live agent → 404 (correct refusal) ✓ 10 unit tests in test_admin_recovery.py cover: recover/list/scope, refuse-live-row, refuse-nonexistent, newest-first ordering, limit handling, agent_name scoping. Related to #834. Phase 1c. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(recover): make recovered agents visible + honest message (#834 Phase 1c) Smoke-testing the rebased stack on the live instance surfaced a recovery dead-end: 1. `GET /api/agents/{name}` 404'd after a successful recover. The handler resolves the agent via `get_agent_by_name` (Docker-backed); soft-delete removed the container and recovery is metadata-only, so there's no container → 404. The operator literally could not see the agent they just recovered, let alone act on it. Recovery was pointless from the UI's perspective. Fix: when `get_agent_by_name` returns None but a live agent_ownership row exists (the auth dependency already proved it does — `get_agent_owner` filters `deleted_at IS NULL`), synthesize a DB-backed `status=stopped, needs_start=true` representation so the agent lists and the UI can offer a Start affordance. 2. The recover endpoint's success message claimed "POST /start to bring it back online" — but Start also 404s on a container-less agent (it too requires an existing container). Container recreate from the preserved workspace volume is the explicitly-deferred #834 Phase 2. Rewrote the message to be accurate: recovery restores all *relational* state (the hard-to-recreate part that #834 exists to protect); re-running the agent needs Phase 2. Added `needs_container_recreate: true` to the response. What recovery delivers today (correct + tested): the agent_ownership row, chat history, schedules, sharing, permissions, credentials config — every relational artifact — comes back intact and visible. What it doesn't (Phase 2): a runnable container. Live-verified on the running stack: create → soft-delete (GET 404) → recover (200) → GET now 200 with needs_start=true → agent visible. Start still 404s by design until Phase 2; message + flag now say so. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(recover): centralize models + cap limit + docs (#834 Phase 1c) Addresses PR #840 review (vybe, CHANGES_REQUESTED); rebased onto the updated #839/#838. - Move SoftDeletedAgent / SoftDeletedSchedule from routers/admin_recovery.py to models.py (Architectural Invariant #14 — response models are centralized, not declared in router files). - Cap limit on both list endpoints: limit: int = Query(200, le=500) — prevents unbounded DB reads (422 on >500). - requirements.md: §32.3 fleshed out (endpoints, recovery semantics, metadata-only/container-recreate-is-Phase-2, audit events, model location). - architecture.md: new "Soft-Delete Admin Recovery (#834 Phase 1c)" endpoint table with all 4 endpoints, auth, and behavior notes. Related to #834 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…#1149) Surface per-schedule performance on the Overview tab and the Schedules tab, both from a SINGLE compact aggregate (no N per-schedule round-trips) — extends #1107 (Overview) and generalises #868 (per-schedule deep analytics). Backend: - db `get_agent_schedules_summary(agent, hours)` — one rollup row per non-deleted schedule (zero-run schedules included): terminal success_rate (success / (success + failed[incl. error]); None when zero terminal), NULL-skipping avg_duration_ms, cost_total, context_avg, tool_call_total (parsed over newest 5,000 rows agent-wide, tool_calls_sampled flag), and last-run outcome. Cheap grouped SQL; iso_cutoff window (Invariant #16). - GET /api/agents/{name}/schedules/analytics-summary?window=7d|14d|30d (AuthorizedAgent). Declared BEFORE /{schedule_id} in routers/schedules.py so the literal segment isn't captured as a schedule_id (Invariant #4) — putting it in analytics.py would be shadowed (schedules_router mounts first). - models: ScheduleSummaryRow + AgentSchedulesSummaryResponse (Invariant #14). Frontend (single fetch, two consumers — Invariant #7): - executions.js fetchSchedulesSummary, cached per ${name}:${window} like fetchAgentAnalytics. - OverviewPanel: "Schedules performance" section, honors the existing 7/14/30d window selector, each row deep-links to the Schedules tab; hidden at zero. - SchedulesPanel: inline mini-stats per row (success rate, avg duration, runs, last-run dot) — badge style, no new chart/modal — from the same call. Tests: tests/unit/test_1115_schedules_summary.py (6) — terminal success rate, NULL-skip avg, tool-call total, zero-run-still-appears, soft-delete excluded, out-of-window excluded. Full analytics suites green (30 passed). Frontend prod build clean; endpoint verified live across 7/14/30d windows. Related to #1115 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <1073874+vybe@users.noreply.github.com>
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…-14, #654) Move 97 request/response BaseModel classes from 32 routers into src/backend/models.py (Architectural Invariant #14), plus the fan_out / loops / webhooks module-level constants their validators reference. Each class moved verbatim — validators, default_factory, and Config preserved. Behaviour preserved, proven two ways the move could silently break it: - Normalized app.openapi() snapshot diff: 330 paths / 198 schemas, byte-identical origin/dev vs branch (schema-level proof). - Validator-preservation unit tests for the 5 behaviour-bearing files (fan_out, loops, canary, audit_log, schedules) — the field_validator logic, default_factory dicts, and Config.from_attributes an OpenAPI diff can't see. One documented exception, allowlisted in the new static guard: canary.py::RunCycleRequest evaluates INVARIANTS (the canary library) in a Field(description=...) at class-definition time, and the canary library imports TaskExecutionStatus back from models — relocating it would force models.py to `from canary import ...`, inverting the dependency direction of a module meant to be a low-level leaf everything imports from. Flat models.py (not a package): a models/ dir would break tests/conftest.py's by-file model preload and the Dockerfile's by-file COPY *.py (the #1033 crash-loop class). Scope is router models only — db_models.py and adapters/base.py are intentional separate homes. New / changed: - tests/unit/test_models_centralized.py: static guard (no BaseModel under routers/ except the documented allowlist) + planted-violation tests - tests/unit/test_router_model_validators.py: validator / default_factory / Config preservation negatives - tests/unit/test_telegram_webhook_backfill.py: load the real models module in the standalone settings.py stub (was already red on dev) and stub the #1197 services.agent_service.capabilities import -> green - docs/memory/architecture.md: Invariant #14 scope note + re-measured router/service/agents counts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- feature-flows.md: Recent Updates row for the router-model centralization (Invariant #14), noting behavior-preserved / OpenAPI-byte-identical and the documented canary.RunCycleRequest allowlist exception. - security-reports: CSO --diff report for PR #1308 (37 files); zero findings across all categories. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…(INV-14, #654) The INV-14 centralization moved router-defined models into models.py, which left three flow docs citing a routers/X.py home this PR emptied: - scheduling.md: ScheduleUpdateRequest routers/schedules.py:76-86 -> models.py:1574 - audit-trail.md: fix wrong invariant number (#15 -> #14) and the now-inverted claim "response models in routers/audit_log.py" -> models.py:947-982 - business-validation.md: Schedule/execution response models routers/schedules.py -> models.py Citation-only; no behavioral or model-shape change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…-14, #654) (#1308) * refactor(models): centralize router Pydantic models in models.py (INV-14, #654) Move 97 request/response BaseModel classes from 32 routers into src/backend/models.py (Architectural Invariant #14), plus the fan_out / loops / webhooks module-level constants their validators reference. Each class moved verbatim — validators, default_factory, and Config preserved. Behaviour preserved, proven two ways the move could silently break it: - Normalized app.openapi() snapshot diff: 330 paths / 198 schemas, byte-identical origin/dev vs branch (schema-level proof). - Validator-preservation unit tests for the 5 behaviour-bearing files (fan_out, loops, canary, audit_log, schedules) — the field_validator logic, default_factory dicts, and Config.from_attributes an OpenAPI diff can't see. One documented exception, allowlisted in the new static guard: canary.py::RunCycleRequest evaluates INVARIANTS (the canary library) in a Field(description=...) at class-definition time, and the canary library imports TaskExecutionStatus back from models — relocating it would force models.py to `from canary import ...`, inverting the dependency direction of a module meant to be a low-level leaf everything imports from. Flat models.py (not a package): a models/ dir would break tests/conftest.py's by-file model preload and the Dockerfile's by-file COPY *.py (the #1033 crash-loop class). Scope is router models only — db_models.py and adapters/base.py are intentional separate homes. New / changed: - tests/unit/test_models_centralized.py: static guard (no BaseModel under routers/ except the documented allowlist) + planted-violation tests - tests/unit/test_router_model_validators.py: validator / default_factory / Config preservation negatives - tests/unit/test_telegram_webhook_backfill.py: load the real models module in the standalone settings.py stub (was already red on dev) and stub the #1197 services.agent_service.capabilities import -> green - docs/memory/architecture.md: Invariant #14 scope note + re-measured router/service/agents counts Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(models): add INV-14 feature-flow row + CSO diff report (#654) - feature-flows.md: Recent Updates row for the router-model centralization (Invariant #14), noting behavior-preserved / OpenAPI-byte-identical and the documented canary.RunCycleRequest allowlist exception. - security-reports: CSO --diff report for PR #1308 (37 files); zero findings across all categories. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tests): add pydantic[email] extra to test requirements (#654) INV-14 centralized EmailStr-bearing models (SendMessageRequest, etc.) into models.py, which the db layer imports non-tolerantly (db/schedules.py -> `from models import TaskExecutionStatus`). Building those schemas at import time now requires email-validator, so the unit-CI job failed at conftest collection: "ImportError: email-validator is not installed". The backend Docker image already installs pydantic[email]>=2.10.4; tests/requirements-test.txt had bare pydantic. Align the test env with production. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): repoint stale model-home citations to models.py (INV-14, #654) The INV-14 centralization moved router-defined models into models.py, which left three flow docs citing a routers/X.py home this PR emptied: - scheduling.md: ScheduleUpdateRequest routers/schedules.py:76-86 -> models.py:1574 - audit-trail.md: fix wrong invariant number (#15 -> #14) and the now-inverted claim "response models in routers/audit_log.py" -> models.py:947-982 - business-validation.md: Schedule/execution response models routers/schedules.py -> models.py Citation-only; no behavioral or model-shape change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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* fix(agent): make agent /tmp tmpfs size configurable via AGENT_TMP_SIZE (#1231) (#1233)
Agent containers mounted /tmp as a hardcoded 100 MB noexec,nosuid RAM-backed
tmpfs. It fills easily — e.g. `gh` CLI install artifacts (~38 MB) that hardcode
/tmp and bypass the #1098 TMPDIR redirect — after which every /tmp write fails
with "No space left on device", including git's commit scratch, so autonomous
scheduled runs "complete" but silently fail to persist. The size being a
literal meant operators couldn't tune it without a code change + base-image
rebuild.
- capabilities.py: AGENT_TMPFS_MOUNT size now read from AGENT_TMP_SIZE (env on
the backend service, which builds the agent mount spec), default 512m,
validated `^\d+[mg]$` with empty/invalid → default. noexec,nosuid stay
hardcoded — only size is configurable, and it stays bounded (counts against
the agent memory cgroup). Single source of truth, so create (crud.py) and
recreate (lifecycle.py) can't drift.
- Wire AGENT_TMP_SIZE=${AGENT_TMP_SIZE:-512m} on the backend service in both
docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.prod.yml; document in .env.example.
- architecture.md Container Security: note the now-configurable size.
- tests/unit/test_1231_agent_tmp_size.py: default, valid m/g, case-fold,
invalid→default, and the security flags are never dropped.
Mount specs are creation-time: existing agents pick up a new size on recreate,
not restart. Builds on #1098 (TMPDIR redirect) — closes the gap for tools that
hardcode /tmp. The agent-side git-sync silent-persist-failure is a separate
issue in the abilities repo, per the ticket.
Related to #1231
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <1073874+vybe@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(ui): per-schedule performance scorecards on Agent Detail (#1115) (#1149)
Surface per-schedule performance on the Overview tab and the Schedules tab,
both from a SINGLE compact aggregate (no N per-schedule round-trips) — extends
#1107 (Overview) and generalises #868 (per-schedule deep analytics).
Backend:
- db `get_agent_schedules_summary(agent, hours)` — one rollup row per
non-deleted schedule (zero-run schedules included): terminal success_rate
(success / (success + failed[incl. error]); None when zero terminal),
NULL-skipping avg_duration_ms, cost_total, context_avg, tool_call_total
(parsed over newest 5,000 rows agent-wide, tool_calls_sampled flag), and
last-run outcome. Cheap grouped SQL; iso_cutoff window (Invariant #16).
- GET /api/agents/{name}/schedules/analytics-summary?window=7d|14d|30d
(AuthorizedAgent). Declared BEFORE /{schedule_id} in routers/schedules.py
so the literal segment isn't captured as a schedule_id (Invariant #4) —
putting it in analytics.py would be shadowed (schedules_router mounts first).
- models: ScheduleSummaryRow + AgentSchedulesSummaryResponse (Invariant #14).
Frontend (single fetch, two consumers — Invariant #7):
- executions.js fetchSchedulesSummary, cached per ${name}:${window} like
fetchAgentAnalytics.
- OverviewPanel: "Schedules performance" section, honors the existing 7/14/30d
window selector, each row deep-links to the Schedules tab; hidden at zero.
- SchedulesPanel: inline mini-stats per row (success rate, avg duration, runs,
last-run dot) — badge style, no new chart/modal — from the same call.
Tests: tests/unit/test_1115_schedules_summary.py (6) — terminal success rate,
NULL-skip avg, tool-call total, zero-run-still-appears, soft-delete excluded,
out-of-window excluded. Full analytics suites green (30 passed). Frontend
prod build clean; endpoint verified live across 7/14/30d windows.
Related to #1115
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <1073874+vybe@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(ui): in-app bug reporting from the floating Help widget (#1116) (#1283)
* docs(readme): document the Trinity Ops Agent and PostgreSQL backend/migration (#1290)
Adds a top-of-README callout recommending PostgreSQL for production (SQLite remains the zero-config dev default, opt-in via DATABASE_URL, #300), links the public Trinity Ops Agent (trinity-ops-public) for instance operations, and documents migrating existing SQLite instances via its /migrate-to-postgres skill. Also adds a Database section, a DATABASE_URL env row, and an ops-agent entry in the docs index.
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(reliability): unify the SUB-003 auth-class failure classifier into one shared module (#1088) (#1297)
The `is_auth_failure` + `AUTH_INDICATORS` + `NON_AUTH_KILL_MARKERS` (#904)
logic was duplicated inline in `subscription_auto_switch.py` and
`scheduler/service.py`, kept in sync by a hand-written "keep these lists in
sync" comment — exactly how the #904 kill-marker bug class re-appears.
Consolidate into one canonical module:
- New `src/backend/services/failure_classifier.py` — canonical, pure-stdlib
classifier (55 lines). `subscription_auto_switch.py` now re-exports
`is_auth_failure` unchanged, so existing importers
(`routers/chat.py`, `services/task_execution_service.py`) and their test
patch targets keep working.
- New `src/scheduler/failure_classifier.py` — byte-identical vendored mirror.
The scheduler runs in a separate container and cannot import
`backend.services`; it uses the classifier for log-labelling only (picks the
`logger.error` wording, never gates a switch). The agent-runtime classifier
in `error_classifier` is intentionally NOT merged — it diverges semantically
and stays kill-safe by `_classify_signal_exit` precedence (D4).
- Byte-identity is enforced by
`tests/unit/test_904_sigkill_no_false_auth.py::TestBackendSchedulerParity`;
the re-export is pinned by `TestBackendReExportGuard`. No hand-sync.
Pure structural refactor, no behavioral change (verified by SHA-256 equality
of the two copies and line-for-line comparison vs the deleted code). The test
rewrite also drops the prior `exec(compile(...))` source-slicing in favour of
`importlib` path-loading, removing the only injection primitive in scope.
Tests: 19/19 pass in `test_904_sigkill_no_false_auth.py`.
CSO --diff: CLEAR (docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-06-21.md).
Refs #1088
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(orchestration): pull-pilot routing for agent→agent MCP chat behind default-OFF flag (#946) (#1293)
* feat(orchestration): pull-pilot routing for agent→agent MCP chat behind default-OFF flag (#946)
Phase 2 PoC for pull/work-stealing (Epic #1045, umbrella #1081). When
MCP_AGENT_CHAT_PULL_ENABLED is ON, a sequential agent→agent (scope='agent',
non-self) chat_with_agent is routed by the MCP server through the durable async
/task path instead of the synchronous held /chat; the caller gets an immediate
{accepted|queued, execution_id} receipt and polls get_execution_result.
scope='user', self-tasks, and parallel=true are unchanged. Default OFF — flag
flip + MCP routing revert is the whole rollback.
- config.py: canonical MCP_AGENT_CHAT_PULL_ENABLED registry entry (both services
read the SAME env key, so a single-.env deploy can't drift).
- settings.py: surface mcp_agent_chat_pull_enabled in /api/settings/feature-flags
(auth-gated, observability-only — not a UI surface).
- chat.py: release the idempotency claim on the two /task dispatch-breaker-open
(CircuitOpen) deny paths, mirroring /chat and CapacityFull (T5 fix) — without
it a breaker-open reject silently blocks same-key retries for 24h.
- mcp-server: scope-based pull routing + D8 dispatch-mode idempotency token so a
flag flip can't replay a wrong-shape snapshot across endpoints; startup log of
the routing mode for the soak's control/treatment window.
- tests: chat.test.ts (routing fork + key behavior), test_946_task_idempotency_on_deny.py
(deny-path claim release), feature-flag exposure tests.
