diff --git a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md
index 6fd9561221d..e2e81458451 100644
--- a/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md
+++ b/docs-site/src/content/docs/reference/proxy-formats.md
@@ -688,3 +688,17 @@ that repair, it becomes a normal user message. If a current v2 task remains genu
 but the selected routed target cannot read native ChatGPT ciphertext, opencodex fails with
 `unreadable_encrypted_agent_task` instead of sending unreadable bytes to that provider. See
 [Sub-agent Surface](/guides/sub-agent-surface/) for the client behavior around worker tasks.
+
+History is handled too, and differently, because losing a replayed message should not end a
+conversation. A replayed `agent_message` that mixes readable text with backend ciphertext cannot
+be lowered to a public message, so a routed Responses destination would otherwise receive the
+ciphertext along with an item type only the ChatGPT backend declares. Before dispatch, opencodex
+replaces that ciphertext with `[encrypted content omitted]` — the same marker it already
+substitutes after an upstream decrypt failure — which leaves the item lowerable and the readable
+text intact. The provider never sees the ciphertext or the private item, and the conversation
+continues. Combo targets are repaired individually, since each receives its own copy of the
+request. The canonical ChatGPT Codex backend is exempt because it is the destination that minted
+and can read those bytes; a `forward` provider pointed at any other origin is not exempt.
+Explicitly trusted `allowEncryptedV2AgentTasks` routes and translated Chat or Anthropic wires are
+unaffected, as are other item types such as reasoning and tool-output blobs, which keep their
+existing decrypt-failure recovery.
diff --git a/src/server/responses.ts b/src/server/responses.ts
index 2a446619a26..4187e4ff2e3 100644
--- a/src/server/responses.ts
+++ b/src/server/responses.ts
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { requestPacingOverloadResponse } from "./responses/pacing-overload";
 
 export { buildToolBridgeMaps, isV1CollabSurface, collabSurface, multiAgentGuidanceText, V2_GUIDANCE_CHAR_BUDGET, injectDeveloperMessage } from "./responses/collaboration";
 export type { MultiAgentGuidanceOptions, MultiAgentGuidanceDeps } from "./responses/collaboration";
-export { hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask, sanitizeEncryptedContentInPlace } from "./responses/encrypted-payload";
+export { hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask, sanitizeEncryptedContentInPlace, stripAgentMessageCiphertextInPlace } from "./responses/encrypted-payload";
 export { COMPACT_RESPONSE_MAX_BYTES, bufferCompactResponse } from "./responses/compact";
 export { disableResponsesRequestTimeout, safeHostLabel, fetchWithHeaderTimeout } from "./responses/fetch-helpers";
 export { sidecarOutcomeRecorder, isShadowSourceModel, codexLogAccountId, usesCodexForwardPoolAuth, codexForwardTerminalOutcomeRecorder, decodeRequestErrorResponse, buildComboChildHeaders, linkAbortSignal } from "./responses/core";
diff --git a/src/server/responses/core.ts b/src/server/responses/core.ts
index 87124ab57f0..bfd3a5dc7eb 100644
--- a/src/server/responses/core.ts
+++ b/src/server/responses/core.ts
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ import type { EffectiveSubagentRoster, SpawnAgentSurface } from "../../codex/cat
 
 import { buildToolBridgeMaps, collabSurface, injectDeveloperMessage, multiAgentGuidanceText } from "./collaboration";
 import { mapCodexAuthContextErrorToResponse, nativeMainRefreshFailureResponse } from "./codex-auth-error";
-import { hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask, looksLikeBackendCiphertext, sanitizeEncryptedContentInPlace } from "./encrypted-payload";
+import { hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask, looksLikeBackendCiphertext, sanitizeEncryptedContentInPlace, stripAgentMessageCiphertextInPlace } from "./encrypted-payload";
 import { fetchWithHeaderTimeout, providerFetch, safeHostLabel, safeOriginLabel, storedPoolReplayDispatchNotifier, type ProviderFetchOptions } from "./fetch-helpers";
 import { classifyTransportFailureKind, transportErrorCode } from "../../lib/upstream-reachability";
 import {
@@ -4024,6 +4024,49 @@ async function handleResponsesInner(
     return unreadableEncryptedAgentTaskResponse(recoveryFailureReason);
   }
 
