Date: 2024-01-XX
Application: JustDB - PostgreSQL Database Explorer
Severity Levels: CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW
Location: lib/db.ts:executeQuery(), app/api/query/route.ts
Issue: User-provided SQL queries are executed directly without validation, sanitization, or whitelisting. This allows arbitrary SQL execution including:
- Data exfiltration
- Data modification/deletion
- Database schema changes
- Privilege escalation
Risk: Complete database compromise
Recommendation:
- Implement query whitelisting (only allow SELECT statements)
- Add query parsing and validation
- Implement query timeout limits
- Restrict to read-only operations for production
Location: app/api/connect/route.ts:33-40
Issue: Database credentials (including passwords) are stored in cookies using base64 encoding, which is NOT encryption. Base64 is easily reversible.
Risk:
- Credentials exposed if cookies are intercepted
- XSS attacks can read cookies
- Credentials visible in browser DevTools
Recommendation:
- Encrypt credentials before storing in cookies using AES-256
- Use server-side session storage instead of cookies for sensitive data
- Implement proper key management
- Consider using secure session tokens instead
Location: All API routes
Issue: The application has no user authentication. Anyone with access to the application can:
- Connect to any database
- Execute arbitrary queries
- Access all data
Risk: Unauthorized database access
Recommendation:
- Implement user authentication (JWT, session-based, or OAuth)
- Add role-based access control (RBAC)
- Implement database connection restrictions per user
- Add audit logging
Location: lib/db.ts:23, lib/db.ts:35
Issue: rejectUnauthorized: false disables SSL certificate validation, making the application vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.
Risk: Database credentials and data can be intercepted
Recommendation:
- Enable SSL certificate validation in production
- Use proper CA certificates
- Make SSL validation configurable but default to secure
Location: All API routes
Issue: API endpoints have no rate limiting, allowing:
- Brute force attacks
- DoS attacks
- Resource exhaustion
Risk: Service disruption, abuse
Recommendation:
- Implement rate limiting per IP/user
- Use middleware like
express-rate-limitor Next.js middleware - Set appropriate limits for different endpoints
Location: All API routes
Issue: Database error messages are returned directly to clients, potentially revealing:
- Database structure
- Table names
- Column names
- Internal errors
Risk: Information leakage for reconnaissance
Recommendation:
- Sanitize error messages
- Log detailed errors server-side only
- Return generic error messages to clients
- Implement error logging
Location: All POST endpoints
Issue: No CSRF tokens on state-changing operations (connect, disconnect, query execution).
Risk: Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks
Recommendation:
- Implement CSRF tokens
- Use SameSite cookie attribute (already set to 'lax', consider 'strict')
- Validate Origin/Referer headers
Location: lib/db.ts:executeQuery()
Issue: Queries can run indefinitely, potentially:
- Exhausting database connections
- Causing DoS
- Hanging the application
Risk: Resource exhaustion, service disruption
Recommendation:
- Implement query timeout (e.g., 30 seconds)
- Use connection timeout settings
- Monitor long-running queries
Location: lib/db.ts:62-66, app/api/connect/route.ts:42
Issue: Connection configurations are logged to console, potentially exposing:
- Database hosts
- Database names
- Connection details
Risk: Information leakage if logs are exposed
Recommendation:
- Remove or redact sensitive information from logs
- Use structured logging with sensitive field filtering
- Implement log rotation and secure storage
Location: Query input, connection form inputs
Issue: No maximum length validation on user inputs, allowing:
- Extremely long queries
- Buffer overflow attempts
- Resource exhaustion
Risk: DoS, potential buffer issues
Recommendation:
- Implement maximum length limits
- Validate input sizes before processing
- Set reasonable limits (e.g., 10KB for queries)
Location: lib/connection-store.ts:38-40
Issue: Session IDs use timestamp and random string, which may be predictable.
Risk: Session hijacking if predictable
Recommendation:
- Use cryptographically secure random generation (crypto.randomBytes)
- Increase entropy
- Consider using UUID v4
- Table Name Validation: Proper regex validation for table names prevents some injection
- Parameterized Queries: Table data queries use parameterized queries correctly
- HttpOnly Cookies: Session cookies use HttpOnly flag (prevents XSS cookie theft)
- Input Type Validation: Basic type checking on API inputs
- SQL Identifier Escaping: Uses
escapeIdentifier()for table names
- ✅ Encrypt database credentials in cookies (AES-256 encryption implemented)
- ✅ Implement query whitelisting/restrictions (SELECT-only queries enforced)
- ✅ Sanitize error messages (Generic error messages returned to clients)
- ✅ Add query timeout (30-second default timeout)
- ✅ Input length validation (10KB query limit, 255 char input limits)
- ✅ Stronger session ID generation (crypto.randomBytes)
- ✅ CSRF protection improvement (SameSite: strict)
⚠️ Add authentication/authorization (CRITICAL - Still needed)⚠️ Enable SSL certificate validation (HIGH - Still needed)⚠️ Implement rate limiting (MEDIUM - Still needed)⚠️ Set ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable (REQUIRED for encryption to work)
- Implement rate limiting
- Add CSRF protection
- Implement query timeouts
- Remove sensitive data from logs
- Add audit logging
- Implement query history/audit trail
- Add database connection pooling limits
- Implement monitoring and alerting
- This is a database explorer tool, so some risks are inherent (users need database access)
- Focus on preventing unauthorized access and query abuse
- Consider making this an internal tool only (behind VPN/firewall)
- Add disclaimer about security risks for production databases
- Consider read-only mode for production use
- Database credentials are now encrypted using AES-256-CBC before storing in cookies
- Encryption key must be set via
ENCRYPTION_KEYenvironment variable - Generate key:
openssl rand -hex 32
- Only SELECT queries are allowed (DROP, DELETE, UPDATE, INSERT, etc. are blocked)
- Query length limited to 10KB
- 30-second query timeout enforced
- Query validation before execution
- All connection inputs validated for length (255 char limit)
- Port number validation (1-65535)
- Table names validated with regex before use
- Generic error messages returned to clients
- Detailed errors logged server-side only
- Prevents information leakage
- Cryptographically secure session ID generation
- SameSite: strict cookies (improved CSRF protection)
- HttpOnly cookies (prevents XSS cookie theft)
# REQUIRED: Generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
ENCRYPTION_KEY=your-32-byte-hex-key-here
# Optional
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL=http://localhost:3000WARNING: Without ENCRYPTION_KEY set, the application will generate a random key on startup, but this key will change on each restart, making encrypted cookies invalid. Always set a persistent ENCRYPTION_KEY in production.