- docs: ACTOR_MODEL_POSTCARD (#945 resolved), PULL_PILOT_946_SOAK harness +
go/no-go record, CSO diff audit (CLEAR), TARGET_ARCHITECTURE/architecture updates.
Refs #946
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): document pull-pilot routing (#946) + AGENT_TMP_SIZE tmpfs (#1231)
Sync feature-flow docs with recent changes:
- agent-to-agent-collaboration.md: new Pull-Pilot Routing (#946) section —
flag-gated MCP routing fork to the durable async /task path, poll-for-result
receipt contract, D8 idempotency route token, feature-flag exposure, and the
T5 /task dispatch-breaker-open deny-path claim release.
- container-capabilities.md: refresh stale tmpfs facts — agent /tmp size is now
operator-configurable via AGENT_TMP_SIZE (default 512m, noexec,nosuid fixed),
plus the TMPDIR=/home/developer/.tmp heavy-scratch redirect (#1098).
- feature-flows.md: add Recent Updates index rows for #946 and #1231.
Refs #946
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* feat(agent): runtime data_paths with portable export/import (#1169) (#1294)
* feat(agent): runtime data_paths with portable export/import (#1169)
Declare an agent's runtime data (SQLite DBs, datasets) under data/ on the
already-durable home volume — no separate volume, no platform schema change.
- template.yaml `data_paths:` surfaced by template_service (github + local)
and materialized at creation by crud.py -> git_service.materialize_data_paths:
writes ~/.trinity/data-paths.yaml and appends data/ + entries to the agent's
own .gitignore (idempotent). Opt-in; empty list is a no-op.
- S4 persistent-state and data_paths now share one extracted heredoc/list
primitive (materialize_trinity_yaml_list / _read_trinity_yaml_list).
- New routers/agent_data.py: POST /data/export (stream | base64, 413 over cap,
manifest-only tar when data/ missing) and POST /data/import (proxies to the
agent-server restore primitive; data/** allowlist + traversal guard;
Idempotency-Key). Both serialized per agent by a cross-worker Redis op lock.
- MCP tools export_agent_data / import_agent_data (Invariant #13).
- Validation checks DP-001..DP-005 in agent-validation-spec.
- Docs: architecture, requirements, feature-flows index + agent-data-volumes
flow, agent guide; CSO diff audit report (0 critical/high).
Tests: ~30 unit + TestClient tests (export/import endpoints, allowlist,
gitignore, template surface). PR2 (scheduled snapshots + pre-snapshot
quiesce hook + retention/cascade) deferred.
Closes #1169
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(agent-data): satisfy sys.modules pollution lint in #1169 tests
The two new data_paths test files copied the baselined `patch.dict` +
bare `del sys.modules[...]` loader from test_persistent_state_allowlist.py,
which the sys.modules pollution lint flags as NEW (non-baselined) violations.
Adopt the blessed snapshot/restore exception (precedent:
test_telegram_webhook_backfill.py): declare a top-level
`_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` list + an autouse `_restore_sys_modules` fixture, and
install the stubs / evict the cached module directly (the fixture owns
restoration). Removes the bare `del sys.modules[...]` entirely rather than
hiding it. Drop the now-unused `patch` import from the gitignore test.
Lint passes (no new violations); both files' 16 tests still green; no
cross-file leakage.
Refs #1169
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): sync recent changes — #1231 tmpfs, #1115/#1231 index rows
Fix container-capabilities.md for the now-configurable agent /tmp tmpfs
(#1231): default 100m → 512m via AGENT_TMP_SIZE, and correct the stale
full_capabilities ternary excerpts to the shared AGENT_TMPFS_MOUNT constant
(noexec,nosuid always applied, both modes). Add Recent Updates index rows for
the per-schedule performance scorecards (#1115) and the tmpfs-size fix (#1231);
the #1169 and #1116 rows already shipped in-commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* fix(security): authenticate the in-container agent server on the shared agent network (#1159) (#1292)
* fix(security): authenticate the in-container agent server on the shared agent network (#1159)
The in-container agent server (:8000) had zero inbound auth on
trinity-agent-network: any agent could read a sibling's .env secrets or
run arbitrary Claude on it. Every backend->agent call now carries a
per-agent X-Trinity-Agent-Token = HMAC-SHA256(AGENT_AUTH_SECRET,
"trinity-agent-auth:v1:"+name), verified by a pure-ASGI middleware on all
HTTP and WebSocket routes (constant-time compare; only /health exempt).
- Derive-don't-store: the master AGENT_AUTH_SECRET lives only in the
backend env (auto-generated by start.sh like SECRET_KEY); each container
receives only its own token, so a compromised agent cannot compute a
sibling's. Fail-closed -- derive raises on an empty secret.
- Callers route through services/agent_auth.py (agent_httpx_client /
build_agent_auth_headers / merge_auth_headers); a static guard test
fails any new raw agent-{name}:8000 caller that bypasses them.
- Removed the dead, unauthenticated /ws/chat route (ran arbitrary Claude)
and the agent server's wildcard CORS (internal-only).
- Grace path for old images: empty TRINITY_AGENT_AUTH_TOKEN -> allow;
check_agent_auth_token_env_matches forces a one-pass recreate to inject.
- Retired the unused src/scheduler/agent_client.py.
Tests: unit (matcher, middleware, header guard, derivation) + security
isolation test. CSO diff audit in docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-06-20.md.
Closes #1159
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): document agent-server authentication (#1159) + sync recent flows
Add a feature-flow doc for the in-container agent-server inbound auth shipped
in this PR, and sync the index with two recent merged changes.
- New feature-flows/agent-server-authentication.md: end-to-end trace of the
derived X-Trinity-Agent-Token (HMAC over AGENT_AUTH_SECRET), the pure-ASGI
middleware enforcing it on every HTTP/WS route, fail-closed vs grace path,
recreate reconciliation, and the migrated callers + static guard. Added to
the Authentication & Security catalog in the index.
- container-capabilities.md: refresh the stale /tmp tmpfs size (was a hardcoded
100m) to the configurable AGENT_TMP_SIZE (default 512m, #1231).
- Recent Updates rows for #1159, #1231, and the previously-missing #1115.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* docs(voip): genericize moved-issue reference in feature-flow
#1039 (configurable data-retention) moved to the private enterprise
tracker; replace the now-private issue number in voip-telephony.md with a
generic description so the public doc doesn't deep-link a private issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(agents): server-side compatibility validation with auto-fix (#668)
Run ~100 best-practice checks (11 categories) against a running agent's
workspace, surfaced non-blocking in the Overview tab with one-click
auto-fix for the 10 gitignore checks, plus an MCP tool.
- services/compatibility/ package (spec/collector/static_checks/ai_checks/fixes):
ONE docker exec -> in-container python -> JSON snapshot (secret files
existence-only, size/binary caps); pure STATIC checks (HARD-only) +
category-batched AI checks (Haiku, iterate-expected, fail-open, capped at
SOFT, secret-redacted); runtime-aware (claude-only checks skipped for
Codex/Gemini).
- GET/POST endpoints (read AuthorizedAgentByName; fix OwnedAgentByName, gitignore
only, per-agent Redis lock, atomic write, uncommitted until next sync;
include_ai path rate-limited). agent_compatibility_results table (dual-track
SQLite + Alembic) persists the latest snapshot; cascade/rename via AGENT_REFS.
- CompatibilityPanel.vue (two-phase fetch, grouped checklist, per-check fix,
re-run) in OverviewPanel; get_agent_compatibility_report MCP tool.
- 35 fixture-driven unit tests; spec sync-tested against docs/agent-validation-spec.md.
Persistence departs from the issue's "no DB table" note so AI verdicts show
without re-spend + enable fleet aggregation (see requirements section 41).
Fixes #668
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(compat): remove polynomial-ReDoS in secret-assignment regex (#668)
CodeQL py/polynomial-redos (high): `_ASSIGN_RE` captured the value as
`[ \t]*(.+?)[ \t]*$`. The lazy `.+?` and the surrounding `[ \t]*` can both
match a tab, giving polynomial backtracking when `_redact()` runs the pattern
over up to 48 KB of agent-supplied file text.
Capture the value greedily to end-of-line (`(.*)$`) and let the callers
strip — both `_looks_placeholder()` callers already `.strip()`, so secret
detection and redaction are behaviourally identical (verified: `=`, `:`,
`export`, and indented forms still match). 35 unit tests pass.
* feat(sso): OSS gated surface for enterprise SSO (OIDC) (#32)
Companion to trinity-enterprise#36. OSS carries only the entitlement-gated
surface; all SSO logic lives in the private submodule.
- Login.vue: "Sign in with <IdP>" buttons (shown only when the `sso` feature is
entitled and a provider is enabled), plus OIDC callback-fragment handling
(`/login#sso=ok|mfa|error`) — reuses the existing 2FA challenge UI when the
IdP login still requires a local second factor.
- stores/auth.js: completeSsoLogin() (reuses _finalizeLogin / _setMfaChallenge)
+ fetchSsoProviders() (empty in OSS-only builds — endpoint 404s).
- Settings.vue: admin-gated "SSO" tab → SsoPanel.vue (provider CRUD + test +
policy). Gated by enterpriseStore.isEntitled('sso'), same as the 2FA tab.
- Bump enterprise submodule to the SSO module commit.
- docs: architecture enterprise-modules row + requirements §40 (SSO/OIDC).
No new backend dependency (python-jose + httpx already in the image) and no
OSS Python changes — the mint/whitelist/mfa seams already exist.
Stacked on feat/5-2fa-totp (reuses the OSS mfa_gate + 2FA challenge surface).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(sso): bump enterprise submodule to OIDC hardening (#32 review)
Pulls in the email_verified / issuer-pinning / login-CSRF fixes
(trinity-enterprise 87c8f97). OSS gated surface unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(planning): note incubating goal-directed direction; reword voip flow
Add an "Incubating Directions (Not Yet Decided)" section to
TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md capturing the goal-directed control-surface idea
(Objective + policies + roster + externally-measured evals), explicitly
bounded by CLAUDE.md §8 and sequenced after the pull migration + #300.
Incubating in trinity-enterprise#27.
Reword the voip-telephony flow note to drop a stale #1039 reference in
favor of describing the LOG_* data-retention no-op class directly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(security): add CSO 2026-06-21 posture report
Routine /cso full-audit posture report (Phases 0–14, daily 8/10 gate).
Follows the docs/security-reports/ convention; no real secrets reproduced.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(user-docs): video library + per-page links, v0.6.1 What's New, sync dev features
- Add videos.md (35 published videos, newest-first by topic) and a README Watch section
- Add 'Watch' callouts to 32 feature pages linking the most relevant, newest videos
- Add user-facing whats-new/v0.6.1.md (translated from release notes; no issue numbers)
- Document dev-only features: agent runtimes (Claude Code/Codex/Gemini CLI, #1187),
agent data paths + export/import (#1169), compatibility validation (#668),
in-app bug reporting (#1116), subscription hot-reload (#1089), pull-pilot routing (#946),
configurable AGENT_TMP_SIZE (#1231), Postgres migration-runner groundwork (#1160)
- Index agent-runtimes, agent-data, and the previously-orphaned agent-session pages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(setup): first-run operator intake + admin email login (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#38, #82)
Capture an optional operator email/company at first-run setup with an explicit,
unchecked-by-default opt-in to "occasionally receive important security & product
updates", submitted once to a new /v1/operator-intake endpoint on #1116's
Cloudflare intake app. The same email binds as the admin's sign-in identity so
the operator can log in with email + password — no verification email is sent (a
fresh install has no Resend key; the email is bound, not code-verified). The
code-based email second factor stays Phase 2 on the existing mfa_gate seam.
- backend: operator_intake_service (fire-and-forget, at-most-once via a
system_settings marker, DO_NOT_TRACK aware, owns installation_id); setup
endpoint captures profile + binds admin email; authenticate_user resolves the
admin by username OR registered email (password guard blocks code-only users);
PUT /api/users/me/email for the existing-admin transition
- frontend: SetupPassword email/company + consent checkbox; Login "username or
email" field; Settings -> General "Admin sign-in email" card
- config: OPERATOR_INTAKE_ENABLED / OPERATOR_INTAKE_URL (+ .env.example)
- docs: requirements section 43, architecture catalog, first-time-setup feature flow
- tests: 16 unit tests (intake idempotency/guards, email-login resolution, setup)
Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#38
Fixes #82
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): index row for first-run intake + admin email login (trinity-enterprise#38, #82)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(setup): de-ambiguate email regex to clear CodeQL polynomial-ReDoS (#82)
The _EMAIL_RE pattern duplicated into setup.py and users.py had two
[^@\s]+ atoms around the literal \. that both also match '.', giving the
engine many ways to place the dot and backtracking polynomially on
user-controlled email input (CodeQL alerts #211, #212).
Constrain only the final segment to [^@\s.]+ (no dot) so the trailing \.
can align with exactly one position -> linear matching. Behaviour is
unchanged: multi-subdomain addresses still validate; an 80k-char
pathological input now resolves in ~2ms.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(credentials): curated credential file-type injection (SA keys, certs, SSH, binary) (#1305)
* feat(credentials): curated credential file-type injection — SA keys, certs, SSH, binary (enterprise#11)
Widens CRED-002 injection from the fixed 3-path exact allowlist
(.env/.credentials.enc/.mcp.json) to a curated set of credential file *types*,
without reopening the arbitrary-path RCE surface (#183/#590/#598).
- New services/credential_paths.py — single-source policy: ALLOW (.config/gcloud/**,
.kube/config, *.pem/*.key/*.crt/*.cert/*.p12/*.pfx, .ssh/id_*, + existing exact set)
with deny-precedence over anything executed/sourced at startup (shell rc,
CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md/.claude/**, .mcp.json.template, .ssh/authorized_keys/config,
.git*, bin/**) and `..`/absolute traversal. Vendored byte-identically into the
agent image (Invariant #5) with a parity test.
- Agent-server hardening: the inject + update file loops now enforce the policy AND
a resolve-under-home traversal guard the original write path lacked; parent-dir
creation + chmod 0o600 preserved. New GET /api/credentials/list for export discovery.
- Binary-safe: inject carries files_b64 (base64); agent writes via write_bytes.
.credentials.enc gains a v2 {files, files_b64} envelope (legacy flat archives still
decrypt); encrypt/decrypt stay flat for the single-secret callers (SIEM/2FA/SSO).
- Export now captures the FULL injected set (via /list) + binary, not just the 2 defaults.
- Three surfaces in sync (Invariant #13): MCP inject_credentials gains files_b64;
frontend CredentialsPanel gains a file-upload affordance (text vs base64 auto-detected).
- Tests: allowlist test now exercises the REAL policy (newly-allowed + still-blocked),
+ credential_paths parity test + binary archive round-trip test. 61 pass.
- docs/memory/architecture.md: credential-path policy documented.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#11. Loosens a deliberately-tight boundary —
run /cso on the diff before merge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(credentials): close /cso findings on the injection widening (#11 review)
Security review of the widening surfaced one HIGH regression + hardening items;
all fixed here.
#1 (HIGH, RCE): the #598 .mcp.json content-validation guard was bypassable via
the new files_b64 (binary) channel — validate_mcp_config only checked `files`,
so `files_b64={".mcp.json": base64(<stdio-command MCP server>)}` skipped it and
configured an RCE MCP server on the target agent. Fix: .mcp.json may only arrive
as TEXT (files), where it is validated; rejected in files_b64 at the backend
inject router AND the agent-server write helper.
#2 (defense-in-depth): import/auto-import wrote decrypted archives via the
agent-server /inject layer only. Added validate_credential_set() (curated path
policy + .mcp.json content + no-binary-.mcp.json) on the backend import boundary
so enforcement is dual-layer as the issue mandates. (Archives are AES-GCM with
the server key, so a forged archive wasn't practical — but the layer belongs.)
#3: .ssh/ is now locked to id_* only — a stray *.key/*.pem under .ssh is no
longer accepted (policy was previously broader than the "SSH keys = id_*" intent).
#4 (noted): .config/gcloud/** can hold a google-auth executable credential_source;
only honored under non-default GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_EXECUTABLES=1.
Documented in credential_paths.py.
+6 regression tests (169 pass). CSO report: docs/security-reports/cso-2026-06-22-11-diff.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(credentials): exclude vendor dirs from cert globs + accurate export count (#11 live test)
Found while testing PR #1305 against a real local instance:
1. Over-capture: the broad *.pem/*.key/*.crt globs matched bundled CA files
(e.g. .local/.../site-packages/certifi/cacert.pem), so export's /list walk
swept vendored cert material into .credentials.enc. Added node_modules,
site-packages, .local, .venv/venv, .cache, go/pkg to the deny-list (both
root and nested forms) so cert globs only catch real credential files.
2. export's files_exported count re-read just the 2 default files (reported 1
while the archive actually held 5). export_to_agent now returns the true
captured count; dropped the redundant stale read.
Verified end-to-end on a live agent: allowed types inject (text+binary, 0600,
parent dirs), blocked paths 400 (incl. .ssh non-id_*, .mcp.json-via-files_b64,
weaponized .mcp.json text), and binary round-trips through export→import with
matching sha256. +5 regression tests (72 pass).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(security): annotate CSO 2026-06-21 findings as remediated; drop stale voip hunk
Two review-driven fixes ahead of the v0.7.0 cut:
- Annotate the CSO posture report (.md + .json) with post-audit remediation
status. The report audited `main` pre-cut and listed F1/F2/F3 as open
VERIFIED findings; they are already remediated on `dev` and ship in v0.7.0:
- F1 (unauth agent-server) -> #1159 X-Trinity-Agent-Token middleware
- F2 (fastmcp -> hono/undici) -> #1255, #1289; fastmcp ^4.3.0
- F3 (form-data CRLF via axios) -> #1254
- F4/F5/F8 exploit path closed by #1159 (auth gate)
Adds a top-of-report banner, per-row status tags, per-finding notes, and a
machine-readable `remediation_status` block in the JSON. Avoids publishing a
stale "open CRITICAL + exploit" to a PUBLIC repo without its fix context.