+  // The guard above asks whether the CURRENT worker task is readable, and it only inspects the
+  // tail item. An `agent_message` that mixes readable text with backend ciphertext answers
+  // "readable" to that question at every position, so it passed -- and then
+  // `normalizeRoutedAgentMessages` refused to lower it, because lowering requires every part to
+  // be representable. The raw Responses passthrough serialized the private item as it stood, so
+  // backend ciphertext and an item type only the Codex backend declares reached a third-party
+  // provider, which answered `422 unknown item type "agent_message"` (#4454).
+  //
+  // The opaque-blob path already knows the repair: replace the undecryptable part with an
+  // omission marker, which leaves the item lowerable. It applied that repair only AFTER an
+  // upstream rejection. For a destination that cannot accept the private item under any
+  // circumstances, that round trip was never going to succeed and sent the ciphertext to find
+  // out, so do the repair here instead. Recovery above has already had its chance to turn the
+  // same bytes into real plaintext; only what it could not rescue reaches this.
+  if (inboundWire === "responses" && !finalRouteCanPassThroughEncryptedTask) {
+    // Only the raw Responses passthrough puts input items on the wire verbatim, so that is the
+    // only wire this has to repair: translated wires rebuild the body from parsed messages, where
+    // `inputContentParts` drops an encrypted part instead of forwarding it. The exemption is the
+    // canonical Codex backend alone, because it is the one destination that minted these bytes and
+    // can read them. `authMode: "forward"` is NOT that test -- a noncanonical forward gateway is
+    // somebody else's server that happens to be configured for passthrough, and it receives the
+    // ciphertext like any other third party.
+    //
+    // Combo children run this too. Each child carries its own `structuredClone` of the body
+    // (`concreteComboRequestBody`) and its own concrete route, so a sibling's repair is invisible
+    // here and a target that resolves to a routed Responses wire would otherwise send the
+    // ciphertext that the parent's own dispatch no longer does.
+    const wireProvider = resolveWireProtocolOverride(
+      route.providerName,
+      route.modelId,
+      route.provider,
+      inboundWire,
+    );
+    if (wireProvider.adapter === "openai-responses" && !isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider(wireProvider)) {
+      const repaired = stripAgentMessageCiphertextInPlace((body as { input?: unknown } | undefined)?.input);
+      if (repaired > 0) {
+        console.warn(
+          `[opencodex] replaced ciphertext in ${repaired} replayed agent message(s) with an omission marker; the selected provider cannot read native ChatGPT ciphertext`,
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
   // The canonical ChatGPT backend rejects previous_response_id, so a local replay miss leaves no
   // safe way to recover the omitted history. Fail before auth, adapter construction, or upstream
   // I/O instead of stripping the id and silently forwarding a context-free delta (#702).
diff --git a/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts b/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts
index 82d4b0514eb..066bb9b5226 100644
--- a/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts
+++ b/src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts
@@ -319,6 +319,167 @@ export function hasEncryptedContentPart(content: unknown): boolean {
 }
 
 
+/** The marker `prepareOpaqueBlobRecovery` already substitutes for an undecryptable part. */
+export const OMITTED_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_TEXT = "[encrypted content omitted]";
+
+/**
+ * The Fernet WIRE shape, without validating the body: version prefix, base64url alphabet, and a
+ * canonical encoded length. Free text is judged by this rather than by
+ * `looksLikeBackendCiphertext`, which is length >= 64 over a character class that a SHA-256 hex
+ * digest matches exactly at 64 characters -- as do a SHA-512 digest, a long key, and adjacent
+ * short encoded fragments. An `encrypted_content` slot carries ciphertext by definition and is
+ * stripped whatever it holds; a text part does not, and replacing a digest a child deliberately
+ * printed would destroy readable content to protect bytes that were never secret.
+ */
+const FERNET_SHAPED = /^g[A-Za-z0-9_-]+={0,2}$/;
+
+function looksLikeFernetToken(text: string): boolean {
+  return text.length >= 100 && text.length % 4 === 0 && FERNET_SHAPED.test(text);
+}
+
+function textWithRunsOmitted(payload: string, runs: readonly FernetTokenRun[]): string {
+  let last = 0;
+  let out = "";
+  for (const run of runs) {
+    out += payload.slice(last, run.index) + OMITTED_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_TEXT;
+    last = run.index + run.token.length;
+  }
+  return out + payload.slice(last);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Replace ciphertext inside `agent_message` items with an omission marker, so
+ * `normalizeRoutedAgentMessages` can lower them onto public messages. Returns how many items
+ * were repaired. Items are replaced rather than mutated, and every other item type is left
+ * alone: reasoning and function-output blobs keep their own reactive recovery.
+ *
+ * `hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask` above answers a different question: can the CURRENT worker
+ * task be read at all? It inspects only the tail item and reports false the moment any plaintext
+ * survives the envelope. `normalizeRoutedAgentMessages` asks the opposite question -- is EVERY
+ * part lowerable? -- and forwards the private item verbatim when one is not. A mixed
+ * `input_text` + `encrypted_content` item answers "readable" to the first and "not lowerable"
+ * to the second, so it fell between them: the guard never fired, the adapter refused to lower it,
+ * and the raw Responses passthrough put a private item and backend ciphertext on the wire
+ * (#4454). Position was never the discriminator -- a replayed child result lands mid-history and
+ * the tail-only scan cannot see it -- but the tail is equally exposed when it is mixed.
+ *
+ * This is the repair `prepareOpaqueBlobRecovery` performs after an upstream rejection, applied
+ * before dispatch for a destination that cannot accept the private item under any circumstances.
+ * The round trip it replaces was never going to succeed, and it sent ciphertext to a third party
+ * to find that out. Nothing is decrypted, and nothing readable is lost: the parent could not read
+ * these bytes either.
+ *
+ * The two kinds of slot are judged differently, because they carry different guarantees. An
+ * `encrypted_content` slot holds ciphertext by definition, so it is stripped whatever it holds:
+ * demanding a well-formed token there would reopen this defect one payload later, since a
+ * truncated token, a standard-base64 blob carrying `+` or `/`, an unexpected version byte, or a
+ * run past the recovery size limits would each keep the item and forward the bytes.
+ *
+ * A text part carries no such guarantee, so it is matched strictly: embedded runs that validate
+ * as Fernet, or a whole slot with the Fernet wire shape. A loose character-class test would be
+ * worse than the defect for that half -- a SHA-256 digest is exactly 64 characters of
+ * `[A-Za-z0-9]` and would be replaced with a marker, silently deleting something a child
+ * deliberately printed.
+ */
+export function stripAgentMessageCiphertextInPlace(input: unknown): number {
+  if (!Array.isArray(input)) return 0;
+  let repaired = 0;
+  for (let index = 0; index < input.length; index += 1) {
+    const item = input[index];
+    if (!item || typeof item !== "object" || Array.isArray(item)) continue;
+    const record = item as Record<string, unknown>;
+    if (record.type !== "agent_message") continue;
+    const content = record.content;
+    if (typeof content === "string") {
+      const replaced = textWithoutCiphertext(content);
+      if (replaced === content) continue;
+      input[index] = { ...record, content: replaced };
+      repaired += 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (!Array.isArray(content)) continue;
+    const parts = contentWithoutCiphertext(content);
+    if (parts === content) continue;
+    input[index] = { ...record, content: parts };
+    repaired += 1;
+  }
+  return repaired;
+}
+
+/** Free text: drop embedded token runs, and replace a slot that is nothing but a token. */
+function textWithoutCiphertext(text: string): string {
+  const runs = fernetTokenRuns(text);
+  if (runs.length > 0) return textWithRunsOmitted(text, runs);
+  return looksLikeFernetToken(text.trim()) ? OMITTED_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_TEXT : text;
+}
+
+function ciphertextTextOfPart(part: unknown): string | undefined {
+  if (!part || typeof part !== "object") return undefined;
+  const record = part as { type?: unknown; text?: unknown };
+  return (record.type === "input_text" || record.type === "text") && typeof record.text === "string"
+    ? record.text
+    : undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Adjacent text slots that are one token between them. Each fragment can be too short to judge on
+ * its own, which is the text-side twin of the split `encrypted_content` run. The join must still
+ * be Fernet-shaped, so two ordinary encoded fragments do not become a marker by being adjacent.
+ */
+function joinedCiphertextTextParts(content: readonly unknown[]): Set<object> {
+  const flagged = new Set<object>();
+  let run: Array<{ part: object; text: string }> = [];
+  const finish = (): void => {
+    if (run.length > 1 && looksLikeFernetToken(run.map(entry => entry.text).join(""))) {
+      for (const entry of run) flagged.add(entry.part);
+    }
+    run = [];
+  };
+  for (const part of content) {
+    const text = ciphertextTextOfPart(part);
+    if (text === undefined || text.trim().length === 0 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+={0,2}$/.test(text)) {
+      finish();
+      continue;
+    }
+    run.push({ part: part as object, text });
+  }
+  finish();
+  return flagged;
+}
+
+function contentWithoutCiphertext(content: unknown[]): unknown[] {
+  let changed = false;
+  const joined = joinedCiphertextTextParts(content);
+  const parts = content.map((part: unknown) => {
+    if (!part || typeof part !== "object") return part;
+    if (joined.has(part)) {
+      changed = true;
+      return { type: "input_text", text: OMITTED_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_TEXT };
+    }
+    const record = part as { type?: unknown; text?: unknown; encrypted_content?: unknown };
+    if (record.type === "encrypted_content" && typeof record.encrypted_content === "string") {
+      changed = true;
+      // Keep whatever plaintext a recognizable slot carries around its token; a slot this
+      // cannot parse is replaced whole rather than forwarded on the chance that it is benign.
+      const runs = fernetTokenRuns(record.encrypted_content);
+      return {
+        type: "input_text",
+        text: runs.length > 0
+          ? textWithRunsOmitted(record.encrypted_content, runs)
+          : OMITTED_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT_TEXT,
+      };
+    }
+    const text = ciphertextTextOfPart(part);
+    if (text === undefined) return part;
+    const replaced = textWithoutCiphertext(text);
+    if (replaced === text) return part;
+    changed = true;
+    return { ...record, text: replaced };
+  });
+  return changed ? parts : content;
+}
+
+
 