- Drop the voip-telephony.md reword: it is superseded by already-merged #1301,
which made the identical `#1039` -> `LOG_*` change on `dev`. Restoring to
merge-base removes the redundant/conflicting hunk from this PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: set version to 0.7.0
* feat: streamline first-time setup wizard (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#49)
Drop the log-copied setup token, require an admin email, and rebuild the
first-run page as a welcoming animated welcome screen.
Backend (routers/setup.py, main.py):
- Remove the setup-token machinery entirely (ensure_setup_token /
clear_setup_token / Redis-shared token + the main.py startup emission).
Setup no longer depends on Redis — the admin write goes straight to SQLite.
- Make admin email REQUIRED (sign-in identity): missing -> 422 at the model
layer; blank/typo -> 400, validated before any write so setup never
half-completes. Password complexity (OWASP ASVS 2.1) still enforced.
- get_setup_status keeps setup_available:true for frontend back-compat.
Frontend (SetupPassword.vue):
- Full redesign: dark branded hero with an animated orbiting fleet
constellation (Trinity mark core + agent nodes on three rings), split
layout (stacks on mobile), prefers-reduced-motion aware.
- No setup-token field; email required; order email -> password (+confirm)
-> company -> updates opt-in. Removed the Redis-wait panel + polling.
Security tradeoff (chosen: accept + document): removing the token leaves the
unauthenticated first-run window with no proof-of-control. Documented as an
operator responsibility (deploy behind a tunnel/VPN until setup completes) in
docs/DEPLOYMENT.md Security Recommendations; endpoint still self-disables
after first success. See docs/security-reports/cso-diff-2026-06-23.md (F1).
Docs: DEPLOYMENT.md security note, architecture.md, requirements.md
(§15.2/§43), feature-flows/first-time-setup.md.
Tests: remove obsolete test_1165_setup_token_shared.py; update test_setup.py
(no token, email required) and test_setup_operator_profile.py (email
required, model-layer + blank/invalid rejection). 7 operator-profile unit
tests pass; new contract verified live (422/400 negative paths).
Fixes abilityai/trinity-enterprise#49
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(setup): full-bleed setup screen via normal flow, not position:fixed
The redesigned first-run page used `position:fixed; inset:0` for its root.
On wider viewports this left a band of the light `#app` (bg-gray-100)
background showing through on the right/bottom — a fixed root is clipped to
the nearest transformed/contained ancestor instead of the viewport, so its
coverage isn't guaranteed.
Switch the root to the original component's proven normal-flow approach
(`position:relative; width:100%; min-height:100vh`), which fills the
full-width `#app`, and make the decorative aurora/grid `position:absolute`
within it. Verified covering the full viewport at 2560x1440 (light mode, the
repro case) and stacking correctly at 430px.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): defer routers.setup import so unit collection can't be corrupted
The CI backend-unit regression gate runs `cd tests && pytest unit/` (the whole
unit suite). test_setup_operator_profile.py imported `routers.setup` at module
(collection) time; that import — pulling in database/dependencies/services and
their many `utils.*` leaves — failed/perturbed sys.modules during collection and
INTERRUPTED the entire `unit/` collection (head collected ~2 of 2734 → the diff
gate flagged it as a new failure).
Defer the `import routers.setup` to a cached `_get_setup()` accessor used inside
the tests, so module collection imports only stdlib/pytest/fastapi/pydantic and
can never corrupt the suite. `_get_setup()` also spec-preloads the backend
`utils.*` leaves (helpers/errors/credential_sanitizer/password_validation/
url_validation/image_optimize) the same way conftest preloads `utils.helpers`,
without touching `sys.modules["utils"]`, so the import resolves cleanly at run
time regardless of harness utils state.
Verified with the exact CI command (`cd tests && pytest unit/ --co`): the full
suite now collects 2734 items with no interruption, and the 7 setup tests pass.
No conftest changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): drop sys.modules preload — plain lazy import (passes #762 lint)
The previous commit's `_get_setup()` spec-preloaded backend utils leaves via
`sys.modules[...] = …` / `.pop`, which tests/lint_sys_modules.py (#762) bans
outside conftest. It's also unnecessary: in the backend-unit gate
(`cd tests && pytest unit/`), tests/unit/conftest.py already installs
src/backend/utils as the canonical `utils` package, so a plain lazy
`import routers.setup` resolves the backend `utils.*` leaves natively.
Simplify `_get_setup()` to a cached plain lazy import — no sys.modules
mutation. Verified: lint clean (no new violations), `pytest unit/ --co`
collects 2734 with no interruption, and the 7 setup tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): update #858 guards for setup-token removal (#49)
Removing the setup token (trinity-enterprise#49) deleted
`routers/setup.py::ensure_setup_token` and the lifespan token emission, so two
#858 regression guards asserted gone behavior and failed in the backend-unit
gate:
- test_ensure_setup_token_logs_token_via_logger_warning
- test_lifespan_emits_setup_token_via_logger_before_event_bus
The #858 invariant itself is intact: the lifespan still emits the first-run
notice via `logger.warning` (not print), after setup_logging() and before
event_bus.start(). Replace the token-specific guard with one that matches the
new FIRST-TIME SETUP warning by content + ordering, drop the now-obsolete
ensure_setup_token guard, and remove the unused BACKEND_SETUP constant. The
Dockerfile PYTHONUNBUFFERED parity checks and the no-print-in-lifespan guard are
unchanged. 4 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(whatsapp): deliver ChannelResponse.files as Twilio MediaUrl (#1315)
WhatsApp agents can now send files to users. send_response delivers
ChannelResponse.files as Twilio MediaUrl attachments (one message per file,
text first), reaching parity with the Slack adapter.
- New create_share_from_bytes() persists in-memory bytes through the FILES-001
pipeline (MIME-blocklist/quota/disk/DB) and mints a public ?sig= URL; both it
and create_share now share the extracted _persist_and_register helper.
- Per-agent file_sharing_enabled gate; 1h share TTL (cleanup reaper purges).
- Caps (image/audio/video ~5MB, documents ~16MB) on the detected MIME; graceful
text-link fallback when public_chat_url is unset/non-HTTPS, the MIME is
unsupported, or the file is oversized — never silently dropped.
- Per-file isolation: a rejected/failed file never aborts the text or siblings.
- 42 unit tests; requirements.md + whatsapp-integration.md updated.
Fixes #1315
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(whatsapp): webhook routes to backend, not frontend (#1281) (#1316)
The WhatsApp panel's deployment-prerequisite notice told operators to route
/api/whatsapp/webhook/* to the "frontend service". That path is a backend
FastAPI route (Twilio HMAC-verified); pointing tunnel ingress at the static
SPA silently drops inbound messages. Corrected to the backend service
(http://backend:8000), matching the cited PUBLIC_EXTERNAL_ACCESS_SETUP.md.
Related to #1281
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ui): loading skeletons for Dashboard graph & timeline (#1266) (#1312)
The initial fleet/metrics load can take 20s+ on 10+ agent fleets (#1265);
until now the Dashboard rendered the "No agents" empty state (or blank
timeline) during that wait, so the UI looked frozen/broken.
- New reusable `SkeletonLoader.vue` (dark-mode aware, accessible
role=status/aria-busy, reserves space to avoid layout shift) with `rows`
(timeline/list) and `nodes` (collaboration graph) variants.
- `stores/network.js`: add `loading` (defaults true so the first paint is a
skeleton, not the empty state) + `loadError` (distinct failed-load state),
toggled in `fetchAgents` (finally-cleared so a failure never shows an
infinite skeleton).
- `Dashboard.vue`: graph canvas and timeline now render skeleton → error →
empty → content off those flags. Loading shows immediately on nav; error
states offer a Retry (reuses `refreshAll`).
Frontend-only; pairs with the backend perf work in #1265. `vite build` passes.
Related to #1266
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(db): set SQLite end-of-support to September 1, 2026 + Postgres migration notes (#1278) (#1314)
Records the firm SQLite end-of-support date and the SQLite → PostgreSQL
migration announcement/guidance. Documentation/decision only — SQLite code
removal stays with the migration work (#300/#1183/#746).
- docs/migrations/SQLITE_TO_POSTGRES.md (new): authoritative guide — EOL date,
what changes and when, switching a fresh deployment (DATABASE_URL + postgres
profile), migrating an existing deployment (backup-first; no turnkey data-copy
tool yet — honest cutover options), verification, and release-notes copy.
- docs/releases/v0.6.2.md (new, draft): EOL announcement section linking the
guide, seeding the next release notes.
- docs/planning/TARGET_ARCHITECTURE.md + docs/memory/architecture.md (Invariant #3):
reference the EOL date so it's discoverable outside the release.
- Cross-links the in-repo reminder companion (#1279).
Related to #1278
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: stop disclosing enterprise functionality in public docs (trinity-enterprise#45) (#1311)
* docs: stop disclosing enterprise functionality in public docs (trinity-enterprise#45)
The public repo documented the full design, feature catalog, and gating
strategy of the paid enterprise tier — a free blueprint of what we monetize
and how it's built. This removes that competitive content and keeps only the
generic open-core seam public.
- Delete 4 strategy/design docs (OSS_ENTERPRISE_SPLIT_RESEARCH,
ENTERPRISE_ARCHITECTURE, feature-flows/enterprise-modules, ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV)
- architecture.md "Enterprise Modules" table -> neutral seam pointer
(no paid-feature catalog, no enterprise_* table DDL, no per-module detail)
- requirements.md §35 -> abstract EntitlementService seam (drop the enumerated
module list + dead links to the deleted strategy docs)
- audit-trail.md: neutralize the lone enterprise-pillar mention
- CLAUDE.md: standing rule — enterprise designs live only in trinity-enterprise
- CI: enterprise-docs-guard.yml fails the build if live public docs reintroduce
paid-feature / private-schema tokens
Content is preserved (relocated to the private trinity-enterprise repo, see the
companion PR). Git-history scrub of the deleted files + point-in-time historical
docs (archive/, releases/, security-reports/) tracked as a follow-up.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#45
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ci(enterprise-docs-guard): add least-privilege permissions block
Clears CodeQL actions/missing-workflow-permissions (medium). The guard only
checks out and greps, so contents: read is sufficient.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(releases): add 0.7.0 release notes
* fix(#1115): port get_agent_schedules_summary to SQLAlchemy Core (Postgres-safe)
The #300 SQLAlchemy migration dropped the get_db_connection import from
db/schedules.py but left get_agent_schedules_summary (#1115) calling it,
so the /schedules/analytics-summary endpoint raised NameError at runtime.
Surfaced for the first time by the v0.7.0 release-PR full-suite run (dev
pushes only lint).
Port the method to get_engine() Core queries like its siblings, and
replace the SQLite-only bare-column-with-MAX last-run query with a
portable ROW_NUMBER() window so it works on PostgreSQL too.
Also refresh the test_login_rate_limit_split config stub, which went
stale when auth.py grew a PUBLIC_ACCESS_REQUESTS_ENABLED dependency
(trinity-enterprise#10) — 8 collection errors under HEAD.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(voip): per-agent VoIP config panel + persisted voice (abilityai/trinity-enterprise#28)
Add the missing per-agent VoIP config UI (agent Settings/Sharing tab) and a
persisted per-agent Gemini voice. Shipped as plain OSS gated on the existing
voip_available platform flag — NOT entitlement-gated (a UI gate over a
money-spending OSS backend would be cosmetic; deliberate simplification of the
issue's original "entitlement-gated" framing).
Backend:
- agent_ownership.voice_name (default Kore) via dual-track migration
(SQLite db/migrations.py + Alembic 0004 + schema.py/tables.py). db
get/set_voice_name with read-path fallback to Kore for unset/invalid values.
- GET/PUT /api/agents/{name}/voice/name (PUT owner-only, validated against
GEMINI_VOICE_NAMES). _get_voice_name and voip_service now read the persisted
voice instead of the two hardcoded "Kore" sites.
- PUT /api/agents/{name}/voip/enabled toggle (owner-only, 404 when no binding);
create_binding upsert no longer forces enabled=1 so re-saving credentials
preserves a disabled state (call path already refuses disabled bindings).
Frontend:
- VoipChannelPanel.vue (modeled on WhatsAppChannelPanel) mounted in SharingPanel
under voip_available; shared src/constants/voices.js (drift-guarded vs backend);
AgentWorkspace picker defaults to the persisted voice; sessions store surfaces
voip_available.
Tests: tests/unit/test_28_voip_voice_config.py — voice fallback/roundtrip/
invalid->default, enable toggle + re-PUT-preserves-disabled (H3), and the
frontend/backend voice-list drift guard. Schema-parity + voip-db guards green.
Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#28
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(voip): HTTP-level endpoint tests for /voice/name + /voip/enabled (#28 review I1)
Pre-landing /review flagged that the new endpoints were covered only at the DB
layer. Add FastAPI TestClient tests (mount real routers, override auth deps, stub
db/voip_service) asserting:
- PUT /voice/name: owner-gated (403), 400 on unknown voice, empty clears to
default, valid voice persists; GET returns voice_name + available_voices.
- PUT /voip/enabled: owner-gated (403), 404 when no binding / when voip flag off,
200 reflecting state with no auth_token leaked.
Also capture a durable learning (docs/memory/learnings.md): the schema-parity
test is blind to db/tables.py drift — a missing Column there passes parity but
breaks at runtime; guard it with a db-accessor unit test that executes a live
select on the new column.
Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#28
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(docs): agent-readable zero-to-value onboarding (#1280) (#1336)
* refactor(docs): agent-readable zero-to-value onboarding (#1280)
Make the repo's entry points machine-first so an autonomous agent can self-orient and reach a useful result without a human translating context.
- AGENTS.md: add a "Using this file" machine-contract header (declares it the authoritative agent entry point, states the AGENTS/CLAUDE/README boundary, explains how to traverse). Rebuild Route-by-task with an explicit "Done when" zero-to-value signal per persona.
- CLAUDE.md: cross-link to AGENTS.md and frame CLAUDE.md as the contributor working agreement (auto-loaded by Claude Code), not the agent landing page.
- Fixes from a context-free agent onboarding test (AC#5 validation): AGENTS.md deploy verify no longer assumes an undefined $TOKEN (leads with `trinity agents list`, shows token derivation); deploy section states the running-instance prerequisite; README CLI example adds the `trinity agents list` verify step; docs/CLI.md leads with `pip install trinity-cli` (PyPI) and marks `-e src/cli/` as the from-source/dev variant.
Validated by an agent performing a zero-to-value deploy task using only repo files, no human context: self-oriented in 2 hops (README -> AGENTS.md) to a correct deploy+verify answer; friction items above are its findings, folded back in.
Repo-root AGENTS.md is hand-authored; the CLAUDE.md->AGENTS.md mirror (#1187) is per-agent-container (startup.sh), so these edits are conflict-free.
Related to #1280
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(templates): machine-readable starter-template catalog (#1280)
Affordance sweep for agent self-selection. Previously an agent had to `ls`
config/agent-templates/ (24 dirs, 7 of them test fixtures) and open each
template.yaml to find a starting point.
- config/agent-templates/README.md: catalog grouping the 17 real templates
(single-purpose: scout/sage/scribe/demo-*/trinity-system; the dd-* due-
diligence suite) with one-line affordances, how-to-use, and an explicit
"not starting points" list for the test/canary fixtures
- AGENTS.md: link the catalog from the Deploy-an-agent section so the
zero-to-value path is "pick a ready-made template", not "author from scratch"
Related to #1280
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): un-quarantine and fix the 15 unmasked unit failures (#1103) (#1338)
Removes the @pytest.mark.skip quarantines added in #300 and fixes the
underlying issues. Each group fixed at root cause, not by matching assertions
to current behavior.
Environmental (git identity):
- tests/unit/conftest.py: set GIT_AUTHOR/COMMITTER_NAME/EMAIL process-wide so
in-test `git commit` works on a CI runner with no global git identity
("Author identity unknown"). Fixes test_reset_preserve_state_guardrails (3)
and the test_git_pull_branch end-to-end setups.
Test-setup bug (production code was correct):
- test_git_pull_branch.py: the repos did `git push -u origin main` but `git init`
defaults to `master` (no init.defaultBranch), so origin/main never existed and
_get_pull_branch correctly fell back to the working branch — the assertions
expecting "main" failed. Force `git init -b main` (local + bare). Fixes all 5
(TestGetPullBranch 2 + TestGitPullFromMainEndToEnd 3).
Test-isolation bug (assertions were correct):
- test_orphaned_execution_recovery.py: shared module-level mocks were reset with
plain reset_mock(), which keeps return_value/side_effect — so one test's
get_agent_container.side_effect bled into later tests under random ordering,
skewing recovery counts ("assert 3 == 2"). Reset with
reset_mock(return_value=True, side_effect=True). Stable across 5 seeds.