 export function sanitizeEncryptedContentInPlace(input: unknown): number {
   if (!Array.isArray(input)) return 0;
diff --git a/structure/subagents.md b/structure/subagents.md
index 98c827ffa7d..6cd17a3b91b 100644
--- a/structure/subagents.md
+++ b/structure/subagents.md
@@ -148,6 +148,66 @@ unreadable split-token shapes. The sanitizer preserves just those fragment objec
 normalizing independent plaintext slots. Detection never authorizes reconstruction or recovery;
 other fragment layouts and mixed readable content retain their documented residual boundaries.
 
+## Routed agent-message ciphertext egress
+
+Two questions about an `agent_message` were asked in two places, and the gap between them was
+open. `hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask` asks whether the CURRENT worker task can be read and
+inspects only the tail item; `normalizeRoutedAgentMessages` asks whether EVERY part can be lowered
+onto a public message and forwards the private item verbatim when one cannot. An item mixing
+`input_text` with `encrypted_content` is readable by the first measure and unlowerable by the
+second, so it passed the guard, kept its private type through the raw Responses passthrough, and
+left the process as backend ciphertext plus an item type only the Codex backend declares. The
+destination answered `422 unknown item type "agent_message"` after the bytes were already sent.
+Position was incidental: a replayed child result sits mid-history, where a tail-only scan cannot
+see it, and the tail is exposed the same way once it is mixed.
+
+The repair already existed reactively. `prepareOpaqueBlobRecovery` replaces an undecryptable part
+with `[encrypted content omitted]`, which leaves the item lowerable, and it ran after an upstream
+rejection. A destination that cannot accept the private item under any circumstances was never
+going to answer that request, so the round trip only served to send the ciphertext.
+`stripAgentMessageCiphertextInPlace` in `src/server/responses/encrypted-payload.ts` applies the
+same repair before dispatch, and `src/server/responses/core.ts` runs it against the final route,
+after `expandPreviousResponseInput`, after the sanitizer has rewritten plaintext parked in
+encrypted slots, and after encrypted-task recovery has had its chance to produce real plaintext
+instead of a marker.
+
+The two kinds of slot are judged differently, because they carry different guarantees. An
+`encrypted_content` slot holds ciphertext by definition, so it is stripped whatever it holds:
+demanding a well-formed token there would reopen the same defect one payload later, since a
+truncated token, a standard-base64 blob carrying `+` or `/`, an unexpected version byte, or a run
+past the recovery size limits would each keep the item and forward the bytes. A text part carries
+no such guarantee, so it is matched strictly -- embedded runs that validate as Fernet, or a whole
+slot with the Fernet wire shape, which is the version prefix, the base64url alphabet and a
+canonical length of at least 100 divisible by four. Adjacent text fragments are joined before that
+test, so a token split across slots is still caught. `looksLikeBackendCiphertext` is deliberately
+NOT used on text: it is length >= 64 over a character class that a SHA-256 digest matches exactly
+at 64 characters, and replacing a digest a child deliberately printed would delete readable content
+to protect bytes that were never secret. Other item types are untouched: reasoning and
+function-output blobs keep the reactive opaque-blob recovery, which still rescues a destination
+that merely failed to decrypt something it was entitled to read, and which stays reachable for the
+canonical backend and for explicitly trusted routes.
+
+The repair resolves the same wire override the adapter is built from rather than restating routing
+policy, and runs for `openai-responses` whenever the destination is not the canonical Codex
+backend. `authMode: "forward"` is deliberately not that test: it describes how this proxy treats
+credentials, not who answers, and a forward-configured gateway at another origin receives the
+ciphertext like any third party. Only `isCanonicalOpenAiForwardProvider` is exempt, because it
+alone minted these bytes and can read them. The wire override matters for the reported destination,
+where the provider row names the Chat wire and a registry model default moves the model onto
+Responses. Translated wires are untouched because `inputContentParts` drops an encrypted part
+instead of forwarding it, and `canPassThroughEncryptedV2AgentTask` keeps an explicitly trusted
+route exempt. Combo children run the repair themselves: `concreteComboRequestBody` gives each
+target its own `structuredClone` and its own concrete route, so a sibling's repair is invisible to
+them and a target resolving to a routed Responses wire would otherwise send what the parent's own
+dispatch no longer does.
+
+Nothing here decrypts, and the tail NEW_TASK envelope keeps `unreadable_encrypted_agent_task` and
+its opt-in recovery unchanged: an unreadable current task still fails closed rather than reaching a
+child with a marker where its assignment should be. An `agent_message` carrying unknown parts but
+no ciphertext still reaches the wire unchanged and still draws the destination's own 422, which is
+a compatibility gap rather than an egress one. Covered by
+`tests/server/v2-agent-message-failfast.test.ts`.
+
 ## Subagents
 
 New non-OAuth provider registrations carry `initialModelSelection` with a unique
diff --git a/structure/transports/responses.md b/structure/transports/responses.md
index c00d08f18c8..1f1bd3cd2fb 100644
--- a/structure/transports/responses.md
+++ b/structure/transports/responses.md
@@ -288,12 +288,12 @@ call when `isXaiResponsesDestination` recognizes HTTPS `api.x.ai` or `cli-chat-p
 on the standard port. A nonblank string becomes one `input_text` part with the original text;
 the same author/recipient attribution is retained and the private transport item id is removed.
 
-This addresses readable child-result delivery (#3907), not scheduling or decryption. Blank,
-malformed, ciphertext-only and mixed unknown/encrypted content retains the existing fail-closed
-path. Forward destinations never enable the option. The parser and encrypted-task recovery
-owners are unchanged, and no broad content-schema validation or adapter-wide string conversion
-is introduced. Mocked server fixtures cover parent, child, and parent-result continuation over
-SSE and JSON while preserving actual tool-call/result pairs.
+This addresses readable child-result delivery (#3907), not scheduling or decryption. Blank, malformed,
+ciphertext-only and mixed unknown/encrypted content stays unlowered here; backend ciphertext is replaced by the
+[omission marker](../subagents.md#routed-agent-message-ciphertext-egress) before it can reach a routed destination.
+Forward destinations never enable the option. The parser and encrypted-task recovery owners are unchanged, and no
+broad content-schema validation or adapter-wide string conversion is introduced. Mocked server fixtures cover
+parent, child, and parent-result continuation over SSE and JSON while preserving actual tool-call/result pairs.
 
 OpenCode Go documents `gpt-5.6-luna` on `/zen/go/v1/responses` while sibling models use its Chat or
 Anthropic endpoints. The built-in preset therefore selects `openai-responses` only for Luna and
diff --git a/tests/responses/responses-opaque-blob-recovery.test.ts b/tests/responses/responses-opaque-blob-recovery.test.ts
index 87eb74f9232..d36e67e4837 100644
--- a/tests/responses/responses-opaque-blob-recovery.test.ts
+++ b/tests/responses/responses-opaque-blob-recovery.test.ts
@@ -155,9 +155,11 @@ function serializedOutboundWithEncryptedAgentMessage(): string {
 }
 
 /**
- * What a routed destination receives on the retry: recovery has replaced the undecryptable
- * part with an omission marker, which leaves the item entirely plaintext, so the adapter
- * converts it into the public user message a routed Responses schema can accept.
+ * What a routed destination receives: the undecryptable part has been replaced with an omission
+ * marker, which leaves the item entirely plaintext, so the adapter converts it into the public
+ * user message a routed Responses schema can accept. Since #4454 that repair runs before the
+ * first dispatch rather than after an upstream rejection, so this is the FIRST body such a
+ * destination sees, not a retry.
  */
 function recoveredAgentMessage(): Record<string, unknown> {
   return {
@@ -171,6 +173,19 @@ function recoveredAgentMessage(): Record<string, unknown> {
   };
 }
 