Real lint findings:
- docker/base-image/startup.sh: shellcheck now exits 0. Converted the 4 fragile
file-iteration loops to `find -print0 | while read` (SC2010/SC2045/SC2044),
hardened 8 `cd` with `|| exit 1` (SC2164), split the SC2155 export, and
documented-disabled SC2001 on the two regex `sed` lines that ${//} can't
express. `bash -n` clean. Un-skips test_startup_sh_shellcheck_clean.
backlog (3) and 929 (1) were already un-quarantined on dev (db_harness schema),
so no change needed there.
Verified: the 11 un-skipped tests pass across multiple random seeds; full unit
suite shows no regressions from these changes (the unrelated pre-existing
test_1115_schedules_summary / test_admin_email_login failures fail on dev too).
Related to #1103
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps-dev): bump happy-dom (#1326)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /tests/git-sync with 1 update: [happy-dom](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom).
Updates `happy-dom` from 20.10.5 to 20.10.6
- [Release notes](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/capricorn86/happy-dom/compare/v20.10.5...v20.10.6)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: happy-dom
dependency-version: 20.10.6
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(deps-dev): bump @types/node in /src/mcp-server (#1327)
Bumps [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node) from 25.9.3 to 26.0.0.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
dependency-version: 26.0.0
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-major
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(deps): bump fastmcp (#1325)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /src/mcp-server with 1 update: [fastmcp](https://github.com/punkpeye/fastmcp).
Updates `fastmcp` from 4.3.0 to 4.3.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/punkpeye/fastmcp/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/punkpeye/fastmcp/compare/v4.3.0...v4.3.2)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: fastmcp
dependency-version: 4.3.2
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(deps): bump the patch-and-minor group (#1329)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /src/frontend with 5 updates:
| Package | From | To |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [axios](https://github.com/axios/axios) | `1.18.0` | `1.18.1` |
| [@playwright/test](https://github.com/microsoft/playwright) | `1.61.0` | `1.61.1` |
| [autoprefixer](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer) | `10.5.0` | `10.5.1` |
| [@rollup/rollup-darwin-arm64](https://github.com/rollup/rollup) | `4.62.0` | `4.62.2` |
| [@rollup/rollup-linux-arm64-musl](https://github.com/rollup/rollup) | `4.62.0` | `4.62.2` |
Updates `axios` from 1.18.0 to 1.18.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/axios/axios/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/axios/axios/blob/v1.x/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/axios/axios/compare/v1.18.0...v1.18.1)
Updates `@playwright/test` from 1.61.0 to 1.61.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/microsoft/playwright/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/microsoft/playwright/compare/v1.61.0...v1.61.1)
Updates `autoprefixer` from 10.5.0 to 10.5.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/postcss/autoprefixer/compare/10.5.0...10.5.1)
Updates `@rollup/rollup-darwin-arm64` from 4.62.0 to 4.62.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/compare/v4.62.0...v4.62.2)
Updates `@rollup/rollup-linux-arm64-musl` from 4.62.0 to 4.62.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/rollup/rollup/compare/v4.62.0...v4.62.2)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: axios
dependency-version: 1.18.1
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: "@playwright/test"
dependency-version: 1.61.1
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: autoprefixer
dependency-version: 10.5.1
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: "@rollup/rollup-darwin-arm64"
dependency-version: 4.62.2
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
- dependency-name: "@rollup/rollup-linux-arm64-musl"
dependency-version: 4.62.2
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(executions): propagate cancelled terminal status end-to-end (#679) (#1333)
Defense-in-depth follow-up to #671. Make the agent task-runner aware that an
operator cancel happened and surface a third terminal outcome — `cancelled` —
alongside success/failed, so a cancel is never recorded as a billable success
or an agent failure.
Agent server:
- ProcessRegistry records a `_terminated[execution_id]` marker on a successful
SIGINT send; `was_terminated()` (read-only, 300s lazy TTL, cleared on
register) lets the sync chat handler and async result callback relabel a
graceful-exit-0 / SIGKILL->504 turn as cancelled.
- `record_task_finish` accepts a neutral finish (success=None): a cancel
neither resets nor increments the dispatch-breaker failure counter (#526).
Backend:
- 3-way status map (success->SUCCESS, cancelled->CANCELLED, else->FAILED) in
the async callback (routers/agents.py) and the sync applier
(task_execution_service). An auth/rate terminal is never reclassified as a
cancellation — guarded at the backend trust boundary too (CSO finding 2).
- Consumers (message_router, chat, paid, public, validation_service) treat
cancelled as non-delivery; paid no longer settles on cancel (money bug).
- terminate writes CANCELLED only when it actually stopped a running turn; on
already-finished the agent's real terminal stands (Issue 7).
Tests: 9 new unit suites (64 cases) + execution-termination integration
additions; 85 unit tests pass locally. CSO diff audit: CLEAR.
Refs #679
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ui): unify Chat + Session into one Chat tab with a session-mode toggle (#1112) (#1340)
Collapse the redundant Chat + Session tabs on Agent Detail into a single "Chat"
tab carrying a "Session mode" toggle (default ON), keeping the legacy stateless
surface as a first-class user-selectable mode rather than dead code.
- AgentDetail.vue: single `{ id: 'chat' }` tab (drop the separate Session entry).
New `chatMode` ref ('session'|'legacy', default 'session') persisted per-user in
localStorage['trinity.chatMode']. `sessionAvailable` = feature flag on AND
runtime has --resume (not Codex); `effectiveChatMode` forces legacy when the
Session surface is unavailable and hides the toggle. The toggle swaps
SessionPanel ↔ ChatPanel in-place (v-if). isFullscreenTab keys on the single
'chat' id; `?tab=session` aliases to 'chat' (hinting session mode).
- Execution-resume: ExecutionDetail "continue as chat" (?tab=chat&resumeSessionId)
forces legacy ChatPanel (which owns resume) via a transient, non-persisted
routeForcedMode — without rewriting the user's saved preference.
- No backend change (session_tab_enabled already exists). MobileAdmin unaffected:
its openChat is a self-contained mobile chat overlay, not an AgentDetail
deep-link, so there is nothing to repoint.
- docs: architecture Session Tab block + requirements §5.8 note.
Related to #1112
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(access): Access tab — manage Trinity operators per agent (trinity-enterprise#17) (#1317)
New Access tab on Agent Detail that manages Trinity operators (platform users)
with access to an agent, distinct from the Sharing tab's external channel
clients. Draws the operator-vs-client line on the read path.
Backend:
- db.get_agent_operator_access(): outer-joins agent_sharing × users on the
grantee email (lower-cased, engine-based → PG+SQLite). Resolved → active
operator (username/role/last_active); unresolved → pending invite.
- GET /api/agents/{name}/access (AgentOperatorAccess model). Add/remove reuse
the existing /share + /share/{email}.
Frontend:
- AccessPanel.vue: operator roster (status + role badges, last-active), add by
email, remove. Access tab wired into AgentDetail (owner-gated).
- SharingPanel.vue: Team Sharing allow-list removed (moves to Access); dead
share-management script + stale "Team Sharing below" copy cleaned/repointed.
- stores/agents.js: getAgentAccess().
Tests: active-vs-pending classification + agent scoping. vite build passes.
Note: the strict client-vs-operator split (non-user emails → a dedicated client
roster) is deferred to the Sharing-side redesign (#18/#20); removing them here
now would orphan those grants, so all allow-list entries stay visible on Access.
Related to Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#17
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ui): slim the Overview executions-by-type bars
The "Executions by type" stacked bars rendered full-width with a 1px
gap, so a busy agent's week read as a solid wall of color. Cap each
bar at 56px and center it inside its (still full-width) hover column,
and soften the top corner. The column stays flex-1 so spacing/tooltips
are unchanged and wider windows (14d/30d) thin naturally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(voip): add Gacrux to the Gemini Live voice picker
Adds the "Gacrux — Mature" prebuilt voice to the per-agent VoIP voice
selector (and the shared AgentWorkspace per-session picker, which reads
the same list). Updated in lockstep across the three mirrored sources so
the frontend↔backend parity test stays green:
- src/frontend/src/constants/voices.js — single frontend source of truth
- src/backend/config.py GEMINI_VOICE_NAMES — write-validation allowlist +
read-path fallback
- tests/unit/test_28_voip_voice_config.py — hardcoded parity tuple
Follow-up to #1323 (per-agent VoIP config panel + persisted voice).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(ui): reframe Sharing tab to external-client sharing via channels (#1347)
Part of the Access/Sharing redesign (Epic trinity-enterprise#16). The Access
tab (#17) already owns Trinity operators; this scopes the Sharing tab to the
operator → external-client surface.
- Google-Docs-style "Share this agent" framing; operator language removed
(operators live on the Access tab).
- External access policy collapsed into one **Restricted ↔ Open** segmented
control over require_email/open_access (Restricted = approval-gated, Open =
anyone verified; identity proof always on for external sharing).
- Pending requests kept, reframed as external clients awaiting approval.
- Channels rendered as compact collapsible summary rows (new
ChannelDisclosure.vue). Detailed config stays reachable inside the expanded
row as a non-regressing interim seam — #19 replaces the body with a modal
dialog. No channel functionality removed.
- Outbound file sharing + public links nudged into a separate "Distribution"
section (distribution, not client access).
Frontend-only; no API changes. SharingPanel prop/emit contract unchanged.
Verified: both SFCs compile (vue/compiler-sfc), design-token check passes.
Related to abilityai/trinity-enterprise#18
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(architecture): trim architecture.md under the 150k-char context limit (#1344)
architecture.md had grown to ~156.7k chars (on dev), past the 150k
soft limit Claude Code warns about when auto-loading it each session
(it's `@`-imported by CLAUDE.md). Over the limit the file risks silent
truncation and eats a large slice of the context window every session.
Compressed the densest Cross-Cutting Subsystem narratives, the migration
and non-root-container invariants (#3/#17), a few catalog/endpoint rows,
and the longest frontend UI prose — preferring summary + pointer where a
dedicated `feature-flows/` doc already owns the deep detail (the doc's own
editorial rule). Result: 156.7k → 149.3k chars (~4.8% smaller).
No facts dropped: every issue tag, field name, default, and error-string
is preserved; protected SQLite DDL (tracked by /validate-schema) untouched;
heading/code-fence/table counts unchanged; all 12 added flow-doc links
resolve.
Related to the over-limit warning surfaced in Claude Code.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps): bump js-yaml from 4.2.0 to 5.1.0 in /src/frontend (#1330)
Bumps [js-yaml](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml) from 4.2.0 to 5.1.0.
- [Changelog](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/compare/4.2.0...5.1.0)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: js-yaml
dependency-version: 5.1.0
dependency-type: direct:production
update-type: version-update:semver-major
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ci): guard the Alembic (Postgres) track in schema-parity (#1342) (#1345)
* fix(ci): guard the Alembic (Postgres) track in schema-parity (#1342)
The schema-parity required check validated only the SQLite track
(migrations.py ↔ schema.py). A schema change that ships the SQLite
migration but omits the Alembic revision under
src/backend/migrations/versions/ passed every required check green yet
broke PostgreSQL — init_database() runs alembic_runner.upgrade_to_head(),
which applies revision files only and does not autogenerate from
tables.py. Two PRs reached "green CI but PG-broken" and had to be held by
hand.
Add a cross-track guard, folded into the existing required schema-parity
job (no new required-check to manage):
- scripts/ci/check_alembic_parity.py — fails a PR that ADDS schema DDL to
db/{migrations,schema,tables}.py without a net-new revision file under
src/backend/migrations/versions/. Pure stdlib, PR-only (diffs base...head).
- Heuristic / false-positive guard: the signal is a DDL keyword on an
*added, non-comment* line (SQL: CREATE/ALTER/ADD COLUMN/…; SQLAlchemy:
Column(/Table(/Index(/…). Comment edits, data-only and down migrations
carry no DDL keyword, so they don't trip it. Documented in the script
docstring and the workflow header.
- tests/unit/test_alembic_parity_guard.py — 20 tests incl. the acceptance
fixtures (SQLite-only change fails; dual-tracked passes; comment/data-only
pass). Wired into the parity pytest run.
Also notes the enforcement in architecture.md Invariant #3.
Verified locally: 24 tests pass; end-to-end smoke across clean / SQLite-only
(exit 1) / paired-revision (exit 0) scenarios behaves correctly.
Related to #1342
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): tighten Alembic guard to require a new MIGRATIONS entry (#1342)
Verifying against real repo history surfaced a false positive: the
migration-runner refactor #1263 (_atomic_rebuild table rebuilds) re-emits
CREATE TABLE / CREATE INDEX for *existing* tables in a rename-swap but adds
no actual schema and no new MIGRATIONS entry — yet the original "any added
DDL keyword" heuristic flagged it, violating AC #4 (non-schema edits must
not trip).
Tighten the signal to two conjuncts: a schema change must (1) register a
net-new ("name", _migrate_fn) entry in the MIGRATIONS list AND (2) carry a
DDL keyword. Runner refactors / table rebuilds add no entry → exempt;
data-only new migrations carry no DDL → exempt; real column/table adds do
both → caught.
Validated against real commits:
• #740 agent_loops, #526 agent_ownership column → FAIL (correctly blocked)
• #668 compat, voice_name (both shipped an Alembic revision) → PASS
• #1263 runner refactor → PASS (false positive fixed)
A full post-Alembic history scan finds 0 outstanding missing revisions, so
no backfill is owed; the pre-Alembic columns are already in 0001_baseline.
28 tests pass (added MIGRATIONS-entry detection + the #1263 rebuild case).