+/** The function-output twin: the reactive repair still owns this item type. */
+function recoveredFunctionOutput(): Record<string, unknown> {
+  return {
+    type: "function_call_output",
+    call_id: "call-encrypted-output",
+    output: [
+      { type: "input_text", text: "[encrypted content omitted]" },
+      { type: "input_text", text: "visible tool output" },
+      { type: "input_image", image_url: "", detail: "high" },
+    ],
+  };
+}
+
 function config(): OcxConfig {
   return {
     defaultProvider: "first",
@@ -249,6 +264,43 @@ function agentMessageRequest(stream = false): Request {
   });
 }
 
+/**
+ * The canonical Codex backend is exempt from the pre-dispatch repair (#4454), because it is the
+ * one destination that minted this ciphertext and can read it. That keeps
+ * `prepareOpaqueBlobRecovery`'s `agent_message` arm live exactly where it still makes sense: the
+ * backend failing to decrypt its own bytes.
+ */
+function nativeConfig(): OcxConfig {
+  return {
+    defaultProvider: "openai",
+    providers: {
+      openai: {
+        adapter: "openai-responses",
+        baseUrl: "https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex",
+        authMode: "forward",
+        codexAccountMode: "direct",
+      },
+    },
+  } as OcxConfig;
+}
+
+function nativeAgentMessageRequest(stream = false): Request {
+  return new Request("http://localhost/v1/responses", {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: {
+      "content-type": "application/json",
+      "x-codex-parent-thread-id": "thread-native-encrypted-agent-message",
+      authorization: "Bearer caller-codex-token",
+    },
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      model: "gpt-5.5",
+      stream,
+      store: false,
+      input: agentMessageReplayInput(),
+    }),
+  });
+}
+
 function decryptStreamResponse(wire: string, contentType: string | null): Response {
   // A string body would implicitly add text/plain even when headers are omitted.
   const response = new Response(new TextEncoder().encode(wire), {
@@ -548,11 +600,15 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
     });
   });
 
-  test("retries a ChatGPT agent-message decrypt failure once with an omission marker", async () => {
+  test("omits agent-message ciphertext before the first dispatch, with no decrypt round trip", async () => {
+    // This used to send the blob, collect `502 could not be decrypted`, repair, and retry. A
+    // routed destination was never going to decrypt a ChatGPT-minted blob, so the repair now runs
+    // first and the rejection never happens (#4454). The transient-5xx retry below is unrelated
+    // and still carries the already-repaired body.
     const outbound: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
     globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
       outbound.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)) as Record<string, unknown>);
-      return outbound.length <= 3
+      return outbound.length <= 1
         ? new Response(CHATGPT_FUNCTION_OUTPUT_DECRYPT_ERROR, {
           status: 502,
           headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
@@ -565,31 +621,79 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
     expect(response.status).toBe(200);
     await response.text();
 
+    expect(outbound).toHaveLength(2);
+    for (const sent of outbound) {
+      const input = sent.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>>;
+      expect(input.at(0)).toEqual(recoveredAgentMessage());
+      expect(JSON.stringify(sent)).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_BLOB);
+    }
+    expect((outbound.at(1)?.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).at(1))
+      .toEqual(agentMessageReplayInput().at(1));
+    expect(logCtx.activeAttempt?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["transient-5xx"]);
+  });
+
+  test("omits agent-message ciphertext before the first streamed dispatch", async () => {
+    const outbound: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      outbound.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)) as Record<string, unknown>);
+      return streamedSuccess("resp-stream-agent-message-repaired");
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+
+    const response = await handleResponses(agentMessageRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
+    const body = await response.text();
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(body).toContain("response.completed");
+    expect(outbound).toHaveLength(1);
+    const sentInput = outbound.at(0)?.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
+    expect(sentInput?.at(0)).toEqual(recoveredAgentMessage());
+    expect(JSON.stringify(outbound.at(0))).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_BLOB);
+  });
+
+  test("still retries a ChatGPT agent-message decrypt failure on the canonical backend", async () => {
+    const outbound: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      outbound.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)) as Record<string, unknown>);
+      return outbound.length <= 3
+        ? new Response(CHATGPT_FUNCTION_OUTPUT_DECRYPT_ERROR, {
+          status: 502,
+          headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+        })
+        : success("resp-native-agent-message-recovered");
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+    const logCtx: RequestLogContext = { model: "", provider: "" };
+
+    const response = await handleResponses(nativeAgentMessageRequest(), nativeConfig(), logCtx);
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    await response.text();
+
     expect(outbound).toHaveLength(4);
-    const retriedInput = outbound.at(3)?.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
-    expect(retriedInput?.at(0)).toEqual(recoveredAgentMessage());
-    expect(retriedInput?.at(1)).toEqual(agentMessageReplayInput().at(1));
+    // The blob reaches this destination, which is the point of the exemption, and only the
+    // post-rejection repair takes it back off the wire.
+    expect(JSON.stringify(outbound.at(0))).toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_BLOB);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(outbound.at(3))).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_BLOB);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(outbound.at(3))).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
     expect(logCtx.activeAttempt?.recoveryKinds).toEqual(["transient-5xx", "opaque-blob-rejection"]);
   });
 
-  test("recovers a zero-output streamed agent-message decrypt failure before client relay", async () => {
+  test("still hides a streamed agent-message decrypt failure from the client on the canonical backend", async () => {
     const outbound: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [];
     globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
       outbound.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)) as Record<string, unknown>);
       return outbound.length === 1
         ? streamedFunctionOutputDecryptFailure()
-        : streamedSuccess("resp-stream-agent-message-recovered");
+        : streamedSuccess("resp-native-stream-agent-message-recovered");
     }) as typeof fetch;
 
-    const response = await handleResponses(agentMessageRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
+    const response = await handleResponses(nativeAgentMessageRequest(true), nativeConfig(), { model: "", provider: "" });
     const body = await response.text();
 
     expect(response.status).toBe(200);
     expect(body).toContain("response.completed");
     expect(body).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_DECRYPT_MESSAGE);
     expect(outbound).toHaveLength(2);
-    const retriedInput = outbound.at(1)?.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
-    expect(retriedInput?.at(0)).toEqual(recoveredAgentMessage());
+    expect(JSON.stringify(outbound.at(0))).toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_BLOB);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(outbound.at(1))).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_BLOB);
   });
 
   test("recovers a zero-output error-event decrypt failure before client relay", async () => {
@@ -601,7 +705,9 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
         : streamedSuccess("resp-stream-error-event-recovered");
     }) as typeof fetch;
 
-    const response = await handleResponses(agentMessageRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
+    // Carried by the function-output fixture: an agent message reaches a routed destination with
+    // its ciphertext already omitted, so it no longer has a blob for the upstream to reject.
+    const response = await handleResponses(functionOutputRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
     const body = await response.text();
 
     expect(response.status).toBe(200);
@@ -609,7 +715,7 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
     expect(body).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_DECRYPT_MESSAGE);
     expect(outbound).toHaveLength(2);
     const retriedInput = outbound.at(1)?.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
-    expect(retriedInput?.at(0)).toEqual(recoveredAgentMessage());
+    expect(retriedInput?.at(1)).toEqual(recoveredFunctionOutput());
   });
 
   for (const streamMode of ["legacy-tee", "eager-relay"] as const) {
@@ -644,7 +750,7 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
         const terminals: string[] = [];
         let markTerminal!: () => void;
         const terminal = new Promise<void>(resolve => { markTerminal = resolve; });
-        const response = await handleResponses(agentMessageRequest(true), {
+        const response = await handleResponses(functionOutputRequest(true), {
           ...config(), streamMode,
         }, logCtx, { onNativePassthroughTerminal: status => {
           terminals.push(status);
@@ -684,7 +790,7 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
       return sends === 1 ? streamedFunctionOutputDecryptErrorEvent(true) : streamedSuccess("resp-identity");
     }, { preconnect: originalFetch.preconnect });
     try {
-      const response = await handleResponses(agentMessageRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
+      const response = await handleResponses(functionOutputRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
       const body = await response.text();
       expect(body).toContain("response.completed");
       expect(body).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_DECRYPT_MESSAGE);
@@ -736,7 +842,7 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
         : streamedSuccess("resp-missing-ct-error-event-recovered");
     }) as typeof fetch;
 
-    const response = await handleResponses(agentMessageRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
+    const response = await handleResponses(functionOutputRequest(true), config(), { model: "", provider: "" });
     const body = await response.text();
 
     expect(response.status).toBe(200);
@@ -744,7 +850,7 @@ describe("opaque blob recovery through /v1/responses", () => {
     expect(body).not.toContain(FUNCTION_OUTPUT_DECRYPT_MESSAGE);
     expect(outbound).toHaveLength(2);
     const retriedInput = outbound.at(1)?.input as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined;
-    expect(retriedInput?.at(0)).toEqual(recoveredAgentMessage());
+    expect(retriedInput?.at(1)).toEqual(recoveredFunctionOutput());
   });
 