Related to #1342
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* docs(dependab…
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…118 Part A) (#1555) * feat(mcp): make per-agent MCP connector OSS-core (trinity-enterprise#118 Part A) Relocate the per-agent MCP connector (ent#46/#55/#51, shipped v0.8.0 entitlement- gated as `mcp_connector`) from the private enterprise submodule into OSS core, and drop the entitlement gate front and back. Decision (Eugene, 2026-07-09): sharing agents via individual MCP connectors is a platform-adoption surface, not a paid module. Backend (router → service → db, Invariants #1/#2/#14): - routers/connector.py — /api/agents/{name}/connector* (config, mint/regenerate/ revoke key, playbooks), mounted unconditionally in main.py; no requires_entitlement. - services/connector_service.py — snippet builder + playbook resolution. - db/connector.py (ConnectorOperations) — config CRUD + scoped-key mint/revoke into mcp_api_keys (scope='connector'); facade delegators on database.py. - models.py — ConnectorConfigUpdate/Status/KeySecret/Playbook/ClientSnippet. Schema: enterprise_connectors table re-homed onto OSS dual-track (db/tables.py, db/schema.py, db/migrations.py:enterprise_connectors_table + Alembic 0015_enterprise_connectors). Name kept so existing enterprise installs adopt their data with zero migration (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, no duplicate-table drift). Delete/rename cascade via an enterprise_connectors AGENT_REF. Frontend: ConnectorChannelPanel un-gated in SharingPanel.vue (dropped the isEntitled('mcp_connector') v-if + the now-unused enterprise store wiring). The MCP proxy tools (connector.ts), the connector-scope auth fence (dependencies.py), and ExposedToolsPanel.vue were already OSS and edition-agnostic. `mcp_connector` is removed from the entitlement registry by the paired enterprise PR (deletes register_module). Docs: requirements mcp.md §7.5 + feature-flows/mcp-connector.md + architecture/index. Tests: tests/unit/test_118_mcp_connector_oss.py (11) — service helpers, config CRUD, key mint/regenerate/revoke, scope='connector' validate contract. Part B (email-auth onboarding, #848) deferred pending design sign-off. Related to trinity-enterprise#118 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(submodule): bump enterprise to post-#121 so the connector isn't double-mounted (#118) #1555 makes the per-agent MCP connector OSS-core. The enterprise submodule was pinned at 630cca9e, which still ships backend/mcp_connector/ and registers it via register_enterprise() — so an enterprise build would double-mount the connector router alongside the new OSS-core one. Bump the pin to f5d69be6 (enterprise main post trinity-enterprise#121), where the private module is removed. This forward-integrates two already-on-enterprise-main commits into the pin: - trinity-enterprise#121 — removes backend/mcp_connector/ (the intended pair) - trinity-enterprise#120 — ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV docs (docs only) - trinity-enterprise#106 — client-portal umbrella (already on enterprise main) OSS-only CI is unaffected (submodule is update=none / "boots without enterprise"). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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#1296) (#1694) * docs(requirements): agent self-reminders §10.14 (#1296) Requirements-first per Rule of Engagement #1: document the new agent self-reminders capability (durable one-shot deferred self-trigger) before implementing it — AC 1-7, storage fork, scheduler fire home, at-least-once delivery, autonomy hold, and retention. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(db): agent_reminders table — 5-track migration (#1296) Durable one-shot deferred self-trigger storage. Byte-consistent DDL across all five coordinated edits (Invariant #3): - db/schema.py: TABLES entry + two indexes (agent + partial active) - db/migrations.py: _migrate_agent_reminders_table + MIGRATIONS tail - migrations/versions/0028_agent_reminders (off head 0027) - db/tables.py: SQLAlchemy Core Table (byte-matched to DDL) - db/agent_cleanup.py: AGENT_REFS CASCADE (rename cascade + purge + soft-delete filter; source_agent_name left unregistered per the agent_loops precedent) schema-parity, alembic-parity, and cleanup-parity all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(executions): wire triggered_by="reminder" into all three trigger constants (#1296) A new triggered_by value must hit all three sites or reminder executions silently vanish from the Overview chart, fail to filter, or misclassify their failure alert: - _TRIGGER_BUCKETS + _BUCKET_ORDER (db/schedules.py) — first-class "Reminders" bucket (mirrors the #1150 loops precedent) - _AUTONOMOUS_TRIGGERS (task_execution_service.py) — a reminder fires unwatched, so a FAILED reminder earns an operator alert - _VALID_TRIGGERS (routers/executions.py) — the fleet Executions ?triggered_by= filter accepts it Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(reminders): backend create/list/cancel surface (#1296) Three-layer backend for agent self-reminders (Invariants #1/#2/#8/#14/#18): - models.py: ReminderCreate (fire_at XOR delay_seconds validator) + Reminder/ReminderSummary + env-tunable abuse-bound constants - db/reminders.py: RemindersOperations (SQLAlchemy Core, tenant-scoped by-id ops, CAS cancel, pending/daily counts, retention prune+count) - database.py: facade delegation - services/reminder_service.py: thin create — resolved-window bound, timeout clamp to agent cap (#929 parity), pending + durable daily caps, provenance, relative→absolute, insert - services/idempotency_service.py: derive_reminder_key over RAW input - routers/reminders.py: self-only gate (current_user.agent_name==name) + _reject_connector_principal; create-idempotency (header wins else raw-input key; terminal rows excluded from replay; fail() only pre-insert); tenant-scoped cancel (200/409/404); main.py registration Self-only auth mirrors reports; connector keys stay off the auth-entry allowlist AND are explicitly rejected. Verified against a real migrated SQLite DB; models-centralized + enumeration-uniformity green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(scheduler): arm/fire/reconcile agent self-reminders (#1296) The standalone scheduler (single-instance) owns the reminder fire path — a near-clone of the RETRY-001 one-shot DateTrigger machinery: - models.py: Reminder dataclass (naive-UTC fire_at/firing_at) - database.py: committed CAS methods (claim_reminder_firing pending→ firing, mark_fired/failed, release_to_pending, set_execution) + get_active_reminders (pending∪firing JOIN agent_ownership, filters deleted_at + autonomy_enabled=1) + _row_to_reminder via parse_scheduler_ts - service.py: _schedule_reminder_job (DateTrigger), _execute_reminder (at-least-once: CAS claim → create real execution row (__manual__, triggered_by=reminder) → dispatch via _call_backend_execute_task → timeout=assume-dispatched no-force-FAILED / clean-failure=status- guarded FAILED + bounded retry), _reconcile_reminders (fail-open, arms pending + reclaims stale firing) wired into initialize() (own try after _recover_pending_retries), _sync_schedules() (own try, NOT under the cron try — Codex C5), and reload_schedules() (Codex C6) - config.py: MAX_REMINDER_FIRE_ATTEMPTS (default 3) All 207 existing scheduler tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(mcp): set_reminder/list_reminders/cancel_reminder tools (#1296) Third surface (Invariant #13) mirroring loops.ts 1:1: - tools/reminders.ts: createReminderTools → {setReminder, listReminders, cancelReminder}; reuses the inline getClient + resolveAgentName self-scoping (an agent-scoped key defaults to its bound name); Zod carries the abuse bounds (message.max(4000), delay 60..2592000, fire_at ISO string). Idempotency is enforced server-side over the raw input, so a naive retry dedupes without a client-supplied key. - client.ts: setReminder/listReminders/cancelReminder thin request wrappers - server.ts: import + register in the tools array No agent-server mirror (backend-only scheduling primitive). tsc build clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(retention): agent_reminders retention sweep + #1644 guard wiring (#1296) A durable status table needs a retention story (the AGENT_REFS CASCADE only cleans on agent delete; terminal rows on a LIVE agent accumulate). Decision: wire the FULL #1644 blast-radius guard (lightweight, mirrors agent_reports exactly, honors #1638/#1644 discipline): - settings_service.py: agent_reminders_retention_days in OPS_SETTINGS_ DEFAULTS (90, wide/safe), OPS_SETTINGS_DESCRIPTIONS, and RETENTION_OPS_KEYS (surfaced at GET /api/settings/retention, protected from /ops/reset, logged at boot). NOT a community-floor key. - cleanup_service.py: _sweep_agent_reminders_retention — DELETE terminal (fired/cancelled/failed) rows past the window (pending/firing never deleted), chunked, gated via _guard_allows + _after_guarded_prune (default MAX_ROWS_PER_SWEEP floor); CleanupReport.agent_reminders_pruned. retention-guard suite green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(reminders): backend + scheduler coverage (#1296) Backend (tests/unit/test_1296_reminders.py, 33 tests): migration + tables.py live-select accessor guard (the guard schema-parity misses), the three trigger constants (parametrized), ReminderCreate XOR, derive_reminder_key raw-input stability, db round-trip + tenant-scope + cancel CAS states, retention (terminal pruned / pending+firing kept), reminder_service bounds (min/max window, timeout>cap, pending 429, daily 429), and router self-gate ATTACK (sibling 403, connector 403), tenant-scope 404, idempotency edges (dup replay, in-flight 409, cancel-then-recreate-fresh), cancel outcomes, list default-pending. Scheduler (tests/scheduler_tests/test_1296_reminders.py, 17 tests): committed single-fire CAS + multi-connection contention (exactly one wins, Codex C8), _execute_reminder outcomes (claim-loss / success / timeout=assume-dispatched-no-force-FAILED / clean-failure-retry / bounded-failed), _reconcile (arm-once, past-due, stale-firing reclaim, Z-suffix no-raise, missing-table no-op, soft-delete/autonomy-off filtered), reload path (Codex C6). Scheduler suite 224 green; backend reminder+parity+guard sweep 124 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(architecture): agent self-reminders subsystem (#1296) - New 'Agent Self-Reminders (#1296)' subsystem section (sibling to Sequential Agent Loops): storage fork, scheduler fire home, at-least-once delivery, self-only auth + abuse bounds, autonomy hold + AGENT_REFS cascade + retention - agent_reminders DB schema block (dual-track migration, CASCADE) - router/service catalog entries (reminders.py, reminder_service.py) - MCP tools table row (reminders.ts × 3) - Scheduler Service + Cleanup Service background-service rows updated - API Endpoints section for the 3 reminder endpoints Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(feature-flows): agent-self-reminders flow doc + index (#1296) New feature-flow doc mirroring run-agent-loop.md: the two design forks, MCP/backend/scheduler layers, single-fire + at-least-once delivery semantics, the 5-track migration, retention, and the three trigger constants. Adds a Recent Updates row + a Core Agent Features category row to the index (per the always-add-an-index-row rule). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(config): wire agent-reminder tunables into compose + .env.example (#1296) The six REMINDER_*/MAX_*REMINDER* caps are backend os.getenv() levers with working code defaults, so the feature ships functional — but without compose wiring the .env levers are inert on deploy (the #1056/#1039 packaging class), mirroring how REPORT_RATE_LIMIT (#918) is wired into all three files. Adds the block to .env.example, docker-compose.yml, and docker-compose.prod.yml backend.environment: with defaults matching models.py/routers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve .env.example conflict left in the previous merge commit (keep both #1296 REMINDER_* and #1632 OPERATOR_QUEUE_* blocks) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
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Jul 26, 2026
* chore(.claude): bump dev-methodology submodule — Product Quality Bar
Points .claude at trinity-dev 57c8b5c: adds a canonical Product Quality Bar
section to DEVELOPMENT_WORKFLOW.md (six adoption/ease-of-use principles) and
hooks it into the dev pipeline — /create-issue (acceptance criteria),
/autoplan (scope calibration → taste decisions), /implement (build-time
checklist), and /review (new 4.15 catch-in-diff check).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(announcements): v0.8.0 announcement record (#1548)
* chore(.claude): bump dev-methodology submodule — Product Quality Bar
Points .claude at trinity-dev 57c8b5c: adds a canonical Product Quality Bar
section to DEVELOPMENT_WORKFLOW.md (six adoption/ease-of-use principles) and
hooks it into the dev pipeline — /create-issue (acceptance criteria),
/autoplan (scope calibration → taste decisions), /implement (build-time
checklist), and /review (new 4.15 catch-in-diff check).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(announcements): v0.8.0 release announcement record (all channels)
---------
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(avatar): prevent thinking-token truncation dropping the color-scheme block
Avatar refinement runs each identity prompt through GEMINI_TEXT_MODEL to append
a fixed technical block (background #1a1f2e/#111827, indigo rim #6366f1,
head-and-shoulders framing, 85mm lens, 5600K key) — the sole source of avatar
color scheme and cross-generation consistency.
The refinement call capped maxOutputTokens at 512. Since #1130 the default model
is gemini-3.5-flash, a *thinking* model whose reasoning phase draws from the
output budget. Reasoning consumed ~491 of 512 tokens, truncating the refined
prompt (finishReason=MAX_TOKENS) to a ~90-char fragment that dropped the entire
technical block. Avatars were then generated from a bare subject description —
wildly inconsistent and off-palette.
Fix in _call_gemini_text:
- Disable thinking (thinkingConfig.thinkingBudget=0) — refinement is a
deterministic rewrite that needs no chain-of-thought.
- Raise maxOutputTokens 512 -> 4096 as headroom even when thinking stays on.
- Retry once WITHOUT thinkingConfig on HTTP 400: a thinking-mandatory model
(e.g. gemini-2.5-pro) rejects budget=0, and refine_prompt silently falls back
to the raw prompt on error, so an unhandled 400 would re-break avatars.
Verified end-to-end against the live model: all 6 technical-block tokens now
survive refinement (was 0/6). Adds 3 regression tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(channels): count inbound client messages on the Sharing-tab roster (#1533) (#1554)
* fix(channels): count inbound client messages on the Sharing-tab roster (#1533)
The roster showed `message_count = 0` for every external client, `last_active`
was frozen at `/login` time, and clients who never ran `/login` never appeared
at all. All three share one cause: `get_or_create_chat_link` and
`increment_message_count` (Telegram + WhatsApp) had zero callers outside the
`database.py` facade. The shared inbound path writes `public_chat_sessions`, a
different table, so `*_chat_links` rows were only ever created by
`set_*_verified_email` — the `/login` flow.
Note: the issue's Context paragraph states that `last_active` "is touched on
inbound traffic via `get_or_create_chat_link`". It is not — that function was
dead, and returns early for an existing row without writing anything.
Revive the write path behind a default-no-op `ChannelAdapter.record_inbound_activity`
hook, called once per delivered DM from `ChannelMessageRouter._handle_message_inner`
at step 5c: after the access gate, so an unauthenticated stranger who messages the
bot cannot create unbounded chat-link rows, and skipped for groups, since a chat
link is keyed by (binding, user) and counting group traffic would list members who
never DM'd the agent. Telegram and WhatsApp override it; Slack and VoIP inherit
the no-op (Invariant #9). The call is best-effort — a counter write never blocks
message processing.
Replace `get_or_create` + `increment` with one atomic `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO
UPDATE` (`record_inbound`), which removes a cross-worker SELECT-then-INSERT race
under `--workers 2`, halves the writes per message, and refreshes a stale display
name via `COALESCE(excluded, existing)`. Since `increment_message_count` was
`last_active`'s only live writer, one call fixes the count and the timestamp
together. Delete the now-dead methods, their facade delegations, and the
`_row_to_chat_link` helper they alone called.
Historical counts are not backfilled; the roster's "Messages" header says so.
Tests: dual-backend (SQLite + PostgreSQL) roster read-back 0->1->2, `last_active`
advance, username backfill, and `/login` interplay through the real `db_backend`
harness; the real `_handle_message_inner` for the DM, group, access-denied and
counter-failure paths; and the adapter override bodies executed for real —
mutation-verified, a typo'd metadata key turns the suite red. A facade-delegation
guard covers the wholesale-mock blindness recorded in docs/memory/learnings.md.
Verified against a live instance: real Telegram webhook payloads through the real
transport drive the roster 0->1->2; a group message reaches the router and is not
counted; an access-denied message creates no row.
Follow-up #1552 records the read-time-derivation reframe (deriving the roster from
public_chat_messages) that this tactical fix deliberately defers.
Fixes #1533
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(channels): use an example.com placeholder email in the #1533 access-denied case
The public-repo rule in CLAUDE.md calls for `user@example.com`-style
placeholders. `a@b.com` was copied from the neighbouring access-gate test and
was also inconsistent with the rest of this file, which already uses
`alice@example.com`. No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(ci): auto-trigger frontend-e2e (nightly + frontend paths), keep ui opt-in (#1526) (#1551)
The frontend-e2e Playwright suite ran ONLY on `ui`-labeled PRs, so most PRs never
triggered it and the suite rotted silently — specs broke against structural/UX
changes and sat red on `dev` for weeks (four documented instances: #1134, #1508,
#1378). The gate itself was the root cause.
Add automatic triggers so a red suite is always visible:
- Nightly `schedule` (07:00 UTC) on `dev` — the durable signal. A red nightly
opens/updates a single tracking issue (new `report` job, label
`frontend-e2e-nightly`), à la #1185; a green nightly closes it.
- Auto-run on any PR that touches `src/frontend/**` (dependency-free `changes`
job via `gh pr diff`), so frontend authors see their own breakage.
- The `ui` label still works as a manual opt-in on non-frontend PRs and to force a
run (preserved for the heavier @visual/@interactive tiers, #596).
- `workflow_dispatch` for on-demand runs.
DECISION (AC): advisory, NOT a required merge gate. The recurring failure class is
modal/overlay flake on a fresh zero-user-agent stack, so a hard gate like #715's
unit gate needs a flake budget first (#596). Recorded in the workflow header.
Per-job least-privilege permissions; concurrency keyed per-PR (cancel) vs per-ref
(schedule, no cancel). Only @smoke runs in CI, unchanged.
Related to #1526
* feat(mcp): make per-agent MCP connector OSS-core (trinity-enterprise#118 Part A) (#1555)
* feat(mcp): make per-agent MCP connector OSS-core (trinity-enterprise#118 Part A)
Relocate the per-agent MCP connector (ent#46/#55/#51, shipped v0.8.0 entitlement-
gated as `mcp_connector`) from the private enterprise submodule into OSS core, and
drop the entitlement gate front and back. Decision (Eugene, 2026-07-09): sharing
agents via individual MCP connectors is a platform-adoption surface, not a paid
module.
Backend (router → service → db, Invariants #1/#2/#14):
- routers/connector.py — /api/agents/{name}/connector* (config, mint/regenerate/
revoke key, playbooks), mounted unconditionally in main.py; no requires_entitlement.
- services/connector_service.py — snippet builder + playbook resolution.
- db/connector.py (ConnectorOperations) — config CRUD + scoped-key mint/revoke
into mcp_api_keys (scope='connector'); facade delegators on database.py.
- models.py — ConnectorConfigUpdate/Status/KeySecret/Playbook/ClientSnippet.
Schema: enterprise_connectors table re-homed onto OSS dual-track (db/tables.py,
db/schema.py, db/migrations.py:enterprise_connectors_table + Alembic
0015_enterprise_connectors). Name kept so existing enterprise installs adopt their
data with zero migration (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS, no duplicate-table drift).
Delete/rename cascade via an enterprise_connectors AGENT_REF.
Frontend: ConnectorChannelPanel un-gated in SharingPanel.vue (dropped the
isEntitled('mcp_connector') v-if + the now-unused enterprise store wiring).
The MCP proxy tools (connector.ts), the connector-scope auth fence
(dependencies.py), and ExposedToolsPanel.vue were already OSS and edition-agnostic.
`mcp_connector` is removed from the entitlement registry by the paired enterprise
PR (deletes register_module).
Docs: requirements mcp.md §7.5 + feature-flows/mcp-connector.md + architecture/index.
Tests: tests/unit/test_118_mcp_connector_oss.py (11) — service helpers, config CRUD,
key mint/regenerate/revoke, scope='connector' validate contract.
Part B (email-auth onboarding, #848) deferred pending design sign-off.
Related to trinity-enterprise#118
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(submodule): bump enterprise to post-#121 so the connector isn't double-mounted (#118)
#1555 makes the per-agent MCP connector OSS-core. The enterprise submodule was
pinned at 630cca9e, which still ships backend/mcp_connector/ and registers it via
register_enterprise() — so an enterprise build would double-mount the connector
router alongside the new OSS-core one. Bump the pin to f5d69be6 (enterprise main
post trinity-enterprise#121), where the private module is removed.
This forward-integrates two already-on-enterprise-main commits into the pin:
- trinity-enterprise#121 — removes backend/mcp_connector/ (the intended pair)
- trinity-enterprise#120 — ENTERPRISE_LOCAL_DEV docs (docs only)
- trinity-enterprise#106 — client-portal umbrella (already on enterprise main)
OSS-only CI is unaffected (submodule is update=none / "boots without enterprise").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* docs(enterprise): explain the private feature catalog + runtime verification
ENTERPRISE.md documents the open-core seam mechanism (correct) but never
said WHERE the feature-level OSS/enterprise split lives or WHY it isn't
here. Add a short "Why there's no feature catalog here" note: the standing
rule trinity-enterprise#45 (enforced by enterprise-docs-guard.yml) keeps
the paid-feature catalog private, and entitled customers find it in the
private enterprise repo. Point readers at the runtime source of truth for
"what's enabled on this instance" (GET /api/version + feature-flags).
Mechanism-only, no named features — enterprise-docs-guard grep verified green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(announcements): webinar video announcement record 2026-07-10
Record of the "sovereign, isolated AI agents per client" webinar
video announcement (https://youtu.be/8w98dA6hDew) sent via /announce
to Discord, Slack, Telegram, Twitter/X (trinity + default), and
GitHub Discussions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(deps-dev): bump @types/node (#1531)
Bumps the patch-and-minor group in /src/mcp-server with 1 update: [@types/node](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/tree/HEAD/types/node).