   test("absent Content-Type decrypt stream does not recover a non-stream request", async () => {
diff --git a/tests/server/v2-agent-message-failfast.test.ts b/tests/server/v2-agent-message-failfast.test.ts
index 0d2b77dcdd8..0e0dc66a24b 100644
--- a/tests/server/v2-agent-message-failfast.test.ts
+++ b/tests/server/v2-agent-message-failfast.test.ts
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, test } from "bun:test";
+import { resolveWireProtocolOverride } from "../../src/server/adapter-resolve";
+import { structurallyValidFernetTokens } from "../../src/server/responses/encrypted-payload";
 import {
   handleResponses,
   hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask,
@@ -506,3 +508,359 @@ describe("V2 routed agent-message ciphertext guard", () => {
     expect(forwardedBody).toContain(FERNET_TASK);
   });
 });
+
+/**
+ * #4454. The guard above asks whether the CURRENT worker task is readable, and reads only the
+ * tail item. The adapter asks whether EVERY part can be lowered onto a public message. An item
+ * that mixes readable text with ciphertext answers "readable" to the first and "not lowerable"
+ * to the second, so it passed the guard, kept its private `agent_message` type through the raw
+ * Responses passthrough, and reached the provider as backend ciphertext plus an item type only
+ * the Codex backend declares. Position is incidental: a replayed child result simply tends to
+ * sit mid-history, where the tail-only scan could never have seen it.
+ *
+ * The repair is the one the opaque-blob path already applies after an upstream rejection. It
+ * runs before dispatch here, because a destination that cannot accept the private item was
+ * never going to answer that request anyway.
+ */
+describe("routed Responses agent-message ciphertext repair", () => {
+  function routedResponsesConfig(): OcxConfig {
+    return {
+      port: 0,
+      defaultProvider: "relay",
+      providers: {
+        relay: {
+          adapter: "openai-responses",
+          baseUrl: "https://relay.example/v1",
+          authMode: "key",
+          apiKey: "test-relay-key",
+        },
+      },
+    } as OcxConfig;
+  }
+
+  // The reported destination: the provider-wide adapter is the Chat wire, and the registry moves
+  // grok-4.6 onto the raw Responses passthrough for an OAuth caller speaking Responses. Reading
+  // `route.provider.adapter` would miss it, so the repair resolves the same wire override the
+  // adapter is built from.
+  function xaiOAuthResponsesConfig(): OcxConfig {
+    return {
+      port: 0,
+      defaultProvider: "xai",
+      providers: {
+        xai: { adapter: "openai-chat", baseUrl: "https://api.x.ai/v1", authMode: "oauth" },
+      },
+    } as OcxConfig;
+  }
+
+  function mixedChildResult(): Record<string, unknown> {
+    return {
+      type: "agent_message",
+      author: "/root/child",
+      recipient: "/root",
+      content: [
+        { type: "input_text", text: "the child finished the migration" },
+        { type: "encrypted_content", encrypted_content: FERNET_TASK },
+      ],
+    };
+  }
+
+  const userTurn = { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "continue" }] };
+
+  function captureOutbound(model: string): () => string[] {
+    const bodies: string[] = [];
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (_input, init) => {
+      bodies.push(typeof init?.body === "string" ? init.body : "");
+      return Response.json({
+        id: "resp_repaired",
+        object: "response",
+        status: "completed",
+        model,
+        output: [],
+        usage: { input_tokens: 1, output_tokens: 1, total_tokens: 2 },
+      });
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+    return () => bodies;
+  }
+
+  test("repairs a mixed child result replayed behind a later user turn", async () => {
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [mixedChildResult(), userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()).toHaveLength(1);
+    const sent = outbound()[0]!;
+    expect(sent).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(sent).not.toContain("gAAAA");
+    expect(sent).not.toContain("agent_message");
+    expect(sent).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+    // The readable half of the item survives: only the bytes nobody could read are replaced.
+    expect(sent).toContain("the child finished the migration");
+  });
+
+  test("repairs the same shape at the tail, where the readability guard reports readable", async () => {
+    const input = [mixedChildResult()];
+    // The gap itself: this is the guard that was supposed to be the boundary.
+    expect(hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask(input)).toBe(false);
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", input);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain("agent_message");
+  });
+
+  test("omits ciphertext that arrives as text rather than in an encrypted slot", async () => {
+    // #3021 saw a delegated reply reach the parent as raw `gAAAA...` text. The readability guard
+    // reports it readable, and the xAI lowering path would have forwarded it as prose.
+    const input = [{ type: "agent_message", author: "/root/child", recipient: "/root", content: FERNET_TASK }];
+    expect(hasUnreadableEncryptedAgentTask(input)).toBe(false);
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", input);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+  });
+
+  test("the reported xAI destination resolves onto the raw Responses wire", () => {
+    // The repair has to see this destination as the passthrough it becomes, not as the Chat wire
+    // the provider row names. The dispatch itself needs an OAuth credential this fixture has no
+    // business minting, so the wire resolution is asserted directly.
+    const provider = xaiOAuthResponsesConfig().providers.xai!;
+    expect(resolveWireProtocolOverride("xai", "grok-4.6", provider, "responses").adapter)
+      .toBe("openai-responses");
+    expect(provider.adapter).toBe("openai-chat");
+  });
+
+  test("leaves a fully readable child result exactly as the adapter already lowered it", async () => {
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [{
+      type: "agent_message",
+      author: "/root/child",
+      recipient: "/root",
+      content: [{ type: "input_text", text: "the child finished the migration" }],
+    }, userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("the child finished the migration");
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain("agent_message");
+  });
+
+  test("leaves a translated Chat destination on its existing path", async () => {
+    // The private item never reaches that wire: the parser rebuilds the body from messages and
+    // drops an encrypted part outright, so there is nothing to repair and no marker to add.
+    let forwardedBody = "";
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (_input, init) => {
+      forwardedBody = typeof init?.body === "string" ? init.body : "";
+      return Response.json({
+        id: "chatcmpl_routed",
+        object: "chat.completion",
+        model: "grok-4.5",
+        choices: [{ index: 0, message: { role: "assistant", content: "ok" }, finish_reason: "stop" }],
+        usage: { prompt_tokens: 1, completion_tokens: 1, total_tokens: 2 },
+      });
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+
+    const response = await post(routedConfig(), "xai/grok-4.5", [mixedChildResult(), userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwardedBody).toContain("the child finished the migration");
+    expect(forwardedBody).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(forwardedBody).not.toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+  });
+
+  test("leaves a forward destination's private item and ciphertext untouched", async () => {