Updates `@types/node` from 26.1.0 to 26.1.1
- [Release notes](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/DefinitelyTyped/DefinitelyTyped/commits/HEAD/types/node)
---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: "@types/node"
dependency-version: 26.1.1
dependency-type: direct:development
update-type: version-update:semver-patch
dependency-group: patch-and-minor
...
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(reliability): clear per-agent Redis runtime state across the agent lifecycle (#1560) (#1568)
* fix(reliability): clear per-agent Redis runtime state across the agent lifecycle (#1560)
`agent:circuit:{name}` (transport breaker) is keyed by agent NAME, not container
identity, and carries no TTL. Nothing in the lifecycle cleared it, so a container
replaced under the same name inherited its predecessor's `dormant` verdict and
fast-failed every execution with "Agent circuit breaker open — agent is
unhealthy" — without the backend ever contacting the agent.
Adds `services/agent_runtime_state.py` as the single enumeration point for every
name-keyed per-agent Redis keyspace (the Redis-side twin of the `AGENT_REFS`
registry in `db/agent_cleanup.py`), with two entry points whose blast radii
differ by whether a container is running:
clear_agent_breakers heartbeat + transport circuit + dispatch breaker
(safe on a live container)
clear_agent_runtime_state the above + execution slots
(teardown paths only — force_clear_slots would drop
capacity accounting for an in-flight #1083 execution)
Wired into six lifecycle points. The issue's acceptance criteria named delete,
rename and create; none is the reachable path:
* create is unreachable — `is_agent_name_reserved` sees soft-deleted rows and
409s, locking the name for the whole retention window;
* the name only unlocks at the retention purge, which cleared no Redis state;
* the reachable path is `start_agent_internal`, whose `needs_recreation` branch
replaces the container on any config drift (subscription switch, resource
change, auth-token rotation), so one fleet-wide rotation resurrects every
stale verdict.
So start/recreate, purge, and the `trinity-system` bootstrap were added beyond the
written criteria. The start-path clear runs before the recreate, since
`containers_run(detach=True)` brings the replacement up, and is guarded on
`needs_recreation or not was_already_running` so a no-op start cannot reset a
breaker protecting a wedged agent.
Tests: a bidirectional parity guard fails CI when a new `agent:*` keyspace ships
unregistered; wiring tests pin all six call sites and that lifecycle.py never
clears slots; an integration test exercises the real Lua (fakeredis has no
EVALSHA) plus an opt-in leg driving the full recreate path over HTTP. Both guards
are mutation-tested.
Complementary to #1561, which removes the source of breaker poisoning; this
removes the inheritance. Both are needed.
Fixes #1560
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(1560): stop bare sys.modules mutations in the new test files (#762)
The `lint (sys.modules pollution check)` CI gate flagged 7 new violations.
They were real, not a lint technicality: the integration test replaced
`sys.modules["services"]` with a bare stub module and never restored it,
so every later test in the same session that imported the real `services`
package would have seen the stub — the exact cross-file pollution class
#762 introduced this gate for.
- Unit files: drop the `sys.modules[mod_name] = module` registration in
`_load` entirely. `agent_runtime_state.py` is a stdlib-only leaf with no
`@dataclass` needing `sys.modules[cls.__module__]` to resolve annotations,
so the registration bought nothing and risked pollution. Per-test stubs
already go through `monkeypatch.setitem`, which restores itself.
- Integration file: keep the bindings (they are what makes the production
lazy imports resolve to the real modules against real Redis — monkeypatch
cannot reach an import performed inside the function under test) and add
the sanctioned `_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` + autouse `_restore_sys_modules`
snapshot/restore pair, per tests/unit/test_telegram_webhook_backfill.py.
Verified: `python tests/lint_sys_modules.py` clean; running the integration
file followed by a suite that imports the real `services` package passes.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ui): prettify Agent Permissions Matrix — bigger labels, no grid jump (#1563)
The fleet permissions matrix was hard to read (text-xs, 32px cells) and
the grid jumped on every grant/revoke: the toast rendered inline between
the toolbar and the grid, so it pushed the grid down on appear and
snapped it back on the 3.5s auto-dismiss.
- Bump base font (text-xs → text-sm), cells (w-8 h-8 → w-11 h-11),
checkmark (text-base), row/column agent labels (font-medium), corner
hints (10px → text-xs), and column-label headroom (8rem → 10rem).
- Move the toast into a reserved min-h-[2.5rem] slot so appear/dismiss
no longer reflows the grid.
Presentation-only — grant/revoke logic and endpoints unchanged.
Grant/revoke verified end-to-end via the backend API.
Related to #1562
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sync-health): exclude soft-deleted agents from list_git_enabled_agents (#1561) (#1565)
`list_git_enabled_agents()` selected from agent_git_config on sync_enabled
alone, without joining agent_ownership or excluding deleted_at. Soft delete
keeps the git_config row, so the 60s SyncHealthService poller kept issuing
HTTP calls to removed containers forever — each httpx.ConnectError poisoned
the transport circuit breaker, eventually driving it DORMANT and emitting a
bogus circuit_breaker_dormant operator-queue alert for a nonexistent agent.
GET /api/fleet/sync-audit (same accessor) also listed dead agents.
- Join agent_ownership + filter deleted_at IS NULL, mirroring the #834
hardening on list_all_enabled_schedules(). Fixes both consumers at once.
- git_service.get_git_status: bare print() → logger.warning (structured).
- Regression tests: soft-deleted agent is excluded from the accessor and
never polled (zero HTTP, no sync_state row, no operator-queue entry).
Audit sweep (per AC): list_git_enabled_agents was the sole background-loop
accessor missing the deleted_at filter. Other per-agent HTTP pollers
(monitoring, operator-queue) enumerate from Docker, so removed containers are
inherently excluded; scheduler already filters (#834); capacity drain is
DB-only (no agent HTTP). Companion breaker-inheritance defect tracked in #1560.
Related to #1561
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(canary): execution-row integrity invariants E-03, G-03, E-04, G-04 (Phase 4) (#1497)
* test(canary): unblock canary_invariants fixture broken by #1472 merge
Two pre-existing breakages landed via #1472 (367a5e12, merged today) in
root-level tests/test_canary_invariants.py — a file the CI unit job
(tests/unit/ only) does not run, so they merged undetected:
1. Duplicate `CREATE TABLE agent_schedules` in the `canary_db` fixture DDL
— the E-06 work added a second definition next to the pre-existing one,
so `executescript` raised "table agent_schedules already exists" and
every fixture-dependent canary test errored. Removed the older, unused
block (its `message`/`owner_id` columns have no consumer; `_add_schedule`
and the E-06/L-03 collectors use only the kept block's columns).
2. `test_run_invariants_all` expected registry set omitted "E-06" (added to
the invariants registry by the same PR). Added E-06 to the expected set
and asserted it is green on a clean platform.
Restores a green baseline (92 passed) so the #1450 B-01 work can be verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(canary): B-01 queue-status coherence — backend-consistent Side B + confirm-re-read (#1450)
B-01 compared two reads that were neither temporally atomic nor
backend-consistent (both latent while the canary is default-OFF and SQLite
makes the two reads hit one file):
(a) Temporal non-atomicity — a concurrent enqueue/backlog-drain landing
between the two reads produced a transient count mismatch → spurious
critical + green→red Slack alert.
(b) Backend divergence (#300/#1093) — Side A (`db.get_queued_count`) honors
`get_engine()`/DATABASE_URL; Side B read raw sqlite3 at DB_PATH. On
Postgres those are two different databases, so B-01 compared Postgres
truth to a stale/absent SQLite file (fatal under the Postgres direction +
SQLite EOL, #1278).
Production-side residue of #1446 (PR #1452), which fixed only the test-harness
`sys.modules` leak and deferred these two gaps.
Fix (localized to B-01):
- New `_collect_queued_ids_via_engine` reads B-01's Side B through the SAME
`get_engine()` seam as the accessor, on a dedicated `queued_ids_via_engine`
snapshot field. Independent code path (SELECT id/literal 'queued' vs
COUNT(*)/the QUEUED enum) — shares a database, not a code path, so a
cache/status-filter regression still surfaces (non-tautology, AC #3). No
cache / second count of the queue (AC #4).
- The collector performs one confirm-re-read on a mismatch: a transient race
self-heals; a persistent drift survives and fires (AC #2). An engine-read or
unconfirmable confirm degrades to a B-01 skip — it never compares an engine
count against the raw-sqlite id-set (the blocker the reviews surfaced).
- `queued_exec_ids` (raw sqlite) stays untouched for B-02/E-02, so blast
radius is B-01-only and the sibling #1077 merge stays clean.
The running-side / known-agents reads remain raw-sqlite (half-migrated
collector); the collector-wide migration + a dark-canary tripwire are a filed
follow-up.
Tests (test_canary_invariants.py): retarget the synthetic B-01 tests at
`queued_ids_via_engine`; add the AC #5 regression net — a diverged-backend
proxy (raw ≠ engine temp files) that false-fires pre-fix and is green
post-fix, a transient-race confirm-absorb + persistent-drift-still-fires pair,
and an engine-read-failure→skip test. New split fixtures (`canary_db_split` /
`reload_canary_split`) model the diverged backend without a live PG. Convert
the file to the sanctioned `_STUBBED_MODULE_NAMES` + `_restore_sys_modules`
escape hatch so its import-time stubs no longer leak (the #1446 mechanism) and
the reimport `del`s are lint-clean.
Docs: architecture.md Canary B-01 row updated for the engine-backed read path
+ confirm-re-read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): add #1450 canary B-01 Recent Updates row
Sync-feature-flows: canary-internal change, no dedicated flow doc
(architecture.md is canonical); append one Recent Updates row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(canary): fix duplicate agent_schedules DDL + reconcile E-06 in registry test
The canary_db fixture had two `CREATE TABLE agent_schedules` statements in one
executescript (a #1472 merge artifact), so it raised `table already exists` and
reddened the whole file. Merge them into one definition carrying every column
the canary reads (next_run_at/enabled/deleted_at + agent_name). Add
duration_ms/queued_at/backlog_metadata to schedule_executions and extend
_add_execution for the #1077 E-03/E-04 collector work. Reconcile E-06 (already
registered) into test_run_invariants_all's expected key-set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(canary): terminal-row collector for E-03/G-03 (#1077)
Add _collect_terminal_rows(window_seconds) + Snapshot.terminal_rows. Windowed on
started_at (not completed_at, so E-03 can see NULL-completed_at rows), scoped to
success/failed/cancelled via a local _E03_TERMINAL_STATUSES subset that excludes
skipped (which legitimately has no completed_at/duration_ms). PRAGMA guard skips
the source entirely when completed_at/duration_ms are absent (column-absent !=
value-NULL) rather than false-firing. Window = max per-agent timeout + 300s;
bounded ORDER BY started_at DESC LIMIT 5000 with a logged sampled flag (no
(status,started_at) index over 90-day retention; tripwire, not backfill audit).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(canary): register E-03 (completed_at populated) + G-03 (clock sanity) (#1077)
E-03 (A/major): terminal rows must have completed_at NOT NULL. Predicate is
completed_at-only — the catalog's + duration_ms clause false-fires on healthy
queue-terminated rows (cancel/fail/expire set completed_at but never
duration_ms). G-03 (A/minor): started_at <= completed_at with a ~1s cross-worker
clock-skew tolerance, UTC-aware parsing (E-06 _to_utc shape) so a #1474 mixed
naive/Z pair compares without raising. Both are leading-edge tripwires over the
shared terminal-row collector and catch all producers incl. the standalone
scheduler's raw-SQL writers a unit test never exercises.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(canary): E-03/G-03 synthetic + collector + end-to-end coverage (#1077)
Per-invariant synthetic tests (holds-clean, fires-on-violation), collector tests
(started_at window in/out, NULL-completed_at still collected, skipped-status
excluded, column-absent DDL -> unavailable, LIMIT cap + sampled flag), and
end-to-end collect_snapshot tests through the real collector: the C1
cancelled-from-queue holds-clean guard (completed_at set, duration_ms NULL ->
zero E-03), half-written fires E-03, bad-clock fires G-03, sub-second skew does
not, and the #1474 naive-vs-Z compare-without-raising case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(canary): document E-03/G-03 Phase 4 invariants (#1077)
architecture.md canary table gains E-03/G-03 rows + Phase 4 lookup-key line;
requirements/infrastructure.md §31 gains a Phase 4 bullet (and reconciles the
stale 'Phase 2 deferred' note now that #882/#1472 shipped);
orchestration-invariant-catalog.md annotates E-03/G-03 as shipped with explicit
registry-id mapping, notes the E-03 completed_at-only predicate deviation and
G-03 started_at<=completed_at reduction, and flags the catalog-id vs registry-id
E-06 drift (catalog #129 != registry #1472).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): index row for canary Phase 4 E-03/G-03 (#1077)
Canary is an internal invariant harness (no user-facing flow / dedicated flow
doc); follows the #1446 precedent of a Recent Updates row pointing at
architecture.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(canary): queued-row metadata collector for E-04/G-04 (#1077)
Capture queued_at + backlog_metadata for status='queued' rows in the
existing _collect_executions query, keyed by execution_id in a new
AgentSnapshot.queued_meta map. Both columns are PRAGMA-guarded (added by
BACKLOG-001): when either is absent on an older/minimal DDL the map is
left empty so E-04/G-04 skip those eids (older-image fail-open). Scoped
STRICTLY to queued rows — never terminal — so #1449's deferred
terminal-row backlog_metadata NULL-out cannot make E-04 false-fire.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(canary): register E-04 (queued metadata) + G-04 (no creds in metadata) (#1077)
E-04 (Tier A, major): every status='queued' row has queued_at NOT NULL
AND a non-NULL, JSON-parseable backlog_metadata — the
backlog_service.drain_next replay contract. A malformed blob raises
JSONDecodeError and stalls the FIFO. Reports only the failed-predicate
reason code + ids, never the raw metadata (may carry credentials;
violations persist to canary_violations).
G-04 (Tier A, critical): a queued row's backlog_metadata matches no
known secret prefix (sk-/ghp_/gho_/ghs_/ghu_/github_pat_/xoxb-/xoxp-/
AKIA/AIza/sk_live_), word-boundary anchored so common substrings don't
false-fire. Rides E-04's collected bytes. Reports only the matched
pattern NAME + ids, one violation per row (stops at first match) — never
the secret, surrounding bytes, or raw metadata.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(canary): E-04/G-04 synthetic + collector + end-to-end coverage (#1077)
Collector test proves queued_meta is populated for queued rows only (a
terminal row carrying backlog_metadata is excluded — #1449-safe). E-04:
holds on valid rows; fires with the right reason code on NULL queued_at,
NULL backlog_metadata, and non-JSON metadata; skips an eid absent from
queued_meta (older-image fail-open); e2e over a real temp DB. G-04:
holds on benign metadata (incl. "task-" substring that must not
false-fire); fires on github_pat / openai / slack / aws exemplars; skips
NULL metadata (E-04 owns it). Every G-04/E-04 test asserts the secret /
raw metadata bytes appear NOWHERE in the persisted violation record. The
runner test now expects E-04 + G-04 in the registered invariant set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(canary): document E-04/G-04 Phase 4 invariants (#1077)
architecture.md lookup-key table gains E-04 + G-04 rows and the Phase 4
line now lists all four (E-04/G-04 stacked on #1450). requirements
infrastructure.md Phase 4 bullet expands to the full four-predicate set
with the credential-safety note. Catalog flips E-04/G-04 from
"gated on #1450" to SHIPPED, records the json.loads-vs-json_valid
implementation note, the queued-only scope, older-image fail-open, and
the report-reason/pattern-name-only security discipline; G-04 notes the
implemented check covers the backlog half of the title (log-line
scanning out of scope for #1077).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): index row for canary Phase 4 E-04/G-04 (#1077)
Also corrects the header/separator ordering left malformed by the
earlier E-03/G-03 index-row commit (a data row had slipped above the
|---| separator).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* fix(config): forward OPERATOR_INTAKE/DO_NOT_TRACK, DISPATCH_BREAKER_ENABLED, PUBLIC_ACCESS_REQUESTS_ENABLED through compose (#1485) (#1493)
* fix(config): honor cross-tool DO_NOT_TRACK convention for operator intake (#1486)
The operator-intake kill switch only disabled the outbound POST when
DO_NOT_TRACK was one of {"1","true","True"}, so DO_NOT_TRACK=yes|on|2|TRUE
leaked despite the obvious opt-out intent — breaking the very
consoledonottrack.com convention config.py's own comment cites.
Flip to a tracking-allowed whitelist: any value not in {0,"",false}
(case/space-insensitive) disables intake. Unset -> "0" -> tracking
allowed (unchanged). Add tests/unit/test_1486_do_not_track_truthiness.py
so a revert to the exact-tuple check fails loudly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(config): forward operator-intake, dispatch-breaker & public-access levers through compose (#1485)
Same packaging-gap class as PR #1067 (VOIP vars): a lever read by
src/backend/config.py that neither compose file forwards into the backend
container, so setting it in .env silently no-ops (compose reads .env only
for ${VAR} interpolation, and neither backend service uses env_file).
Forward in both docker-compose.yml and docker-compose.prod.yml backend
environment: blocks, mirroring the existing PUBLIC_CHAT_URL idiom:
- PUBLIC_ACCESS_REQUESTS_ENABLED (#1488) — secure default false
- OPERATOR_INTAKE_ENABLED / DO_NOT_TRACK / OPERATOR_INTAKE_URL (#1486)
privacy kill switch. OPERATOR_INTAKE_URL keeps its FULL non-empty
default — a bare :- would arrive set-but-empty and shadow the code
default (#1076 set-but-empty class).
- DISPATCH_BREAKER_ENABLED (#1487) — global gate for the #526 dispatch
breaker; without it the owner-facing PUT .../circuit-breaker toggle
silently no-ops (two-tier gating needs both flags on).
.env.example: add the missing DISPATCH_BREAKER_ENABLED block (documenting
the two-tier gate) and a settable DO_NOT_TRACK=0 line. Backend-only —
src/scheduler reads none of these five vars.
Fixes #1486
Fixes #1487
Fixes #1488
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): note DISPATCH_BREAKER_ENABLED compose-forwarding fix (#1487/#1485)
The dispatch-circuit-breaker flow already documented the DISPATCH_BREAKER_ENABLED
env var, but before this PR that var never reached the container (the
#1039/#1067 packaging-gap class), so a reader following the doc would set it and
the owner toggle would silently no-op. Add a one-line Config-surface accuracy
note + a Recent Updates index row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* fix(scheduler): serialize timestamps as UTC 'Z' so non-UTC browsers show correct relative times (#1474) (#1496)
* fix(scheduler): serialize timestamps as UTC with explicit 'Z' (#1474)
The standalone scheduler wrote execution/schedule timestamps via
datetime.utcnow().isoformat() (no 'Z'), while the backend writes through
utc_now_iso() (Z-suffixed). In a non-UTC browser, JS new Date(naive) parses
the naive string as local time, shifting schedule-triggered rows by the
viewer's UTC offset. Data on disk was fine; only display was wrong.
Vendor a byte-parity mirror of the backend timestamp helpers into
src/scheduler/utils.py (same regenerate-from-backend discipline as
failure_classifier.py): utc_now_iso / to_utc_iso emit 'Z'; parse_scheduler_ts
reads tolerantly and returns naive UTC.
Write + read land together (atomic): once writes emit 'Z',
datetime.fromisoformat("...Z") returns a tz-aware value on 3.11+, and the
duration math (datetime.utcnow() - started_at) would raise aware-naive.
parse_scheduler_ts converts-then-strips so the historical naive model type is
preserved and the subtraction stays naive-naive. All 24 read-parses route
through it; every write site (started_at/completed_at/last_run_at/next_run_at/
retry_scheduled_at/validated_at + process-schedule variants) emits 'Z'.
Updates the #1472 next_run_at comments to note the mapper now returns
naive-UTC (instant preserved), so both compare branches stay correct.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(executions): normalize naive timestamps to UTC 'Z' at read boundary (#1474)
The summary/list readers returned raw dict(row) values straight from the DB,
so a scheduler-written naive started_at/completed_at serialized naive out of
Pydantic and JS new Date(naive) parsed it as local time — the reported
schedule-triggered relative-time shift. This fixes historical rows for all
consumers at the source (unit-testable, unlike the frontend layer).
Reuse the existing parse_iso_timestamp helper (assume-UTC for naive) + the
Z-emitting to_utc_iso — the same normalization the already-correct sibling
readers (_row_to_execution) apply — via a small _norm_ts shim:
- db/schedules.py: get_agent_executions_summary (TasksPanel),
get_fleet_executions (ExecutionsPanel), get_agent_schedules_summary
last_run_at (Overview/Schedules).
- db/activities.py: _row_to_activity / _mapping_to_activity
(UnifiedActivity) started_at/completed_at/created_at.
None passes through untouched. No data migration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ui): parse backend timestamps as UTC in the 5 execution panels (#1474)
Defense-in-depth for the read side (covers WebSocket-pushed timestamps and any
un-audited endpoint, alongside the backend read-boundary fix). Each panel
hand-rolled `new Date(backendStr)`, which parses a naive (no-'Z') string as
*local* time. Replace only the internal parse with the shared idempotent
`parseUTC` (appends 'Z' when no tz indicator present → correct for legacy-naive,
new-'Z', and '+00:00' alike); `new Date()` "now" calls are left untouched and
per-panel display formats are unchanged.
- TasksPanel: formatRelativeTime + inline log-detail timestamp
- SchedulesPanel: formatRelativeTime, isOverdue, formatOverdue, formatDateTime
- ExecutionsPanel: timeAgo
- UnifiedActivityPanel: formatTime
- OverviewPanel: fmtDateTime
Established pattern (stores/network.js, ReplayTimeline.vue).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: record #1474 scheduler Z-suffix + read-boundary under Invariant #16
Extend Architectural Invariant #16 (the #476 ISO-Z rule) with its write-side/
read-boundary cousin: the scheduler vendors src/scheduler/utils.py (Z-suffixed
writes, naive-UTC tolerant reads); the leaking backend read boundaries normalize
via parse_iso_timestamp; the 5 panels parse via parseUTC. Notes honestly that
next_run_at stays mixed-format across writers (safe — Python-compared only) and
that main.py SchedulerStatus.last_check is out of scope.
Update the #1472 learnings entry: the scheduler DB mapper now returns naive-UTC
(convert-then-strip, instant preserved), so the "schedules store AWARE
next_run_at" premise is true of the backend writer, not the scheduler read path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(feature-flows): document #1474 scheduler Z-suffix timestamp contract
Add a "Timestamp serialization contract (#1474)" subsection to
scheduler-service.md (vendored utils.py, Z writes, naive-UTC tolerant reads,
backend read-boundary + panel normalization, next_run_at mixed-format caveat)
plus a Revision History row; add the index Recent Updates row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(scheduler): cover _update_business_status validated_at Z-suffix (#1474)
The service-layer VALIDATE-001 write path (service.py::_update_business_status)
is the one #1474 timestamp write site outside database.py. Add sibling-path
coverage per the incomplete-fix rule: assert validated_at is stored 'Z'-suffixed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* docs(user-docs): add Trinity FAQ — 264 grounded Q&As across 14 topic pages
One page per topic (getting started, agents, chat/sessions, credentials,
scheduling, collaboration, channels, MCP/API, operations, sharing,
deployment, security, advanced, troubleshooting) plus a generated
question index. Answers derived from user docs and verified against
code; .claude pointer picks up the generate-user-docs FAQ step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(user-docs): clarify PAT scope — git transport vs gh CLI/REST API authentication
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(helper-mcp): standalone Trinity docs Q&A MCP server (#1459)
New src/helper-mcp/ package (@abilityai/trinity-docs-mcp): an npx-runnable
stdio MCP server exposing the public ask-trinity docs Q&A endpoint
(DOCS-QA-001) to any MCP client — no Trinity instance or API key required.
- Tools: ask_trinity (multi-turn; detects the endpoint's silent session
reset and warns when context was lost) + get_agent_requirements (agent
guide fetched live from GitHub, quick-reference fallback)
- Guards: 4k question cap, 50s abort timeout, no auto-retry,
redirect:"error", non-JSON guard, structured error text; session_id
handled as opaque string (live values exceed 2^53)
- Deps: official @modelcontextprotocol/sdk + zod only; console.error-only
logging (stdout is the JSON-RPC channel); Node >=18 launcher guard
- Tests: 26 unit (mocked fetch) + pack-and-run stdio smoke test asserting
JSON-RPC stdout purity; CI workflow helper-mcp-test.yml
- Publish: publish-helper-mcp.yml (npm provenance; documented one-time
manual first-publish bootstrap for trusted publishing)
- Corpus: sync-docs-to-vertex.yml now also indexes the agent guide;
feature flow corrected (user-docs/FAQ were already indexed) and extended
with the verified endpoint contract (no citations field, silent session
expiry)
- Docs: requirements/mcp.md entry, README + user-docs install blocks,
package README
Fixes #1459
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(agents): ephemeral ghost agents — budgeted hard-discard lifecycle + spawn provenance (trinity-enterprise#69)
Disposable "ghost" agents: created with a hard budget (max_executions and/or
TTL — expiry ALWAYS stamped, ceiling 24h default), volume-less (container
writable layer; ghosts never recreate), hard-discarded at budget with no
soft-delete/retention/name-reservation. Creation is entitlement-gated
(ephemeral_agents; fail-closed — inert until the enterprise module registers);
all lifecycle mechanics are edition-agnostic OSS primitives.
Lifecycle:
- Schema: 5 additive agent_ownership columns (is_ephemeral, budget, expiry,
spawned_by_agent/key_id); dual-track migration (SQLite + Alembic 0016)
- Creation gates (crud.py): entitlement 403 → ephemeral-caller refusal
(chain-spawn kill) → per-parent spawn rate limit → TTL ceiling 400 →
server-suffixed name (hex8) → atomic per-owner Redis quota (INCR-with-cap,
NX reseed, DB fallback); ghosts skip volume/avatar/cred-injection/auto-sync,
default max_parallel_tasks=1
- Budget: gate at the TOP of CapacityManager.acquire (terminal+active >= max
or expired ⇒ EphemeralBudgetExhausted → 410 Gone / FAILED
ephemeral_exhausted; covers every admission surface); post-CAS-win
apply_result hook (backgrounded, fail-open) triggers discard at budget
- Hard discard (services/agent_service/ephemeral.py): SETNX-locked,
crash-convergent — intent marker → CAS-fail non-terminal rows
(ghost_discarded) → force-remove container → clear Redis state BEFORE purge
→ cascade purge (executions KEEP) → audit. DELETE routes ghosts here before
the container lookup (half-discarded state force-discardable)
- GC (cleanup_service._sweep_ephemeral_agents): DB pass + Docker-as-truth
orphan pass with 15-min newborn grace; capped per cycle
Part 2 — spawn provenance + parent control:
- Any agent-spawned creation persists spawned_by_agent/key_id and auto-grants
the agent_permissions parent→child edge (created_by="spawn:{parent}") so a
parent can immediately chat/list/info the child it spawned
- BEHAVIOR CHANGE: agent-scoped keys may start/stop/delete ONLY agents they
spawned (name AND key-id match; interim until #948); sharing, permission
grants, rename, and credential ops are now human-only (403 for agent keys)
- Ghost-key containment fence at the single auth entry point: a ghost's own
key reaches only heartbeat/result-callback/reports/notifications/self-info
Fleet hygiene: heartbeat watch + fleet health exclude ghosts; operator-queue
polling keeps them; exec/cost stats stay inclusive; schedules on ghosts → 400;
AgentStatus.ephemeral surfaced + GHOST badge.
Tests: tests/unit/test_69_ephemeral_agents.py (40, db_harness real-engine) —
accessors, facade delegations, acquire-gate matrix, key-fence matrix, Part 2
guard matrix, budget hook, discard idempotency/crash-convergence, atomic
quota. Full unit suite verified; residual order-dependent flakes reproduced
on clean dev (pre-existing, documented in learnings.md).
Refs abilityai/trinity-enterprise#69 (Phase 0 record on the issue; closed
manually at release — cross-repo keywords don't auto-close).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(69): patch _REAL_MODULES objects directly, never string targets — fixes seed-12345 order flake
CI's regression-diff (head seed 12345) caught the discard test flaking:
string-form monkeypatch targets resolve through sys.modules at PATCH time,
which under some pytest-randomly orderings is a sibling test's leaked stale
entry — the patch lands on the wrong module object while discard's call-time
import (under the _own_real_modules pin) resolves the real one, so
get_agent_container fell through to the real function (container=None,
removal skipped). Same hazard removed from the gated_capacity and
ghost_fence fixtures (bare fixture-time imports), and the audit assertion
moved to an instance-method patch on the pinned singleton.
Verified: full suite green under all three CI seeds (12345/67890/99999),
3775 passed each.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(learnings): string-target monkeypatch resolves stale sys.modules entries — patch by object
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): pin real modules in TestAcquireCeilingClamp to kill sys.modules-leak flake (#1582) (#1584)
The trio (test_acquire_clamps_above_ceiling / test_get_slot_state_clamps /
test_get_all_states_clamps_each) failed order-dependently under
pytest-randomly on clean dev (5/7 observed runs), passed in isolation and
under -p no:randomly.
Root cause (the #762/#1446 family): `_patch_ceiling` patched
`get_max_parallel_tasks_ceiling` on the settings_service resolved via
`from services import settings_service`, but `capacity_manager.acquire`
imports `clamp_to_ceiling` at call time from `services.settings_service`.
When a sibling's module-level stub (e.g. test_fleet_status_resilience
installing a fresh `services` package with a real `__path__`) leaves two
module objects for `services.settings_service` in play, the patch lands on
one and `clamp_to_ceiling.__globals__` reads the other — the patch is
silently never hit and the clamp assertion sees the unpatched (default)
ceiling.
Fix (the pattern documented for this leak family):
- Capture the real `services` / `services.settings_service` /
`services.capacity_manager` at collection time (this file sorts before
every known leaker, so the import is leak-free).
- Autouse fixture re-pins them into sys.modules per test (monkeypatch
auto-restores) so the code-under-test's call-time import and the test's
patch target resolve to the SAME object — last-write-wins over any leak.
- `_patch_ceiling` now patches the captured real module object directly,
never a bare re-import that could resolve a leaked stub.
Verification: 25/25 in the file; 4/4 trio; 32 passed across 6 random seeds
with test_fleet_status_resilience co-resident; 111 passed / 0 ceiling
failures across 5 full-unit randomized seeds.
Related to #1582
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(reliability): decouple agent autonomy from the circuit breaker (#1557) (#1571)
Disabling autonomy called force_circuit_dormant, parking the transport
circuit breaker dormant. The execute_task gate consults that breaker for
every trigger, so a healthy paused agent fast-failed all inbound chat
(manual/Telegram/Slack/public) with "circuit breaker open — agent is
unhealthy" — never contacted. Autonomy governs proactive work only; it
now acts solely via set_schedule_enabled and never touches the breaker.
#631's flood protection is unaffected (the breaker's own failure-driven
dormant path + #1464 leader lock + #1121 monitoring-default-off).
Also splits the misleading fast-fail message to name the breaker that
fired (transport = unreachable, dispatch = auth-dead).
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* feat(voice): voice replies v2 — per-message capability, agent-level config, runtime ElevenLabs key (trinity-enterprise#117) (#1549)
* feat(voice): voice replies v2 — per-message capability, agent-level config, runtime ElevenLabs key (trinity-enterprise#117)
Rework outbound voice replies (ElevenLabs TTS) along three lines:
1. Voice is a per-message capability, not a hard rule. Channel replies are text
by default; a reply becomes a voice note only when the agent explicitly calls
the new send_voice_reply MCP tool during the turn. The backend resolves the
channel destination from the execution (new schedule_executions.source_channel*
columns), gates on TTS availability + agent enable + per-channel flag, wraps
delivery in effect_guard (#1084), and reuses each channel's send primitive.
The always-voice adapter path (_maybe_send_voice) is removed.
2. Voice config moves to agent Settings (enable + voice selection, one place);
channel panels keep only a per-channel on/off flag
(agent_ownership.tts_voice_{telegram,slack,whatsapp}_enabled, default ON).
GET/PUT /api/agents/{name}/voice-replies extended with channels + effective voice.
3. ElevenLabs API key + platform default voice are runtime-configurable in admin
Settings (GET/PUT /api/settings/elevenlabs), key stored AES-256-GCM encrypted
and surfaced as configured:bool only; resolved via
settings_service.get_elevenlabs_api_key() (stored setting -> env), no restart.
New tts_available feature flag.
Dual-track migrations (SQLite + Alembic 0015/0016). New send_voice_reply MCP tool
(voice.ts) + POST /api/agents/{name}/voice-reply + voice_reply_service. Capability
advertised in the platform prompt only when voice is enabled for the agent and the
current channel's flag is on. OSS-core.
Related to trinity-enterprise#117
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(voice): forward source_channel* through the db facade create_task_execution (trinity-enterprise#117)
DatabaseManager.create_task_execution (the `db` facade wrapper) didn't forward the
new source_channel / source_channel_chat_id / source_channel_thread kwargs to
ScheduleOperations, so a channel-triggered task raised
"unexpected keyword argument 'source_channel'" → 500. Add the passthrough.
Related to trinity-enterprise#117
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(voice): allow send_voice_reply on channel turns via --allowedTools (trinity-enterprise#117)
Channel turns run headless with a restricted `--allowedTools` (default
WebSearch,WebFetch), which blocks every MCP tool — so an agent could not call
send_voice_reply even when the capability was advertised in its prompt. When the
voice capability is advertised for a channel turn, also append
`mcp__trinity__send_voice_reply` to the channel allowed-tools list so the agent
can actually act on it.
Related to trinity-enterprise#117
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(migrations): stage the Alembic re-chain — 0017/0018 revision ids + down_revision onto 0016_agent_ownership_ephemeral
The dev-merge commit renamed the files but the id/down_revision edits were left unstaged, leaving two heads off 0015 (pg-migrations 'Multiple head revisions' failure).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Eugene Vyborov <eugene@beingluminous.com>
* chore(dev-skills): bump .claude — /cso v1.1 Trinity-shape refresh
Pointer bump to trinity-dev 2bdd362: fixes stale audit checks (setup-token
removal ent#49, Redis ACL model, dual-track DB / two-network stack facts)
and adds checks for post-skill surfaces (agent-key self-boundaries
#307/#1083/#918, backend→agent auth #1159, webhook HMAC ent#77, vendored
parity Invariant #5, enumeration uniformity #186, MCP description leak
#846, backlog_metadata G-04 class, enterprise-docs-guard ent#45).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(security): add CSO full-codebase audit report (2026-07-13)
Full-codebase Chief Security Officer audit (all phases, daily 8/10 gate).