+    let forwardedBody = "";
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (_input, init) => {
+      forwardedBody = typeof init?.body === "string" ? init.body : "";
+      return Response.json({
+        id: "resp_native_mixed",
+        object: "response",
+        status: "completed",
+        model: "gpt-5.5",
+        output: [],
+        usage: { input_tokens: 1, output_tokens: 1, total_tokens: 2 },
+      });
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+
+    const response = await post(nativeConfig(), "gpt-5.5", [mixedChildResult(), userTurn], {
+      authorization: "Bearer caller-codex-token",
+    });
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(forwardedBody).toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(forwardedBody).toContain("agent_message");
+  });
+
+  test("repairs a noncanonical forward gateway, which is not the backend that minted the bytes", async () => {
+    // `authMode: "forward"` describes how this proxy treats credentials, not who is on the other
+    // end. Only the canonical Codex backend can read its own ciphertext, so a forward-configured
+    // gateway at somebody else's origin is a third party like any other.
+    const config = {
+      port: 0,
+      defaultProvider: "relayfwd",
+      providers: {
+        relayfwd: { adapter: "openai-responses", baseUrl: "https://relay.example/v1", authMode: "forward" },
+      },
+    } as OcxConfig;
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(config, "relayfwd/child-model", [mixedChildResult(), userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+  });
+
+  test("repairs a combo child, which carries its own clone of the body", async () => {
+    // `concreteComboRequestBody` structuredClones the body per target, so a repair applied on the
+    // parent's own dispatch is invisible here. A combo target that resolves to a routed Responses
+    // wire has to run the repair itself or it sends the ciphertext the parent no longer does.
+    const config = {
+      port: 0,
+      defaultProvider: "relay",
+      providers: {
+        relay: {
+          adapter: "openai-responses",
+          baseUrl: "https://relay.example/v1",
+          authMode: "key",
+          apiKey: "test-relay-key",
+        },
+      },
+      combos: { routed: { strategy: "failover", targets: [{ provider: "relay", model: "child-model" }] } },
+    } as OcxConfig;
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(config, "combo/routed", [mixedChildResult(), userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain("agent_message");
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+  });
+
+  test("repairs a run split across consecutive encrypted slots", async () => {
+    // Each half fails structural validation on its own and only the join is a real token. A
+    // matcher that judged slots individually would forward both halves.
+    const first = FERNET_TASK.slice(0, 60);
+    const second = FERNET_TASK.slice(60);
+    expect(structurallyValidFernetTokens(first)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(structurallyValidFernetTokens(second)).toEqual([]);
+    expect(structurallyValidFernetTokens(`${first}${second}`)).toEqual([FERNET_TASK]);
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [{
+      type: "agent_message",
+      author: "/root/child",
+      recipient: "/root",
+      content: [
+        { type: "input_text", text: "Message Type: MESSAGE\nTask name: /root\nSender: /root/child\nPayload:" },
+        { type: "encrypted_content", encrypted_content: first },
+        { type: "encrypted_content", encrypted_content: second },
+      ],
+    }, userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(first);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(second);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain("agent_message");
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+  });
+
+  test("repairs a token embedded inside a text part and keeps the prose around it", async () => {
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [{
+      type: "agent_message",
+      author: "/root/child",
+      recipient: "/root",
+      content: [{ type: "input_text", text: `the child replied ${FERNET_TASK} and stopped` }],
+    }, userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("the child replied [encrypted content omitted] and stopped");
+  });
+
+  test("leaves readable text that only resembles an encoded blob", async () => {
+    // An `encrypted_content` slot carries ciphertext by definition, so it is stripped whatever it
+    // holds. A text part does not. Judging text by a loose character class would be worse than the
+    // defect for that half: a SHA-256 digest is exactly 64 characters of the same alphabet, and a
+    // child that deliberately printed one would have it silently deleted.
+    const readable = {
+      sha256: "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
+      sha512: "cf83e1357eefb8bd".repeat(8),
+      apiKey: `sk-proj-${"A".repeat(120)}`,
+    };
+    for (const [name, text] of Object.entries(readable)) {
+      const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+      const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [{
+        type: "agent_message",
+        author: "/root/child",
+        recipient: "/root",
+        content: [{ type: "input_text", text: `digest ${text}` }, { type: "input_text", text }],
+      }, userTurn]);
+
+      expect(response.status, name).toBe(200);
+      expect(outbound()[0], name).toContain(text);
+      expect(outbound()[0], name).not.toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("repairs a token split across adjacent text parts", async () => {
+    // The text-side twin of the split encrypted slot. The join must still be Fernet-shaped, so
+    // two ordinary encoded fragments do not become a marker merely by being adjacent.
+    const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+    const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [{
+      type: "agent_message",
+      author: "/root/child",
+      recipient: "/root",
+      content: [
+        { type: "input_text", text: FERNET_TASK.slice(0, 60) },
+        { type: "input_text", text: FERNET_TASK.slice(60) },
+      ],
+    }, userTurn]);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(outbound()[0]).not.toContain(FERNET_TASK.slice(0, 60));
+    expect(outbound()[0]).toContain("[encrypted content omitted]");
+  });
+
+  test("repairs a slot that is not a well-formed token, including standard base64", async () => {
+    // The original defect reached the wire because an item was not lowerable. Recognizing only
+    // canonical Fernet would reopen it one payload later: a truncated token, a bad version byte,
+    // or standard base64 carrying + and / would each keep the item and forward the bytes.
+    const nearMisses = {
+      truncated: FERNET_TASK.slice(0, 96),
+      standardBase64: `gAAA+${"B".repeat(120)}/x==`,
+      badVersion: `h${FERNET_TASK.slice(1)}`,
+    };
+    for (const [name, blob] of Object.entries(nearMisses)) {
+      expect(structurallyValidFernetTokens(blob)).toEqual([]);
+      const outbound = captureOutbound("relay-model");
+
+      const response = await post(routedResponsesConfig(), "relay/child-model", [{
+        type: "agent_message",
+        author: "/root/child",
+        recipient: "/root",
+        content: [
+          { type: "input_text", text: "visible child result" },
+          { type: "encrypted_content", encrypted_content: blob },
+        ],
+      }, userTurn]);
+
+      expect(response.status, name).toBe(200);
+      expect(outbound()[0], name).not.toContain(blob);
+      expect(outbound()[0], name).not.toContain("agent_message");
+      expect(outbound()[0], name).toContain("visible child result");
+    }
+  });
+});