No CRITICAL or exploitable-HIGH findings; prior CRITICAL (unauthenticated
agent-server, #1159) and both HIGH supply-chain items resolved. Ceiling is
MEDIUM: shared-user privilege tier, npm-ci lockfile bypass, unenforced
CODEOWNERS, plaintext backlog_metadata, unpinned deps, enterprise-doc
disclosure the guard can't see, python-multipart CVE. Two candidate findings
(orb.js XSS, Slack code takeover) downgraded to LOW by adversarial verifiers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(portal): hide the platform Help widget on client-portal routes (#1588)
The global "Trinity Help" chat widget is fixed at bottom-right (z-50) and
overlapped the client portal chat composer's Send button. It's an operator/
platform-docs widget (gated on platform auth) and is meaningless on the
standalone client portal, so gate it off there via a `hideHelpWidget` route
meta on the two portal routes (`ClientPortalPublic` /portal and
`EnterpriseClientPortal`). App.vue now renders it only when
`authStore.isAuthenticated && !route.meta.hideHelpWidget`.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(portal): attach/upload files directly in the customer portal chat (ent#144) (#1587)
A client can now attach files in the portal chat composer. The backend already
had everything — `POST /client-portal/agents/{name}/documents` (writes to the
client inbox), and `portal_chat`'s `_collect_inbox_for_turn` attaches inbox
images as vision + lists documents — and the store already had
`uploadDocument`/`fetchUploads`. The only missing piece was the composer UI.
- `PortalChat.vue`: adds an `uploadDocument` prop and a paperclip attach control
(hidden multi-file input). Picked files upload to the inbox immediately and
render as chips with state (uploading / done / error) and a remove button.
On send, the done attachments' (server-sanitized) filenames are appended as
`[Attached: …]` so `_collect_inbox_for_turn` attaches images as vision THAT
turn (it keys on the filename / image-intent) and lists documents. Files-only
turns are allowed; send is blocked while an upload is in flight; a 25 MB
client guard mirrors the backend cap (415/quota surfaced as a chip error).
- `Portal.vue`: passes `:upload-document="(name, file) => store.uploadDocument(name, file)"`.
- The attach control hides when no upload handler is wired (operator-preview
`ClientPortal.vue` renderer), so nothing changes there.
Public-repo (gated Vue) change only — no backend/submodule change (reuses the
shipped enterprise endpoint + inbox consumption).
Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#144
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(access): restore the per-recipient proactive-messaging toggle (#1577) (#1590)
The `allow_proactive` toggle (the only UI for #321/#376) was silently dropped
when the #1317 Access-tab redesign replaced the Sharing tab's Team Sharing rows
— leaving no way to opt a recipient into proactive messages except a raw API
call. Backend was fully intact; this is a UI-only restore.
- `AccessPanel.vue`: each operator row gets a Proactive toggle bound to the
`allow_proactive` the `/access` roster already returns (no extra fetch). On
change it persists via the store and reflects the server's confirmed value,
reverting + surfacing the error on failure (honest status, no optimistic-only
flip). Pending invites are toggleable too (the flag rides on the
`agent_sharing` row, which exists pre-resolution) with a tooltip on timing. A
static note states the owner is always allowed (owners aren't in the roster,
so there's no misleading owner toggle).
- `stores/agents.js`: new `setProactive(name, email, allow)` →
`PUT /api/agents/{name}/shares/proactive`.
- `feature-flows/proactive-messaging.md`: updated — it still documented the
removed SharingPanel markup/line numbers.
- `tests/unit/test_1577_proactive_toggle_guard.py`: static regression guard (3)
asserting the toggle + endpoint wiring survive future panel refactors (the
frontend has no JS unit runner; a full render e2e is a `ui` follow-up).
Related to #1577
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(github): wire the managed agent PAT for the gh CLI + REST API, not just git (#1574) (#1591)
Trinity injected the resolved GitHub PAT as GITHUB_PAT (authenticating git via
the origin URL) but not the `gh` CLI or REST API, which read GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN
— so agents had to prefix every command with `GH_TOKEN="$GITHUB_PAT" gh …`, and
`gh` wasn't even installed. This makes the SAME token cover both. No new token,
endpoint, or UI — wiring only.
Expose GH_TOKEN + GITHUB_TOKEN = the resolved PAT at every point GITHUB_PAT is
set today, gated identically (only when a repo + PAT resolve — never an empty
token that makes `gh` look logged-in but broken):
- create (`crud.py`) and recreate (`lifecycle.py`) bake them into the container env;
- the no-restart `.env` propagation (`github_pat_propagation_service._patch_env_github_pat`)
now patches/adds all three keys, kept in sync;
- `startup.sh` exports them from GITHUB_PAT so child processes (agent server,
terminal shells) auto-authenticate — also covering older baked images that
only carry GITHUB_PAT, without a recreate.
Install the `gh` CLI in the agent base image (`Dockerfile`) from GitHub's official
apt repo (base image must be rebuilt for existing agents to get the binary; the
env vars are harmless on older images — git keeps working).
Honest surfaces: the `set_agent_github_pat` MCP tool description and
`docs/.../github-pat-setup.md` now state the managed token covers `gh`/REST too,
keeping the scope caveat (wiring makes the token available; it can't grant scopes
the token lacks). The credential sanitizer's `.*TOKEN.*`/`GITHUB_.*` patterns
already mask GH_TOKEN/GITHUB_TOKEN (asserted).
Tests: `tests/unit/test_1574_gh_token_wiring.py` — the .env patcher mirrors the
PAT onto all three keys (replace-in-place / append, lookalike-key-safe, value
mirrored); static guards that create/recreate/startup/Dockerfile each wire the gh
vars; sanitizer covers the new vars.
Related to #1574
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(operator-queue): quarantine persistently-failing creates to stop the sync hot-loop (#1525) (#1589)
The `created_at` KeyError in `create_item` was already made defensive on dev
(#1426 — `.get(...) or utc_now_iso()` + `on_conflict_do_nothing`). This closes
the remaining #1525 gap: the sync loop still re-attempted ANY failing create on
every ~5s cycle forever (the row never persists → `operator_queue_item_exists`
stays False → retry + ERROR-log indefinitely), so a DB error or any other
persistent create failure — not just the fixed field case — still hot-loops.
- `operator_queue_service._sync_agent`: track per-request consecutive
create-failure counts; after `MAX_CREATE_ATTEMPTS` (3) skip that request
(one WARN at the quarantine threshold instead of an unbounded ERROR stream).
A create that later succeeds clears the counter; an in-memory safety valve
caps the map so it can never grow without bound.
- `db/operator_queue.create_item`: the last hard-indexed field (`id`) now uses
`.get` and raises a clear `ValueError` (which the caller quarantines) instead
of an opaque `KeyError`. Also hardened the WS-broadcast `item["id"]`.
Tests: `test_1525_operator_queue_quarantine.py` (4, pure/mocked) — create is
attempted at most the cap (not once per cycle), success clears the counter, a
healthy request leaks no quarantine state, and the id-guard raises ValueError.
Related to #1525
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(mcp): one-click Copy connection config on the Expose-via-MCP panel (#1575) (#1585)
* feat(mcp): one-click Copy connection config on the Expose-via-MCP panel (#1575)
Surfaces a ready-to-paste external-client config — with a least-privilege,
agent-scoped, revocable API key already embedded — from the #846 exposure
panel, so an external MCP client connects in one flow (enable → copy → paste).
Direction: reuse the existing per-agent MCP connector (ent#46 → OSS #118)
rather than mint a duplicate credential system. The connector already provides
exactly the hard parts #1575 asks for — a scoped `scope='connector'` key,
owner-selected playbooks exposed as tools, and `build_snippets` producing
per-client `.mcp.json`/CLI blocks with the key embedded — but only on the
Sharing tab. This wires that capability onto `McpExposedPanel.vue` (Settings →
Expose via MCP), shown when `mcp_exposed` is on.
- Frontend-only, no new backend endpoint/key type: reuses
`GET/POST/DELETE /api/agents/{name}/connector[/key]` (owner-only,
`OwnedAgentByName`) + `ExposedToolsPanel` for the playbook allow-list.
- One-click "Copy connection config": mints (or regenerates) the scoped key and
copies the `.mcp.json` in a single action via the robust `utils/clipboard`
helper — the only moment the live secret exists.
- Copy-once integrity: with an existing key, "Copy config" copies the
placeholder config and offers "Regenerate & copy" for a fresh live key;
"Revoke" severs any connected client. Key already lists in Settings → MCP Keys.
- Safe default: the section only appears once the agent is MCP-exposed; a plain
warning marks the config as a live secret.
Docs: mcp-connector.md gains the 2nd-surface row; architecture #846 block notes
the connect surface.
Verification: `McpExposedPanel.vue` compiles clean via @vue/compiler-sfc
(full `vite build` blocked by a pre-existing unrelated missing `mermaid` dep in
AgentWorkspace.vue). Live click-through / ui-labeled e2e needs the running
frontend+backend stack (not up locally).
Not changed (documented scope): a 422 on an invalid playbook name — the picker
only offers live user_invocable playbooks, so the invalid path is UI-unreachable;
left to the connector's existing read-time filter.
Related to #1575
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(mcp): flash a "Copied!" animation on the connection-config copy buttons (#1575)
Adds an inline copied-state affordance to the connect-config copy actions
(Copy connection config / Copy config / per-client snippet Copy): on a
successful clipboard write the button swaps to a green "✓ Copied!" with a
scale-pop checkmark for ~1.6s, then reverts. One shared timer (cleared on
unmount); only fires when the copy actually succeeded; honors
prefers-reduced-motion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(mcp): make the copied state transform the button itself (#1575)
Stronger, unmissable copy feedback: on a successful copy the primary
"Copy connection config" button fills solid success-green, gains a
ring + glow, bumps to a bolder "Copied to clipboard!" with a larger
checkmark, and plays a one-shot pop + outward ring-pulse
(copied-btn-flash) before settling. The existing-key "Copy config"
button gets the same solid-green ring treatment. Reverts after ~1.6s;
honors prefers-reduced-motion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(mcp): animate the connector snippet Copy buttons too (#1575)
The MCP connector panel (Sharing tab, ConnectorChannelPanel) is the other
surface that shows per-client copy snippets; its plain "Copy" links gave no
feedback. Give them the same copied-state treatment as the exposure panel:
on a successful copy the button flashes solid success-green with a ring +
pop + "Copied!" checkmark, reverting after ~1.6s (honors reduced-motion).
Also route its copy() through the robust utils/clipboard helper instead of
raw navigator.clipboard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): conftest no longer deletes real agents named test-* (#1558) (#1586)
* fix(tests): stop conftest from deleting real agents named test-* (#1558)
The session-scoped `api_client` fixture deleted EVERY agent whose name began
with `test-` on whatever `TRINITY_API_URL` pointed at — silent, unprompted
data loss that destroyed a developer's real `test-agent-2` (bound Telegram
bot, chat history, GitHub sync). Any `test-*` agent on a staging/prod instance
was one test invocation from deletion.
Fix — fail-closed on every axis:
- Dedicated prefix: the suite now names every agent it creates
`pytest-ephemeral-*` (a namespace no human uses), never the broad `test-`.
Renamed all conftest agent generators (test_agent_name, module_agent_name,
stopped_agent, shared_agent).
- Session registry: created names are registered (`register_created_agent`)
and reclaimed by name at session end (belt over each fixture's own teardown).
- Startup leftover-sweep is now OPT-IN (`TRINITY_TEST_CLEANUP_SWEEP`), refuses
any non-localhost target (`is_local_target`), and only removes provably
suite-owned names (`select_sweepable_agents` — pure, fail-closed). Default:
no sweep at all.
- `cleanup_test_agent(require_suite_owned=True)` refuses (no stop/delete call)
a name the session can't prove it created — used by every sweep path.
- Docstring + tests/README now state plainly that the suite mutates the target
instance and must point at localhost.
…
vybe
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…gration, API, UI (ent#264) Default-ON toggle for the in-progress indicator, per-agent == per-binding: - Dual-track migration (Invariant #3 / Rule #9), all six touch points: SQLite `telegram_progress_indicator` in db/migrations.py + Alembic 0031_telegram_progress_indicator (down_revision 0030; renumber-at-rebase rule vs ent#265 applies to whichever PR merges second) + schema.py + tables.py DDL + _BINDING_COLUMNS + _row_to_binding. No backfill UPDATE: ADD COLUMN ... DEFAULT 1 populates existing rows (default ON is the AC). - Read predicate evaluated in Python, never SQL (`NULL != 0` is NULL): enabled ⇔ `v is None or v != 0` — only an explicit 0 disables. - db: set_progress_indicator_enabled + set_telegram_progress_indicator facade. - API: GET /api/agents/{name}/telegram surfaces progress_indicator_enabled (pinned in the hand-built response, #1809 lesson — configure PUT too) and is access-hardened get_current_user → AuthorizedAgentByName (the response carries webhook_url, which embeds the webhook secret — previously readable by ANY authenticated user; uniform-404 accessor, Invariant #8). New PUT /api/agents/{name}/telegram/progress-indicator — OwnedAgentByName + reject_agent_principal (behavior toggles are human-only, ent#223 lesson), 404 when no binding; dedicated route so toggling never re-sends the token. - models.py: TelegramProgressIndicatorRequest + response field (Invariant #14). - UI: TelegramChannelPanel.vue switch (SlackChannelPanel allow_proactive precedent), optimistic flip with revert-on-error, dark-mode aware. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vybe
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…t#265) Dual-track migration (Invariant #3 / #1183): SQLite entry channel_report_back_columns + Alembic 0031_channel_report_back (single linear head off 0030), plus db/schema.py + db/tables.py so fresh builds stay correct. - schedule_executions.source_channel_agent (nullable TEXT): the agent whose channel binding owns the execution's INHERITED context (D1 Option A). Written only at the /task row-creation point; NULL for direct rows (reporter falls back to the executing agent). - telegram_group_configs.allow_proactive INTEGER DEFAULT 1: per-group completion-report consent, default ALLOW for existing AND new groups (opt-out mute; no backfill UPDATE needed). - create_task_execution accepts + inserts source_channel_agent; row mapper + ScheduleExecution model surface it. - AgentRef(schedule_executions.source_channel_agent, KEEP) so cascade_rename re-keys the binding agent (D1a); parity-test locks consciously updated (_AGENT_ID_COLUMNS + KEEP set). - Telegram group-config ops carry the flag (columns tuple, row mapper default-allow on NULL, update_group_config arm, explicit insert); database.py facade adds get_telegram_chat_link and converts the group-config passthrough to keyword args (eng M3). - TelegramGroupConfigResponse/UpdateRequest carry allow_proactive (Invariant #14; the response model IS the GET field allowlist). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
obasilakis
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…on (ent#237) Adds the REST surface for multi-source: list, create, update, delete, and per-source sync, plus the SkillSourceCreate/SkillSourceUpdate models in models.py (invariant #14). Every MUTATING route carries `reject_agent_principal` in ADDITION to `require_admin`, and that is load-bearing, not padding. `require_admin` answers "what role", never "is this a human": an agent-scoped MCP key resolves to its owner CARRYING the owner's role, so on a default admin-owned install every agent's injected TRINITY_MCP_API_KEY satisfies it (ent#293 — the third occurrence after trinity-ops-agent#232 → #1644 → #1816). Registering a source is the GRANT action from the learnings.md grant-vs-use distinction: it decides which repo the fleet executes code from, and skills are instructions Claude follows. A prompt-injected agent able to add its own source would get unattended, fleet-wide, persistent prompt injection — the exact chain ent#293 documents, reopened through a new door. ent#237 removes that issue's step-1 target (`skills_library_url`), so shipping these routes with only `assert_admin` would have re-created the hole it closes. Reading and syncing an already-configured source is USE, so those stay role-gated only. Other boundary decisions: * `is_default` is absent from BOTH models — a caller must not be able to claim the bundled source's trust posture (tag-pinned, ours to bump) for an arbitrary repo. The db layer refuses it too, so adding the field back here cannot silently start working. * the SSRF allowlist (#179) runs on write, so a bad URL is rejected at the boundary instead of surfacing later as a recurring sync failure * distinct 409s for duplicate-(url,ref) vs default-already-exists, so the UI can say which * audit is best-effort — a logging failure must not undo a completed write * list is admin-only because the rows carry repo URLs, which for a private source are themselves sensitive; the per-agent Skills tab gets `source_name` from GET /skills/library instead, which exposes no URLs Tests pin the gate statically (an integration test needs a live app + DB, and this must fail the moment a new mutating route lands without it) plus a guards-the-guard test that fails on any unreviewed POST/PUT/DELETE under /skills/sources. Mutation-verified: dropping the call from one handler fails exactly one test. Also fixes a leaky test: the adoption tests assigned `ss.get_skills_library_url` directly instead of via monkeypatch. Since skill_service imports those getters by value, the assignment persisted for the whole session and made every later sync adopt the fixture repo as an extra source — surfacing as unrelated failures once random ordering moved them. 46 tests now pass on three consecutive randomized orderings. Refs Abilityai/trinity-enterprise#237
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Description
Add internal health endpoint, without which the application didn't start locally